Abstract
In this paper, I argue that if we understand Levinas’s Desire of the Other as gift, we can understand it as joyful—that is, as celebratory. After presenting Levinas’s conception of Desire, I consider his claim, found in Otherwise than Being, that the self is a hostage to the Other, and I contend that, paradoxical as it may seem, being a hostage to the Other is actually liberating. Then, drawing on insights Richard Kearney offers in Reimagining the Sacred, I argue for understanding Desire as a gift that is the condition of possibility for joy. If I offer hospitality to the Other, I thereby accept the gift that makes joy possible, and this joy is not egoistic but is the proper response to the gift. Finally, I ask whether Desire can be joyful in practice, given that the pure gift is an originary condition and never a historical one, and I conclude that imperfect joy remains possible. Moreover, this imperfect joy is better than any solitary enjoyment I might experience in the total absence of the Other.
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Notes
As Levinas usually capitalizes “Desire,” I capitalize it throughout this paper. In the case of quotations, when “Desire” is capitalized in the original French text but not in the translation, I have reintroduced the capitalization. When it is not capitalized in the original, I have left it uncapitalized. The same applies to “Other” and “Same.”.
I am referring to the Other with masculine pronouns to follow Levinas’s usage.
Kearney (2001, p. 69).
Westphal (2008, p. 1149).
Chalier (1998, p. 28, my translation).
Peperzak (1996, p. 135).
Ferreira (2001, p. 454).
Peperzak (1996, p. 143).
Ferreira (2001, p. 448).
As I noted earlier, Levinas does not distinguish between joy and enjoyment as I do here, but my usage of the word “joy” fits with my association of Desire and gift.
Kearney (2016b, p. 32).
Kearney (2016a, p. 16).
Kearney (2016a, p. 16).
One should note that in fact Levinas rejects the term “sacred,” writing that “[t]he ethical relation is defined, in contract with every relation with the sacred, by excluding every signification it would take on unbeknown to him who maintains that relation” (2012, pp. 77–78; 2013, p. 79). It remains, however, that Kearney’s characterization of the sacred bears a strong resemblence to Levinas’s characterization of the Other, who is indeed absolutely Other and who transcends me. It is therefore reasonable to ask whether gift (in Kearney’s sense) and Desire (in Levinas’s sense) can be linked.
Kearney (2016a, p. 16).
Kearney (2016b, p. 33).
Kearney (2016b, p. 32).
Levinas does state that “Desire is desire in a being already happy: desire is the unhappiness [malheur] of the happy, a luxurious need” (2012, p. 57; 2013, p. 62, translation modified), but he is emphasizing the distinction between Desire and happiness, not asserting that it is the unhappiness of having unsatisfied needs. Desire transcends the economy of need in relation to which happiness and unhappiness are possible.
It is true that we often also associate celebration with happiness and enjoyment. My sense of the word “celebration” is thus narrower than the common sense of the term, though it shares the usual emphasis on community and hospitality.
Arguing for understanding the face in Levinas as gift (though without discussing Desire specifically), Jeffrey L. Kosky also points out that I cannot enter into an economy of exchange with the Other: “my obligation to the face can never be fulfilled, never paid back in full. In obliging me to respond, the face does not institute a circle of exchange; for giver and receiver do not share a time in which gifts could be exchanged and the circle complete itself” (1997, p. 191).
I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
Kearney (2016b, p. 44).
Kearney (2001, 64).
Note that I cannot accept my ethical responsibility once and for all and thereby receive the gift for all time; rather, I can lose the gift by turning my hospitality into hostility. I must continue to be hospitable in each moment.
By “pure gift,” I mean a gift wholly untainted by the economy of exchange. “Impure gift” (a term I use later in this section) is that in which the trace of the gift remains, although it is contaminated. By “perfect hospitality,” I mean hospitality that is entirely uncontaminated by even a hint of hostility. This article ultimately does not take a position on whether pure gift and perfect hospitality are possible; the crucial point established in this section is that one cannot refute the preceeding analysis—which does implicitly assume pure gift and perfect hospitality—by arguing that they are in fact impossible, as Desire is the condition of possibility for joy regardless.
By “perfect joy,” (or “perfect celebration”) I mean the fullness of joy that I would experience if I could receive the pure gift and offer the Other a perfect welcome. “Imperfect joy” (or “imperfect celebration”) is that in which remains the trace of joy that arises when I receive the impure gift and offer the Other an imperfect welcome. (I will clarify the idea of a trace of joy later in this section.).
Kearney, (2016b, p. 34).
One might object that that which is never a gift certainly belongs in an economy of exchange, so the fact that I place something into an economy of exchange does not imply that it is originarily a gift. But as I have previously argued that the Desire of the Other is originarily a gift, that point is not in question here. The question is whether the gift is only originary and does not exist at all as a historical reality.
One might ask how joy can leave a trace, as if it arises, it does so within specific historical situations. “Trace” is a suitable term, however, if joy is neither fully present (as is so if I cannot receive the pure gift and offer the Other a pure welcome) nor fully absent (because, as I argued above, I can receive the impure gift and offer the Other an impure welcome). That trace reveals itself within my imperfect joy, and because it does so, imperfect joy is still joy even though it is contaminated by my inability to receive the pure gift and offer perfect hospitality.
Westphal (2008, p. 1149).
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Acknowledgements
I wish to thank Dr. Miguel de Beistegui and Melissa Fitzpatrick for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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Horton, S. The joy of Desire: Understanding Levinas’s Desire of the Other as gift. Cont Philos Rev 51, 193–210 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-017-9416-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-017-9416-6