Abstract
Various authors have attempted to understand knowledge-wh—or knowledge ascriptions that include an interrogative complement. I present and explain some of the analyses offered so far and argue that each view faces some problems. I then present and explain a new analysis of knowledge-wh that avoids these problems and that offers several other advantages. Finally I raise some problems for invariantism about knowledge-wh and I argue that contextualism about knowledge-wh fits nicely with a very natural understanding of the nature of questions.
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Notes
See Schaffer (2007) for a defense of anti-reductionism.
Brogaard (forthcoming) mentions examples similar to those found below.
Schaffer claims that (4p) and (5p) respectively are equivalent to the following: (4p’) Fran knows that there is a goldfinch in the garden as the answer to the question of whether there is a goldfinch or raven in the garden. (5p’) Fran knows that there is a goldfinch in the garden as the answer to the question of whether there is a goldfinch or canary in the garden.
In a later paper, Schaffer (forthcoming) has revised this portion of his view.
Note that Schaffer (2007) includes a footnote in which he argues that there seems to be linguistic evidence that supports the inclusion of the proposition that is the answer in the logical form of the proposition expressed. First he points to the validity of existential generalization on the answer; from (1) S knows-wh, we can conclude that (2) There is an answer that s knows to the question of wh. So if I know where the car is parked, then we can conclude that there is an answer that I know to the question of where the car is parked. Next, Schaffer points to the validity of substitution for the answer. From (1) S knows-wh and (2) The answer to wh is an ADJ answer, we can conclude (3) S knows the ADJ answer to the question of wh. For example, if I know where the car is parked and the answer to the question of where the car is parked is an unfortunate answer, then I know the unfortunate answer to the question of where the car is parked. Finally Schaffer points out that we seem to be able to anaphorically refer to the answer. For instance, “I know where the car is parked. I learned it from Tom.” Here, “it” seems to be referring to the proposition that answers the question of where the car is parked. Yet the proposed view can handle this data equally well. On the current proposal, knowledge-wh is a relation between a person and a question and there must be an answer known in order for the knower to stand in the knowledge-wh relation to the question. Yet the answer to the question does not need to be contained in the proposition expressed by the knowledge attribution in order for existential generalization on and substitution for the answer to be valid. To see this, note that we also existentially generalize on, substitute for, and anaphorically refer to what is eaten in an eating attribution, even though the attribution need not refer to the thing eaten and the proposition expressed need not refer to or contain the thing eaten. So, from (1) I ate, we can conclude that (2) There is something that I ate. And from (1) I ate, and (2) The thing I ate was a delicious treat, we can conclude that (3) I ate a delicious treat. Finally, in “I ate. I thought it was really tasty.” The “it” seems to refer to the thing eaten. We see then, that the evidence Schaffer points to is certainly not an infallible guide to the constituents of the proposition expressed on any occasion. While the evidence seems to indicate that there must be an answer to the question, it does not suggest that the answer is included in the logical form of the proposition expressed.
cf. Bach (2005, 3).
Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this concern.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this worry.
Here I use the term “contextualist” to refer to those who are contextualists about knowledge-wh and to refer to those who are contextualists about interrogatives. It seems that, in many cases, those who are contextualists about knowledge-wh are contextualists about knowledge-wh because they think that the question being asked with a certain interrogative sentence can vary from context to context. Certainly one can be a contextualist about knowledge-wh in other ways, but I am not concerned with the other kinds of contextualism about knowledge-wh here.
The alleged problem and this possible reply are discussed in Groenendijk and Stokhof (1994, 1111).
Thanks to Jonathan Schaffer here.
The example is similar to one from Sterelny (1988, 655).
The example is similar to one found in Higginbotham (1996).
cf. Higginbotham (1996).
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Acknowledgments
Many thanks to Kristoffer Ahlstrom, Indrani Bhattacharjee, Jeremy Cushing, Daniel Doviak, Jeff Dunn, Kirk Michaelian, and Alex Sarch for discussion and feedback. I am also very grateful to Hilary Kornblith, Jonathan Schaffer and an anonymous referee for extremely helpful and detailed comments.
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Masto, M. Questions, answers, and knowledge-wh . Philos Stud 147, 395–413 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9288-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9288-z