Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Person-Creating and Filial Piety

  • Published:
The Journal of Value Inquiry Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. Brynn Welch, “Filial Obligation,” in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2015, iep.utm.edu/fil-obli; Mark Wicclair, “Caring for Frail Elderly Parents: Past Parental Sacrifices and the Obligations of Adult Children,” Social Theory and Practice 16, no. 2 (1990): 163–89; Jane English, “What Do Grown Children Owe Their Parents,” in Having Children: Philosophical and Legal Reflections on Parenthood, ed. Onora O’Neill and William Ruddick (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 351–56; Simon Keller, “Four Theories of Filial Duty,” Philosophical Quarterly 56, no. 223 (2006): 254–74; William Sin, “Adult Children’s Obligations Towards Their Parents: A Contractualist Explanation,” Journal of Value Inquiry 53, no. 1 (2019): 19–32; Christina Hoff Sommers, “Filial Morality,” The Journal of Philosophy 83, no. 8 (1986): 439–56; Michael Collingridge and Seumas Miller, “Filial Responsibility and the Care of the Aged,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 14, no. 2 (1997): 119–28.

  2. The exceptions are: Robert C. Roberts, “The Virtue of Piety,” in Spirituality and the Good Life: Philosophical Approaches (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 47–62; Jeremy Schwartz and David Hayes, “Piety as a Virtue,” Journal of Value Inquiry 55 (2021): 109–26.

    For Roberts, piety “sees the parent as progenitor, as antecedent and condition of one’s existence” and its response is one of reverence (52, 57). I agree with much of what Roberts says, though on my account piety’s response is to the parent’s action as a progenitor rather than their status as a progenitor, and its response is not primarily a parent-focused attitude, or an attitude at all, but to continue the parent’s action by being a good person.

    For Schwartz and Hayes, piety responds to “those agents thanks to whose efforts we gained a sense that some activities are worthwhile. The appropriate reaction to them is gratitude” (110). Schwartz and Hayes acknowledge that their purpose is not so much to give an account of piety, but to give an account of an as-yet nameless virtue, a species of gratitude, which they dub piety “somewhat reluctantly… for want of a better term” (110). On my view, a parent, as one who seeks to perfect their creation, will surely want to imbue their child with a sense that some activities are worthwhile, but this is one small aspect of their work. Whereas gratitude responds to benefaction, piety responds to something that encompasses and surpasses benefaction; Aquinas calls it the “principle of our being and government,” the “principle of our begetting and upbringing” (ST II-II Q101 A3 co.; ST II-II Q106 A1 co.)

  3. Elizabeth Brake and Joseph Millum, “Parenthood and Procreation,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2021.

  4. So far as I am aware, all of the literature on the Aristotle’s category of “relatives” is of a scholarly rather than critical character – nobody has specifically attacked relatives as a metaphysical category.

    Matthew Duncombe, “Aristotle’s Two Accounts of Relatives in Categories 7,” Phronesis 60, no. 4 (2015): 436–61; Orna Harari, “The Unity of Aristotle’s Category of Relatives,” Classical Quarterly 61, no. 2 (2011): 521–37; Pamela M. Hood, Aristotle on the Category of Relation (Lanham, MD: United Press of America, 2004); David Sedley, “Aristotelian Relativities,” in Le Style de La Pensée, ed. M. Canto Sperber and P Pellegrin (Paris: Belles Lettres, 2002), 324–52; Fabio Morales, “Relational Attributes in Aristotle,” Phronesis 39, no. 3 (1994): 255–74; Mario Mignucci, “Aristotle’s Definitions of Relatives in Cat. 7,” Phronesis 31, no. 2 (1986): 101–27.

    Aristotle’s remarks bearing on parenthood and filial piety have not received much contemporary attention.

