Abstract
One of the narratives of anger as a pandemic emotion is not diagnostic, but celebratory: anger at racial injustice made a social and political breakthrough during the pandemic. What this breakthrough narrative celebrates is that people who had previously been moved only to alarmed scrutiny of the anger itself and the project of quelling it began instead, not merely to approve of this anger, but to to be oriented and instructed by it, permitting the anti-racist anger of others to sensitize them to the insults and injuries that provoked it. The breakthrough narrative implies that anger is a moral sentiment that can be instructive, not only for the angry person herself, but also for others. This suggests a phenomenonological puzzle: under what description of affective intentionality and its interpersonal and social triangulation would the breakthrough be possible? I draw on Marilyn Frye’s account of anger uptake and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body schema to give an account of the conditions of possibility for the breakthrough narrative. Along the way, I offer an account of uniquely affective hermeneutical injustices, the uniquely affective variety of power at stake in them, and the reparative gesture required to remedy them.
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Notes
See Kimberly Jones, 2020 “How Can We Win”.
The “Black Lives Matter” (BLM) movement, which was founded by Alicia Garza, Patrice Cullors, and Opal Tometti after the murder of Trayvon Martin in 2012, accelerated in response to the murder of Michael Brown in 2014, and achieved mainstream support in after the murder of George Floyd in 2020.
Trevor Noah, 2020 “Kimberly Jones: Speaking Out About Black Experiences in America”.
For example, The Mayo Clinic’s website published a piece called “Does the pandemic have you ‘pangry’?” (see Dyslin, 2022 “Pangry”).
See for example Isaac Bailey’s 2020 NY Times OpEd, “I’m Finally an Angry Black Man”: “I knew that if a black man like me found himself in a perpetual state of rage he couldn’t shake, things were ripe to explode.”
See Robin M. Catagnus, et. al., 2021 “Anger, Fear, and Sadness: How Emotions Could Help Us End a Pandemic of Racism.”
See for example the statement released by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2020 : “Rising disparities in how COVID-19 is affecting communities, and the major disproportionate impact it is having on racial and ethnic minorities, including people of African descent, have exposed alarming inequalities within our societies, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet said Tuesday. She noted that similar inequalities are also fuelling the widespread protests affecting hundreds of cities across the United States.”
American Psychological Association, 2020 “‘We are living in a racism pandemic,’ says APA President.”
Jenna Wortham, writing in the New York Times: “A ‘Glorious Poetic Rage.’” See also Myisha Cherry’s 2020 OpEd in in The Atlantic, “Anger Can Build a Better World.”
Wortham, 2020 “A ‘Glorious Poetic Rage.’”
In Garza’s observation that this awakening comes “countless lives later,” I hear not only her first-order anger at the racial injustice of police killings, but also a second-order anger: indignation at a world that failed, for so long, to find her anger at racist violence “relevant.” See Lugones on this distinction between first-order and second-order anger (Lugones, “Hard-to-Handle Anger”).
While I am noting paths not taken, I should also acknowledge that we could ask any number of empirical questions about the breakthrough narrative. To whatever degree we accept that the breakthrough narrative is accurate, we might ask: what precise changes in material and social conditions facilitated and catalyzed the shift in anti-racist anger’s political effectiveness? But it is also worth inquiring about the accuracy of the breakthrough narrative in the first place. Surely it needs qualifiers: how widespread was the shift really, and to what extent has it proved to be lasting and deep instead of temporary and superficial? As Myisha Cherry observes, racism is resilient: in this same period, racial hatred became more public and brazen, the mainstreaming of white supremacy keeping pace with the mainstreaming of the BLM movement (see Cherry,
2021 The Case for Rage, x). But these empirical questions I leave for others to investigate. Instead of a “why” question, I answer an “If… then how…?” question. Under what description of affective intentionality and its social and interpersonal triangulation could the breakthrough narrative be possible?
For a discussion of this distinction in a variety of political contexts, see Jasper Friedrich, 2022 “Anger and Apology, Recognition and Reconciliation: Managing Emotions in the Wake of Injustice.”
That emotions have intentionality is currently not an especially controversial view. However, it is often accepted as a corollary of some degree of cognitivism about emotions: if we treat emotions as a kind of judgment, then of course they have intentionality. What remains controversial is whether distinctively affective phenomena—bodily feelings and proprioceptive sensations such as stomach-turning, flushed cheeks, etc.—also have intentionality. My own view is that once we have adapted the concept of intentionality to accommodate its embodied, operative character, then affective intentionality becomes paradigmatic of it rather than a tricky or impossible case—and so much the better for our theories of intentionality as well as our theories of affect! I say more about this view in my article “Affective Intentionality and Affective Injustice.”
