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Sharp Edges from Hedges: Fatalism, Vagueness and Epistemic Possibility

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Abstract

Mights plug gaps. If p lacks a truth-value, then ‘It might be that p’ should also lack truth-value. Yet epistemic hedges often turn an unassertible statement into an assertible one. The phenomenon is illustrated in detail for two kinds of statements that are frequently alleged to be counterexamples to the principle of bivalence: future contingents and statements that apply predicates to borderline cases. The paper concludes by exploring the prospects for generalizing this gap-plugging strategy.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Dartmouth College, USA

    R. Sorensen

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  1. R. Sorensen
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Correspondence to R. Sorensen.

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Sorensen, R. Sharp Edges from Hedges: Fatalism, Vagueness and Epistemic Possibility. Philos Stud 131, 607–626 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-7701-4

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