Abstract
Steven French (J Gen Philos Sci, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-018-9401-8, 2018) proposes a vindication of “scientifically disinterested” metaphysics that leaves little room to its original ambitions. He claims that (1) as a discipline that looks to find out truths about the world, it is untenable; and that (2) rather, its vindication lies in its use as a “toolbox” of concepts for a philosophical discipline that does have a claim at getting us closer to truth—the philosophy of science, and more specifically of physics. I respond to both his main claims. The first claim, I argue, neglects what I call (with Ralf Busse) “archaeological” metaphysics, which tries to impose some order on phenomena by “digging deeper” from the less to the more fundamental, or from the less to the more abstract questions. The second claim imposes a hierarchical relation between metaphysics and philosophy of science which should, I argue, be replaced with a more egalitarian picture of philosophy.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Other examples (given in French and McKenzie 2012) include the use of notions of modality, dependence, and fundamentality to spell out a structuralist philosophy of science.
As I have briefly indicated, Barnes would deny that this is all that feminist philosophers discuss in discussing gender. She claims that many metaphysicians of gender agree about the grounding of gender in social practices, and disagree merely about what gender is. I do not make any claims to the contrary.
References
Barnes, E. (2014). Going beyond the fundamental: Feminism in contemporary metaphysics. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 114, 335–351.
Busse, R. (2009). Properties in nature: A nominalist account of fundamental properties. Habilitation: University of Regensburg.
Chalmers, D. (2012). Constructing the world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clarke, R. (2009). Dispositions, abilities to act, and free will: The new dispositionalism. Mind, 118, 323–351.
Fine, K. (1994). Essence and modality. Philosophical Perspectives, 8, 1–16.
Fine, K. (2001). The question of realism. Philosophers’ Imprint, 1, 1–30.
French, S. (2014). The structure of the world: Metaphysics and representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
French, S. (2018). Toying with the toolbox: How metaphysics can still make a contribution. Journal for General Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-018-9401-8.
French, S., & McKenzie, K. (2012). Thinking outside the toolbox: Towards a more productive engagement between metaphysics and philosophy of physics. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 8, 42–59.
Graff Fara, D. (2000). Shifting sands: An interest-relative theory of vagueness. Philosophical Topics, 28, 45–81.
Greco, J., & Turri, J. (2012). Virtue epistemology: Contemporary readings. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Hitchcock, C. (2012). Probabilistic causation. The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/causation-probabilistic/.
Kaplan, D. (1977). Demonstratives. In J. Almog, J. Perry, & H. Wettstein (Eds.), Themes from kaplan (pp. 481–563). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Krödel, T. (2012). Counterfactuals and the epistemology of modality. Philosophers’ Imprint, 12, 1–14.
Ladyman, J., Ross, D., Spurrett, D., & Collier, J. (2007). Every thing must go. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lowe, E. J. (1998). The possibility of metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McDowell, J. (1988). Values and secondary qualities. In T. Honderich (Ed.), Morality and objectivity (pp. 110–129). London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
McLaughlin, B. & Bennett, K. (2011). Supervenience. The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/supervenience/.
Merricks, T. (2013). Three comments on writing the book of the world. Analysis, 73, 722–736.
Reichenbach, H. (1925). Die Kausalstruktur der Welt und der Unterschied von Vergangenheit und Zukunft. Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaft, November: 133–175.
Robb, D. & Heil, J. (2013). Mental causation. The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/mental-causation/.
Roca Royes, S. (forthcoming). Similarity and possibility: An epistemology of de re possibility for concrete entities. In B. Fischer & F. Leon (Eds.), Modal epistemology after rationalism.
Schaffer, J. (2009). On What Grounds What. In D. Chalmers, D. Manley, & R. Wasserman (Eds.), Metametaphysics: New essays on the foundation of ontology (pp. 347–383). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sider, T. (2011). Writing the book of the world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stalnaker, R. (2001). Ways a world might be. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stanley, J. (2005). Knowledge and practical interests. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Steward, H. (2012). A metaphysics for free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vetter, B. (2015). Potentiality: From dispositions to modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vihvelin, K. (2004). Free will demystified. Philosophical Topics, 32, 427–450.
Vihvelin, K. (2013). Causes, laws and free will: Why determinism doesn’t matter. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, T. (2007). The philosophy of philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.
Zagzebski, L. (1996). Virtues of the mind: An inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Vetter, B. Digging Deeper: Why Metaphysics is More Than a Toolbox. J Gen Philos Sci 49, 231–241 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-017-9387-7
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-017-9387-7