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Lindenberg, S. Sustainable cooperation needs tinkering with both rules and social motivation. J Bioecon 16, 71–81 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10818-013-9172-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10818-013-9172-6