Here I am referencing Miranda Fricker’s notion of “hermeneutical injustice,” but considering it in an affective register (see Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing). This is not merely an analogy, but an expansion.
Frye, 1983 The Politics of Reality, 84-85, 89.
Frye, 1983 The Politics of Reality, 88-89.
While I do think that uptake involves being moved by the affective intentionality of another, I am not claiming that intentionality recognition is a necessary or sufficient condition for uptake. As will become clear in this paper, I think uptake is an affective behavior in its own right: it consists in a collaboration or cooperation with another’s affective intentionality, not merely recognition of it. I am rather observing that Frye’s view suggests that the failure of anger uptake has consequences for the success of anger’s intentionality in the first person. The view of uptake I ultimately develop in this paper shows that intentionality recognition is not sufficient for uptake: someone might offer sincere cognitive acknowledgment of my anger’s intentionality while still refusing or failing to be oriented by it. It also may not be necessary: I want to allow for the possibility that some non-intentional emotions may require uptake in order to be successful. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer who called for clarification on this point.
See Whitney, 2018b, “Affective Intentionality and Affective Injustice,” 489.
See Chemaly, 2018 Rage Becomes Her, 376/690.
See Brescoll and Uhlmann, 2008 “Status Conferral, Gender, and the Expression of Emotion in the Workplace.”
The studies I cite here do not track their data intersectionally, but we would do well to ask how race in particular inflects the ways that gender is a site of uptake injustice. I am skeptical that Black men can expect anger uptake in the same way white men can, and white women’s anger on behalf of white supremacy or patriarchy tends to find uptake. I say more below.
Salerno and Peter-Hagene, 2015 “One Angry Woman.”
Rebecca Traister, Good and Mad, 23/511.
During Obama’s presidency, the comedy show Key and Peele did a recurring sketch featuring Luther, Obama’s “anger translator.” The premise of the Luther character is that he embodied a translation of Obama’s speeches animated by the anger Obama was otherwise obliged to swallow in order be well-received by the American public. President Obama himself loved the sketch, inviting Keegan Michael Key to perform as the Luther “anger translator” character while Obama delivered his speech at the White House Correspondents’ Dinner in 2015.
Chemaly, 2018 Rage Becomes Her, 261.
Frye puts the emphasis on intelligibility rather than influence. And she tends to describe uptake refusal as an expression of unjust sense-making conditions rather than constitutive of them. So my interpretation elaborates on her account. But I see no particular inconsistencies between her account and what I add.
Look for my forthcoming work on”anger gaslighting” for more on this.
Frye, 1983 87-88.
Frye, 1983 The Politics of Reality, 88.
“To get angry is to claim implicitly that one is in certain ways and dimensions respectable” Frye, 1983 90.
Frye, 1983 88.
See my footnote in the previous section: while I do think that uptake involves being moved by the affective intentionality of another, I am not claiming that intentionality recognition is a necessary or sufficient condition for uptake. As I will continue to explain, I think uptake is an affective behavior in its own right: it consists in a collaboration or cooperation with another’s affective intentionality, not merely recognition of it.
Merleau-Ponty, 2004 The World of Perception, 83-84.
Merleau-Ponty, 2012 Phenomenology of Perception, 406. Compare this to the direct social perception approach to other minds (see Krueger, 2018 “Direct Social Perception”). I elaborate my own interpretation of Merleau-Ponty in this direction in my earlier published work; my view emphasizes the central role of affect in his approach (see Whitney, 2012, 2018a “Merleau-Ponty on the Mirror Stage” and “Affects, Images and Childlike Perception”).
Ibid, 406.
Merleau-Ponty, 1964a “The Child’s Relations with Others,” 114–118.
Merleau-Ponty, 1964a The Primacy of Perception, 5.
