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A hermeneutical sketch of memory and the immemorial

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Abstract

In one of his more recent works, Paul Ricoeur attempts to re-instate the philosophical discussion of memory at the very center of a more general discourse on human existence. In his exposition, Ricoeur relies upon what he himself characterizes as a phenomenology of memory. It is the aim of the present article to supplement the phenomenological account of memory discussed by Ricoeur with a hermeneutics of memory conscious of its own limitations. Such a hermeneutical supplement would not only be of complementary value but also provoke a rethinking of the relation between key concepts in the western discourse on memory, such as image, imprint, and trace. In this regard, the proposed hermeneutical reconfiguration of memory exceeds its own limitations and overflows into an investigation of the primordial passive and past ground, which motivates and allows the hermeneutical activity in the first place. Following the analyses of Emmanuel Lévinas, I will argue that this immemorial past must be conceived in terms of a responsibility that cannot be fulfilled.

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Notes

  1. Ricoeur (2004, p. xvi).

  2. Ricoeur (2004, pp. 21–44).

  3. Hannoum (2005, p. 124).

  4. Ricoeur (2004, p. 7).

  5. Ricoeur (2004, p. 12).

  6. Ricoeur (2004, pp. 17–21).

  7. Ricoeur (2004, p. 46).

  8. Ricoeur (2004, pp. 50–55).

  9. Ricoeur (2004, p. 52) and Bergson (1950, p. 171).

  10. Ricoeur (2004, p. 51).

  11. De memoria et reminiscentia 449b15, translated and commented in: Richard Sorabji, Aristotle on Memory, 2nd ed. ed. (London: Duckworth, 2004).

  12. De memoria et reminiscentia 453a13–14.

  13. Ricoeur (2004, p. 21).

  14. Ricoeur (2004, p. 52).

  15. Ricoeur (2004, p. 54).

  16. Ricoeur (2004, p. 24).

  17. Ricoeur (2004, p. 26).

  18. Ricoeur (2004, p. 27).

  19. Ricoeur (2004, p. 28).

  20. Ricoeur (2004, p. 24).

  21. Ricoeur (2004, p. 26).

  22. Ricoeur (2004, p. 25).

  23. Ricoeur (2004, pp. 37–38).

  24. Ricoeur (2004, p. 50).

  25. Ricoeur (2004, p. 36).

  26. Ricoeur (2004, p. 43).

  27. Ricoeur (2004, pp. 36–44).

  28. Ricoeur (2004, p. 36).

  29. See Casey (1987).

  30. Ricoeur (2004, p. 40).

  31. Ricoeur (2004, p. 40).

  32. I do not wish to suggest here that reading Husserl as relying on subjectivist idealism is in itself unproblematic. Indeed, Ricoeur admits that these tendencies in Husserl are somewhat remedied when Husserl in his later works introduces the concept of Lebenswelt (Ricoeur 2004, p. 36f.). My claim here is thus not the strong claim of dismissing Husserl as a subjectivist idealist, but rather to point to the fact that those elements which Ricoeur sees as problematic in Husserl to a certain extent is carried over into his own account of memory.

  33. Ricoeur (2004, p. 294).

  34. Heidegger (1996, pp. 151–154).

  35. Heidegger (1996, p. 153).

  36. Heidegger (1996, p. 148).

  37. Heidegger (1996, p. 148).

  38. Heidegger (1996, pp. 144–150).

  39. These considerations are not meant to define memory as strictly personal and exclude the idea of a collective memory as discussed in Ricoeur (2004, pp. 93–132). In this regard, the concepts of ‘world’ and ‘inhabiting’ are neutral concerning the ascription to a personal or collective subject.

  40. Ricoeur (2004, pp. 69–80).

  41. Lotz (2004) discusses the relation between Husserlian recollection and the concept of mourning and tries to show, from a different angle than the one presented here, how the phenomenological account of memory must necessarily push itself beyond its own boundaries towards an absolute, non-representable past.

  42. The process of internalization is discussed by Ricoeur (2004, pp. 58–68) and ranges all the way from simple learning to an ars memoria that combines mnemotecnics with the initiation into hermetic secrets.

  43. Heidegger (1996, p. 63ff.).

  44. Heidegger (1996, pp. 77–80).

  45. Heidegger (1996, pp. 77–80).

  46. Heidegger (1996, pp. 126–131).

  47. Heidegger (1996, p. 129): “The moodedness of attunement constitutes existentially the openness to world of Da-sein.”

  48. One may note the grammatical past tense involved in the concept of thrownness (Geworfenheit). This in itself implies that attunement, by being an openness or disclosure of a past thrownness, is intimately connected to some sort of memory.

  49. Heidegger (1996, p. 129).

  50. Heidegger (1996, p. 202f).

  51. Heidegger (1996, p. 126f).

  52. That is, the openness is determined through the twofold structure of “always-being-my-own-being” (Jemeinigkeit) and “to be” (Zu-sein) discussed in Heidegger (1996, p. 39ff).

  53. The following analysis of the trace and its connection to representation and memory is, admittedly, inspired by Emmanuel Lévinas’ treatment of the subject, especially Lévinas (1963) and (1965).

  54. Greisch (2004, p. 90).

  55. Blanchot (1982, p. 51).

  56. Cf. Edward Casey’s (1988, p. 249) illuminating study of the concept of trace in Lévinas.

  57. Lévinas (1998, p. 51ff).

  58. Lévinas (1998, p. 51).

  59. Lévinas (1987, p. 118).

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  1. Aarhus University, Jens Chr. Skous Vej 7, 8000, Århus C, Denmark

    Jon Utoft Nielsen

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Nielsen, J.U. A hermeneutical sketch of memory and the immemorial. Cont Philos Rev 44, 401–416 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-011-9198-1

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