    Vernon L Provencal, “The Family In Aristotle,” Animus 6 (2001): 3–31; Aristotle and Michael Pakaluk, Nicomachean Ethics Book VIII and IX, ed. Michael Pakaluk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

  5. I have the motive of exploring the biblical idea that children are images of their parents. “[Adam] fathered a son in his own likeness, after his image [tselem]” (Genesis 5:3). Tselem is used of God-man (Genesis 1:26) and demon-idol (Numbers 33:52, 2 Chronicles 23:17). The Septuagint translates tselem as eikon (icon). In the New Testament, Christ is icon of the Father (Colossians 1:15), the righteous are icons of Christ (1 Corinthians 15:48-9). Parallel to my discussion, this means that God is present in and through the human person and that demon is present in and through the idol, our actions toward the image passing to the paradigm (Matthew 25:40, 1 Corinthians 10:20). Neo-Platonic and Hermetic philosophers gave accounts of how gods are drawn down into cultic statues. God breathing life into Adam (Genesis 2:7) references such practices, making us ‘idols’ (eidolon) of God.

    Proclus, “On the Priestly Art,” in Hermeticism and the Renaissance: Intellectual History and the Occult in Early Modern Europe, ed. Brian Copenhaver, Ingrid Merkel, and Allen G. Debus (London: Associated University Presses, 1998); Hermes Trismegistus, “Asclepius,” in Corpus Hermeticum and the Latin Asclepius, ed. Brian Copenhaver (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 24, 37–38; Stephen L. Herring, Divine Substitution: Humanity as the Manifestation of Deity in the Hebrew Bible and the Ancient Near East (Bristol, CT: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013), 115–21, 199.

  6. Katja Coneus, Andrea M. Mühlenweg, and Holger Stichnoth, “Orphans at Risk in Sub-Saharan Africa: Evidence on Educational and Health Outcomes,” Review of Economics of the Household 12, no. 4 (2014): 641–62; Rebecca T. Leeb, Terri Lewis, and Adam J. Zolotor, “A Review of Physical and Mental Health Consequences of Child Abuse and Neglect and Implications for Practice,” American Journal of Lifestyle Medicine 5, no. 5 (2011): 454–68.

  7. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Robert Bartlett and Susan Collins (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 1166a 1-10.

  8. Aristotle, “Rhetoric,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 1380b 35; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1156b 10.

  9. Mathew P. White and Paul Dolan, “Accounting for the Richness of Daily Activities,” Psychological Science 20, no. 8 (2009): 1000–1008; S. Katherine Nelson et al., “In Defense of Parenthood: Children Are Associated With More Joy Than Misery,” Psychological Science 24, no. 1 (2013): 3–10.

  10. Martha F. Erickson and Enola G. Aird, “The Motherhood Study: Fresh Insights on Mothers’ Attitudes and Concerns” (New York, 2005), 6.

  11. S. Katherine Nelson, Kostadin Kushlev, and Sonja Lyubomirsky, “The Pains and Pleasures of Parenting: When, Why, and How Is Parenthood Associated with More or Less Well-Being?,” Psychological Bulletin 140, no. 3 (2014): 8. My italics.

  12. Douglas Kenrick et al., “Renovating the Pyramid of Needs,” Perspectives on Psychologlical Science 5, no. 3 (2011): 292–314.

  13. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a; George Wilson and Samuel Shpall, “Action,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford University Press, 2012).

  14. Joel R. Soza, Lucifer, Leviathan, Lilith, and Other Mysterious Creatures of the Bible (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2017), 92.

  15. David Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood, Second Edition (Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, 2004), 137.

  16. I mention this divide, prominent in ethical discussions of the family and sexuality, to show that my theory is compatible with both views. I lean toward the view that mere biological procreators (deliberate or accidental) are parents, but that they are owed little or no filial piety because they cease to participate in person-creating action, waiving what they would be owed. Supporting the biology-inclusive view is the widespread sentiment among gamete donors of wanting to know that their progeny will go to a good home. Donor-conceived children have both positive and negative ethically-laden sentiments toward their donors, not total indifference.

