Abstract
Devitt (J Gen Philos Sci 42:285–293, 2011) has developed an interesting defense of realism against the threats posed by (1) the Pessimistic Induction and (2) the Argument from Unconceived Alternatives. Devitt argues that the best explanation for the success of our current theories, and the fact that they are superior to the theories they replaced, is that they were developed and tested with the aid of better methods than the methods used to develop and test the many theories that were discarded earlier in the history of science. It is no surprise that theories developed earlier in the history of science needed to be replaced. But our current theories are different, having been developed and tested with the aid of these more recently developed superior methods. I critically analyze Devitt’s defense of realism. I argue that recent developments in methodology cannot support the claims Devitt makes. I present an argument I call the “Argument from Unconceived Methods.” Given the history of science, it seems likely that scientists will continue to develop new methods in the future. And some of these methods will enable scientists to generate data that cannot be reconciled with the currently accepted theories. Consequently, it seems that our current best theories are not immune from being replaced in the future by radically different theories.
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Notes
Stathis Psillos draws the important distinction between those parts of a theory that are responsible for its successes, the so-called "truth-like constituent theoretical claims," and those parts that play no role in generating the successes of the theory, the idle constituents of a theory (see Psillos 1999, 108–114). Similarly, Kitcher (1993) distinguishes between the working posits and the presuppositional posits of a theory. These distinctions map on to Devitt’s distinction between essential and non-essential unobservables.
Devitt's SR should not be confused with Ian Hacking's entity realism. On Hacking's view, scientists are warranted in believing in entities that they routinely use as instruments. Hacking specifically has in the mind the way electrons are used to study other sub-atomic particles (see Hacking 1983). Hacking thinks that scientists who employ electrons in such a manner are committed to the existence of electrons.
Elsewhere I have argued that Laudan does not in fact advance a Pessimistic Induction in “Confutation of Convergent Realism.” Rather, Laudan’s intention is to show (1) that success is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the truth of a theory, and (2) that success is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for genuine reference with respect to theoretical terms (see Wray 2015; also Lyons 2002).
The fact that Devitt claims that one can attack the inference or the premise, rather than the premises, suggests that he regards the argument as an enthymeme. I identify what Devitt regards as the tacit premise shortly.
Fahrbach (2011) also thinks that scientists are much better now at getting at the unobservables underlying the phenomena than they were in the past. And he too thinks that developments in methodology played a key role in this change.
Thomas Kuhn is responsible for emphasizing the discontinuities in science. It was a crucial part of his attack on the cumulative account of scientific progress (see Kuhn 1962/2012). As a consequence of his emphasis on the discontinuities through changes of theory, the alleged lost "knowledge" after episodes of theory change is now commonly referred to as "Kuhn-loss."
Exactly how many such claims about the essential properties of a particular type of theoretical entity need to change before it causes a radical change of theory is not specified.
One could take issue with Devitt's appeal to the notion of "more true." It has proved to be notoriously challenging to articulate a plausible notion of truth-likeness or verisimilitude (see Psillos 1999, Chapter 11). But this will not be the focus of my concerns here. Further, Kuhn discusses the problem with locutions like "truer," rightly claiming that "the term 'truer' has a vaguely ungrammatical ring" (see Kuhn 1991/2000, 115).
I thank one of the referees for pushing me to clarify this point.
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Acknowledgments
I thank Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Lori Nash, and the referees for the Journal of General Philosophy of Science for their critical feedback on earlier drafts. The final round of revisions of this paper were done while I was a Visiting Scholar in the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Fall 2015. I thank MIT for their hospitality. I also thank the State University of New York, Oswego, for granting me a sabbatical leave in the 2015-2016 academic year.
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Wray, K.B. Method and Continuity in Science. J Gen Philos Sci 47, 363–375 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-016-9338-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-016-9338-8