Abstract
I distinguish between naïve phenomenology and really existing phenomenology, a distinction that is too often ignored. As a consequence, the weaknesses inherent in naïve phenomenology are mistakenly attributed to phenomenology. I argue that the critics of naïve phenomenology have unwittingly adopted a number of precisely those weaknesses they wish to point out. More precisely, I shall argue that Dennett’s criticism of the naïve or auto-phenomenological conception of subjectivity fails to provide a better understanding of the intended phenomenon.
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Notes
Cf. Wundt (1888: 304) and Brentano (1924: 128–29). In Ideas I Husserl writes: “It is evident that [...] consciousness and the content of consciousness are recognisable [erkennbar] only through [...] acts of reflection” (Husserl, 1913: 156–57). This passage leaves open the question as to whether one is able to acquire knowledge about consciousness only introspectively, or whether something qualifies as a conscious experience only if it can be accessed introspectively. Unless Husserl can be shown to require the first, much stronger reading, one should opt for the second.
Many additional details would be needed in order to spell out the full nature of this requirement. For instance: what are the relations between the canonical definition given above and the possession conditions of one of the concepts under consideration? For a subject to possess a psychological concept is it necessary that he himself be able to apply it introspectively? One may wish to be liberal and to allow a subject to rely on somebody else’s competence. Indeed, in the heyday of introspective psychology the application of specific psychological concepts was often thought to presuppose training and great concentration. That everybody should attain such a level of sophistication was not necessary. The linguistic division of labour was applied to psychological concepts.
It ought to be mentioned here that Brentano explicitly admitted the possibility for a subject to have false beliefs about her own experiences. Husserl’s criticism fails to do full justice to this point in Brentano’s theory. For more on Brentano’s view see Soldati (2005).
The relevant question here concerns the relation between essences and other types of entities. Husserl appears to have thought that the answer to this question must take into consideration the different ontological regions into which reality divides. The relation between the number two and a heap of two apples is not the same as the relation between the essence of an intentional act and an occurring perception. Essences, one may wish to say, do not manifest themselves in the same way in all regions of reality.
Husserl’s inquiries into the nature of “categorial intuition” and Wesensschau are partially born out of this need.
Useless to say that more would be needed in order to secure Husserl’s claim that the issues at stake are indeed normative. As it has often been noticed, there is a very weak form of ‘ought’ in the claim that an experience ought to be such and such in order to be poised for the grasp of truth-conditions. Husserl was aware of this, and he explicitly dealt with the different kinds of ought on different occasions (for instance in the Prolegonema to the Logical Investigations).
See also: “You reserve judgment about whether the subject’s beliefs, as expressed in their communication, are true, or even well-grounded, but then you treat them as constitutive of that subject’s subjectivity” (Dennett, 2003: 4).
It ought to be noted here that Brentano’s famous notion of inner perception comes close to the idea that there is ‘knowledge by expression.’ See Soldati (2005).
References
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Acknowledgment
I wish to thank Edi Marbach and one anonymous referee for useful discussion and helpful comments. I thank Justin Morris for the linguistic revision of this article.
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Soldati, G. Subjectivity in heterophenomenology. Phenom Cogn Sci 6, 89–98 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-006-9032-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-006-9032-0