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Enactive emotions and imaginative association: a multi-layered account

Talia Morag: Emotion, Imagination, and the Limits of Reason. Abingdon, Oxon & New York: Routledge, 2016, 288 pp, £88.00 HB

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Acknowledgements

The research that informs this commentary was supported by the Australian Research Council Discovery Project “Minds in Skilled Performance” (DP170102987).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW, 2522, Australia

    Daniel D. Hutto

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  1. Daniel D. Hutto
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Correspondence to Daniel D. Hutto.

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Hutto, D.D. Enactive emotions and imaginative association: a multi-layered account. Metascience 26, 393–400 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11016-017-0243-5

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