    Eric Blyth, Samantha Yee, and A. Ka Tat Tsang, “‘They Were My Eggs; They Were Her Babies’: Known Oocyte Donors’ Conceptualizations of Their Reproductive Material,” Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology Canada 33, no. 11 (2011): 1134–40; Veerle Provoost, Florence Van Rompuy, and Guido Pennings, “Non-Donors’ Attitudes Towards Sperm Donation and Their Willingness to Donate,” Journal of Assisted Reproduction and Genetics 35, no. 1 (2018): 107–18; Vasanti Jadva et al., “Experiences of Offspring Searching for and Contacting Their Donor Siblings and Donor,” Reproductive BioMedicine Online 20, no. 4 (2010): 523–32.

  17. Jenny Teichman, “The Definition of Person,” Philosophy 60, no. 232 (1985): 175–85.

  18. Agnieszka Jaworska and Julie Tannenbaum, “The Grounds of Moral Status,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2021, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/grounds-moral-status/.

  19. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1104b 15.

  20. Ibid., 1106b 5-30.

  21. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1129b 25-35; Plato, The Republic, ed. G. R. F. Ferrari (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 432b; Marcus Tullius Cicero, “De Natura Deorum (On the Nature of the Gods),” in The Complete Works of Cicero (East Sussex: Delphi Classics, 2014), II.XV.

  22. Eriugena, Periphyseon, ed. John O’Meara and Inglis Patrick Sheldon-Williams (Washington DC: Dumbarton Oaks, 1987), 451B.

  23. Aristotle, “Categories,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume 1, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 8a 30.

  24. Ibid., 6b 1.

  25. Ibid., 7b 15.

  26. Ibid., 8a 37-40; Sedley, “Aristotelian Relativities,” 327.

  27. Aristotle, “Metaphysics,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 1075a 4-10.; Plato, The Republic, 508d.

  28. Porphyry, On Aristotle Categories, ed. Steven K. Strange (London: Bloomsbury, 1992), 112 1.

  29. Plotinus, “On the Kinds of Being I,” in Ennead VI (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 6.1.7.

  30. Porphyry, On Aristotle Categories, 112 7; Plotinus, “On the Kinds of Being I,” 6.1.7 10; Ammonius, On Aristotle’s Categories, ed. S. Marc Cohen and Gareth B. Matthews (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 71 15; Aristotle, “Metaphysics,” 1021a 25.

  31. So far as I am aware, no one claims that a token child could have had different token biological parents. We can conceive of someone as having had different ‘social parents,’ who continue, rather than initiate, the parental action. In the extreme case, if the human animal that developed into the person that I am had been adopted at birth, I am unsure whether the resulting person would be me.

  32. Aristotle, “Eudemian Ethics,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 1246a 30.

  33. Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 93; Julien A. Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni, In Defense of Shame (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 71–97.

  34. The claim that children have a kind of authority over their parents may sound like an inversion of the authority that parents have over their children, but in fact points to its fulfillment. The authority of parent over child is temporary, since perfect persons are autonomous. Yet, the parent-child relationship is not self-abolishing; the parent does not call the child to be an isolated rational agent. The parent calls the child to a shared life of mutual love and accountability. The teleological end-state of the parent-child relationship is something akin to the relationship between co-parents.

  35. Aristotle, “Metaphysics,” 1021a 22.

  36. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1050 30a.

  37. Aristotle, Aristotle on Friendship: Being an Expanded Translation of the Nicomachean Ethics Books VIII & IX, ed. Geoffrey Percival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940), 1168a 8.

  38. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1168a 6.

  39. Ibid., 1161b 20.

  40. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica. (New York: Bezinger Bros, 1947). ST I Q103, A6, co.

  41. Philip J Ivanhoe, “Filial Piety as a Virtue,” in Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems, ed. Rebecca L Walker and Philip J Ivanhoe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 306.

  42. Aristotle, Aristotle on Friendship, 1167b 35.

  43. Aristotle, “Politics,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume 2, ed. Barnes. Jonathan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 1252a 25.

  44. Aristotle, “Poetics,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume 2, Barnes, Jo (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 1460b 10.