For a more developed account of the way I use the term proprioception, see my earlier published work on Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body schema (Whitney, 2018a, b, 2019, “From the Body Schema to the Historical-Racial Schema,” “Affective Intentionality and Affective Injustice,” and “Merleau-Ponty on the Mirror Stage”). It may help the reader to have in mind the thicker way the notion of proprioception is used in conversations in philosophy of emotion to describe aspects of emotional experience, instead of foregrounding the thinner sense of proprioception used in philosophy of mind and neuroscience. The former sense emphasizes the visceral and kinesthetic experience of the body proper as a certain texture or tone (my stomach turns, my cheeks flush, etc.); the latter emphasizes an experience of recognition, identification, or placement.
“External perception and the perception of one’s own body vary together because they are two sides of a single act” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012 Phenomenology of Perception, 247). Note that this “act” is as much a passion as an action on this account, and intentionality is originally and paradigmatically operative intentionality rather than act intentionality.
For an influential example of this view, see Solomon 1993: “emotions are something far more sophisticated than mere feelings”; they “are not merely ‘affects’... but judgments that we ourselves make” (The Passions, 102, 108). Solomon’s articulation of the view here illustrates an important trend that continues to some extent in philosophy of emotions, in which granting emotional intentionality is a corollary of cognitivism about emotions. Solomon identifies the intentionality feature in emotion by identifying the emotion as a “judgment,” a distinctly epistemic or cognitive operation. The emotion is granted intentionality insofar as it partakes in our deliberative, rational function: emotions have intentionality insofar as they are “judgments that we ourselves make” rather than “merely ‘affects’,” those bodily urges that are not dignified by participation in our more “sophisticated” deliberative activities. But things have changed since Solomon wrote this. Perhaps most influentially, the surge of interest in embodied cognition has made cognition itself a more embodied operation. Philosphers whose work on affective intentionality is informed by this more enactive, embodied approach to mind and cognition such as Giovanna Colombetti (The Feeling Body, 2014) are an important exception to the tendency toward granting intentionality to emotions only as a corollary of cognitivism. Another important exception are philosophers whose work on emotions is informed by the European phenomenological tradition such as Maclaren, 2011 (“Emotional Cliches and Authentic Passions”) and Ratcliffe (Feelings of Being, 2008). Feminist philosophers of emotion also tend to affirm emotional intentionality even as they resist identifying this with cognitivism about emotions. See Jaggar, 1989 (“Love and Knowledge”), Spelman, 1992 (“Anger and Insubordination”); and more recently Ahmed (The Cultural Politics of Emotion, 2004) on the tendency in feminist philosophy to reject “the Dumb view” of emotions, and its significance for feminist theoretical aims.
Again, note that this reversal requires understanding intentionality as originally and paradigmatically an operative and embodied intentionality rather than an act intentionality. Intentionality on this account is a passion of the body more fundamentally than it is an act of consciousness.
Merleau-Ponty, 1964b Sense and Non-Sense, 52-53.
Merleau-Ponty, 2012 Phenomenology of Perception, 181.
Merleau-Ponty, 2004 The World of Perception, 83.
“[J]ust as the parts of my body together form a system, the other’s body and my own are a single whole, two sides of a single phenomenon, and the anonymous existence, of which my body is continuously the trace, henceforth inhabits these two bodies simultaneously” (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 2012 411.).
“To have a phantom limb is to remain open to all of the actions of which the arm alone is capable and to stay within the practical field that one had prior to the mutilation” (Phenomenology of Perception, 2012 111).
For a discussion of social environments unfriendly to declining the use of a prosthetic, see Lorde’s discussion of declining to use a prosthetic after her mastectomy (The Cancer Journals, 2020).
Merleau-Ponty, 1964b Sense and Non-Sense, 53.
Sartre, 2014 Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions.
Though to be sure, any of these meaning-making mediums can be made to serve the ends of domination and abuse just as well as they can be made to serve the end of justice and care.
See both versions of Merleau-Ponty’s lecture on “The Child’s Relations with Others” (in The Primacy of Perception and Child Psychology and Pedagogy). For a more extended interpretation of this account of emotions and how it develops in Merleau-Ponty’s lectures on child pscyhology, see Whitney 2012, 2018a, “Merleau-Ponty on the Mirror Stage” and “Affects, Images, and Childlike Perception.”
Merleau-Ponty, 2010 Child Psychology and Pedagogy, 119.
“Transitivism… is never surpassed in the realm of feelings” (Merleau-Ponty, “The Child’s Relations with Others,” 1964a, 155).
Merleau-Ponty-Ponty, 1964a “The Child’s Relations with Others,” 155.
Ibid, 159.
Ibid, 155.
Frye, 1983 87.
