Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

On an Argument for Functional Invariance

  • Published:
Minds and Machines Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The principle of functional invariance states that it is a natural law that conscious beings with the same functional organization have the same quality of conscious experience. A group of arguments in support of this principle are rejected, on the grounds that they establish at most only the weaker intra-subjective principle that any two stages in the life of a single conscious being that duplicate one another in terms of functional organization also duplicate one another in terms of quality of phenomenal experience.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. For the modal arguments, see Campbell (1970, 100), Kirk (1974), and Chalmers (1996, 93–140); for the knowledge argument, see Broad (1925), Nagel (1970), and Jackson (1982).

  2. See Chalmers (1996, 243–46). This way of arguing for the principle is not without dangers for a dualist, however, who must find a way for our possession of certain functional features to explain our possession of corresponding phenomenal features, without the latter simply reducing to the former. Whether this is possible is a large question beyond the scope of this paper.

  3. See Chalmers (1996, 247–75).

  4. See Greenberg (1998) and van Heuveln et al. (1998). These arguments suffer from a plausibility problem, inasmuch as it does seem possible to survive sudden and unusual changes in the quality of one’s conscious experience.

  5. Chalmers (1996, 256).

References

  • Broad, C. D. (1925). The mind and its place in nature. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.

    Google Scholar 

  • Campbell, K. (1970). Body and mind. London: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Greenberg, W. (1998). On Chalmers’ principle of organizational invariance and his “Dancing Qualia” and “Fading Qualia” thought experiments. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 5(1), 53–58.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal qualia. The Philosophical Quarterly, 32(127), 23–36.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kirk, R. (1974). Sentience and behavior. Mind, 83(329), 43–60.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nagel, T. (1970). The possibility of altruism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • van Heuveln, B., Dietrich, E., & Oshima, M. (1998). Let’s dance! The equivocation in Chalmers’ dancing qualia argument. Minds and Machines, 8(2), 237–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore

    Michael Pelczar

Authors
  1. Michael Pelczar
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Michael Pelczar.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Pelczar, M. On an Argument for Functional Invariance. Minds & Machines 18, 373–377 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-008-9110-x

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-008-9110-x

Keywords

Search

Navigation