Abstract
The notion of truthlikeness (verisimilitude, approximate truth), coined by Karl Popper, has very much fallen into oblivion, but the paper defends it. It can be regarded in two different ways. Either as a notion that is meaningful only if some formal measure of degree of truthlikeness can be constructed; or as a merely non-formal comparative notion that nonetheless has important functions to fulfill. It is the latter notion that is defended; it is claimed that such a notion is needed for both a reasonable backward-looking and a reasonable forward-looking view of science. On the one hand, it is needed in order to make sense of the history of science as containing a development; on the other, it is needed in order to understand present-day sciences as containing knowledge-seeking activities. The defense of truthlikeness requires also a defense of two other notions: quasi-comparisons and regulative ideas, which is supplied in this paper as well.
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Acknowledgments
The ideas in the paper were first given a power point-presentation in Erik Olsson’s seminar at the department of theoretical philosophy in Lund, Sweden, in March 2015, then at the Swedish Philosophy Days in Linköping in June, and I thank the seminar members for comments. For comments on the later written versions, I would like to thank Jan Almäng, Line Breian, Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson, Svein Solberg, Christer Svennerlind, an anonymous referee, and the editors of JGPS.
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Johansson, I. In Defense of the Notion of Truthlikeness. J Gen Philos Sci 48, 59–69 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-016-9343-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-016-9343-y