Schilder, Image and Appearance of the Human Body, 2000, 209-210.
Merleau-Ponty cites Schilder’s study in the Phenomenology, but he also returns to it in his later work. See for instance Schilder’s prominence in the later iterations of his course on nature that he taught in his final years (Nature, 2003). This material reappears in his unfinished manuscript for his much-studied final work (The Visible and the Invisible, 1968).
For more of my reading of Schilder vis-a-vis Merleau-Ponty in this direction, see my published work on the relationship between affects and body images (“Merleau-Ponty on the Mirror Stage,” “Affect, Images, and Childlike Perception,” and “Overwhelming Proximity”).
Does uptake have a particular affective tone or texture? We might think of uptake as a trusting and reverent kind of curiosity: a curiosity that seeks to be moved rather than seeking to expose the other. Consider the curiosity of the pilgrim rather than that of the voyeur or the tourist: the pilgrim approaches the unknown reverently, as one approaches world-making forces. Similarly, to give uptake to your anger is to giving it world-making influence in our shared situation.
On this uniquely affective sense of “closeness,” see Whitney 2013 “Affective Orientation, Difference, and ‘Overwhelming Proximity’ in Merleau-Ponty’s Account of Pure Depth.”
Here I assume that, ceterus paribus, a diversity of “worlds” in Lugones’ sense is desirable and choiceworthy. Thus there could exist hermeneutic gaps that are not always already hermeneutic injustices.
See Fricker 2007 on the “economy of credibility.”
Uptake reparation may also play a role in remedying epistemic injustices, both testimonial and hermeneutical. In general, my aim in insisting on the affective character of certain hermeneutic injustices (and the reparative gesture they demand) is never to draw a sharp line between epistemic and affective. To the contrary, I insist that we should think these things together. To that end, we must begin to grasp the uniquely affective dimension of the very phenomena that we have previously examined from a more narrowly epistemic register. There is an intersectionality of the epistemic and the affective that poses methodological challenges similar to those posed by the intersectionality of, say, gender and race: since they are co-constitutive, we cannot adequately describe the one without the other. The phenomenon requires a non-reductive description, one sensitive to the non-linear (feeding-back) constitutive function of interactions of multiple dimensions.
Some readers may hear the influence of María Lugones in this articulation. Building on Frye’s account of anger and uptake, Lugones describes how anger refused uptake may rage against the the world of meaning that denies it intelligibility. Even in circumstances of extreme hermeneutic injustice, anger may be capable of sustaining itself as a bodily feeling: the affective force of a frustrated impetus toward sense. This rage may resonate with others even while being denied the social conditions of sense-making. In this way, it may become an impetus to gather and create together an alternative sense-making context, one which may be subaltern, but sustains the meaningfulness of a minoritized experience (see Lugones, 2003 “Hard-to-Handle Anger”).
I am not confusing description with explanation here, but rather offering a uniquely descriptive explanation, a phenomenological explanation. That is: instead of answering a “why” question, I am answering an “If… then how…?” question about the breakthrough narrative by describing the requisite conditions of possibility for it. This is distinct from a causal or empirical explanation: I make no claims about the chain of causes and effects that answer a “why” question about the breakthrough narrative. To be sure, those questions are interesting: why did the breakthrough occur during the pandemic summer? What about pandemic conditions might have causally facilitated the breakthrough? Also, whether and to what extent did a breakthrough in fact occur? How much was clawed back in backlash? These are not only outside my scope in this article, but beyond my methodological remit. I do hope others study them though, especially since they would be relevant for a practical project of remedying affective injustices related to anger and uptake.
Phenomenology of Perception, 373.
Ibid, 395.
On the distinction between affective force and sense, see also Whitney 2018, “Affective Intentionality and Affective Injustice.”
See Friedrich, 2022 “Anger and Apology.”
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Acknowledgements
With thanks to Luna Dolezal, Joel Kreuger, Jeff Flynn, Sam Haddad, Selin Islekel, Richard Krause, Kenneth Bruce, Rachel Elliot, and Sarah Lucas for their comments on earlier drafts. Also, many thanks to the University of Connecticut Humanities Institute and folks there during AY 2021/2022; especially Fiona Vernal, but also Michael Lynch, Drew Leder, and Anna Ziering for their insights and feedback on earlier versions of these ideas.
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Whitney, S. Anger and uptake. Phenom Cogn Sci 22, 1255–1279 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-023-09924-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-023-09924-z