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The Problem of Puzzling Pairs

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Yale University, PO Box 208306, New Haven, CT, 06520, U.S.A.

    Michael Nelson

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  1. Michael Nelson
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Correspondence to Michael Nelson.

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Nelson, M. The Problem of Puzzling Pairs. Linguist Philos 28, 319–350 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-004-1600-6

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