  45. Aristotle, “On Memory,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 450b 20.

  46. Aristotle, “Poetics,” 1461b 14.

  47. Plato, “Timaeus,” in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 28a–c.

  48. Aristotle, “Topics,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume 1, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 140a 10.

  49. The portrait does not make Margaret present to us in every sense – we can talk at her, but not expect an answer. Other media may make Margaret present to us, allow us to interact with her, in more ways. For instance, a call presents the two callers with audial images of one another via which they have a conversation. Other media allow people to play games together and might, eventually, allow all the same action-types as physical presence.

  50. Arthur Schopenhauer, “Immortality: A Dialogue,” in Studies in Pessimism, ed. Thomas Bailey Saunders (London: George Allen & Company, 1913), 51–58.

  51. For the notion that many things can be imaged, and in many media; “a man impresses an image of his judgment upon the stream of speech, like reflections upon water" Plato, “Theatetus,” in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 206c-d.

  52. Ingersoll Brooke, “The Social Role of Imitation in Autism,” Infants & Young Children 21, no. 2 (2008): 107–19.

  53. Vivian L Gadsden and Marcia Hall, “Intergenerational Learning: A Review of the Literature” (Philadelphia, 1996).

  54. Toni C. Antonucci and Karen Mikus, “The Power of Parenthood: Personality and Attitudinal Changes During the Transition to Parenthood,” in The Transition To Parenthood, ed. Gerald Y. Michael and Wendy A. Goldberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 64.

  55. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, ST III, Q1, A1, co.

  56. There is some evidence that parents feel a heightened moral responsibility to live well, whether they live up to it or not. The transition to parenthood is accompanied by a greater intention to eat healthily and to stop smoking. Parents display greater sensitivity to violations of moral norms. Making the idea of children more psychologically salient increases prosocial motivations. In one survey, 92% of mothers agreed with the statement “After becoming a mother, I found myself caring more about the well-being of all children, not just my own.” To quote a character from Peep Show: “Oh, my God. There he is. I've got a baby. Maybe I might be a good person from now on. That might be a good idea. Yeah, lead a wholesome life and be a decent citizen and make the whole world okay. Yeah, this is a biggy! This is definitely a biggy!”

    Rebecca L. Bassett-Gunter et al., “Oh Baby! Motivation for Healthy Eating during Parenthood Transitions: A Longitudinal Examination with a Theory of Planned Behavior Perspective,” International Journal of Behavioral Nutrition and Physical Activity 10 (2013): 1–11; Katja Görlitz and Marcus Tamm, “Parenthood and Smoking,” Economics & Human Biology 38 (2020): 1–13; Nicholas Kerry and Damian R Murray, “Conservative Parenting,” Personality and Individual Differences 134, no. May (2018): 90; Erickson and Aird, “The Motherhood Study: Fresh Insights on Mothers’ Attitudes and Concerns,” 7.

  57. Karol Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1981), 259; Plato, “Symposium,” in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 207a; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1161b 27.

  58. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1168a 7.

  59. Aristotle, Aristotle on Friendship, 1161b 35.

  60. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, ST I Q5 A1.

  61. Donald Cox and Oded Stark, “On the Demand for Grandchildren: Tied Transfers and the Demonstration Effect,” Journal of Public Economics 89, no. 9–10 (2005): 1665–97.

  62. Bennett Helm, “Love,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/love/; Roger Scruton, Sexual Desire (London: Phoenix Press, 1986), 89; Plato, “Symposium,” 192d. One might compare a child to a bistable image.

  63. Julius Evola, The Metaphysics of Sex (New York: Inner Traditions International, 1983), 37.

  64. Saint Basil the Great, “De Spiritu Sancto,” in Nicene & Post-Nicene Fathers, Series II Volume VIII, ed. Blomfield Jackson, Philip Schaff, and Henry Wace (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1893), chap. XVIII, https://ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf208/npnf208.ii.html.

