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Weighing pragmatic and evidential reasons for belief

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Abstract

In this paper I argue that we can give a plausible account of how to compare pragmatic and evidential normative reasons for belief. The account I offer is given in the form of a ‘defeasing function’. This function allows for a sophisticated comparison of the two types of reasons without assigning complex features to the logical structures of either type of reason.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, McGill University, Leacock Building, 855, rue Sherbrooke Ouest, H3A 2T7, Montreal, Quebec, Canada

    Andrew Reisner

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  1. Andrew Reisner
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Correspondence to Andrew Reisner.

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I would like to thank John Broome, Stewart Cohen, Roger Crisp, Jonathan Dancy, Brie Gertler, and Iwao Hirose for their comments on earlier versions of this material. A number of revisions have also been made as a result of helpful questions raised during presentations of this paper at Arizona State University, McGill University, and the University of Virginia.

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Reisner, A. Weighing pragmatic and evidential reasons for belief. Philos Stud 138, 17–27 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-0007-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-0007-3

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