  65. Christopher Heath Wellman, “Gratitude As A Virtue,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80, no. 3 (1999): 284–300; Lucius Annaeus Seneca, On Benefits, trans. Miriam Griffin and Brad Inwood (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 1.6.1; Aquinas, Summa Theologica, ST II-II Q106 A1 co.

  66. A. D. M. Walker, “Gratefulness and Gratitude,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1981): 49.

  67. Wicclair, “Caring for Frail Elderly Parents: Past Parental Sacrifices and the Obligations of Adult Children.”

  68. Fred Berger, “Gratitude,” Ethics 85, no. 4 (1975): 304; David Carr, “Varieties of Gratitude,” Journal of Value Inquiry 47, no. 1 (2013): 27; Liz Gulliford, Blaire Morgan, and Kristján Kristjánsson, “Recent Work on the Concept of Gratitude in Philosophy and Psychology,” Journal of Value Inquiry 47, no. 3 (2013): 302; Sungwoo Um, “Gratitude for Being,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98, no. 2 (2020): 222–33.

  69. Tony Manela, “Gratitude,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2019, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/gratitude/. Confer: Berger, “Gratitude,” 300; Paul Camenisch, “Gift and Gratitude in Ethics,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 9, no. 1 (1981): 11; Walker, “Gratefulness and Gratitude,” 52; Wellman, “Gratitude As A Virtue,” 289.

  70. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1159a 30; Hierocles of Alexandria, “The Commentary of Hierocles the Philosopher on the Pythagorean Verses.” In Hierocles of Alexandria, ed. Hermann S. Schibli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 183–185.

  71. Keller, “Four Theories of Filial Duty,” 259–61.

  72. Collingridge and Miller, “Filial Responsibility and the Care of the Aged,” 124.

  73. Karen Bardsley, “Mother Nature and the Mother of All Virtues: On the Rationality of Feeling Gratitude toward Nature,” Environmental Ethics 35, no. 1 (2013): 30–31.

  74. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, ST II-II Q106, A6, ad.3.

  75. Keller, “Four Theories of Filial Duty,” 266.

  76. Ibid., 266–67.

  77. Ibid., 270.

  78. Ibid., 265.

  79. Ibid., 273.

  80. Brynn Welch, “A Theory of Filial Obligations,” Social Theory and Practice 38, no. 4 (2012): 717–37; Anders Schinkel, “Filial Obligations: A Contextual, Pluralist Model,” Journal of Ethics 16, no. 4 (2012): 395–420; Hanhui Xu, “What Should Adult Children Do for Their Parents?,” Nursing Ethics 28, no. 3 (2020): 1–12; Cameron Fenton, “A Complete Special Goods Theory of Filial Obligations” (University of Western Ontario, 2017), https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/5002/.

  81. Keller, “Four Theories of Filial Duty,” 265.

  82. Ibid., 267.

  83. Ibid., 269–70, 272.

  84. Dragoş A. Giulea, “The Divine Essence, That Inaccessible Kabod Enthroned in Heaven: Nazianzen’s Oratio 28,3 and the Tradition of Apophatic Theology from Symbols to Philosophical Concepts,” Nvmen: International Review for the History of Religions 57 (2010): 10.

  85. Irenaeus, “Against Heresies,” in Ante-Nicene Fathers, Vol 1, ed. Alexander Roberts et al. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1885), Bk. 4 Chp. 20.

Acknowledgements

This project has undergone so many major revisions that it is hard to say whether it is one essay, or successive generations of essays. For their helpful comments, thanks to David Shoemaker, Bruce Brower, Alison Denham, Nick Sars, Eric Brown, Jesse Hill, and anonymous reviewers at Philosophia and The Journal of Value Inquiry. Thanks to my parents Patrick and Maria, my wife Victoria, and my daughter Beatrice Sophia. Wisdom of Solomon, Chapter 7.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Concordia University Chicago, 7400 Augusta St, River Forest, IL, 60305, USA

    Marcus William Hunt

Authors
  1. Marcus William Hunt
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Marcus William Hunt.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Hunt, M.W. Person-Creating and Filial Piety. J Value Inquiry (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-023-09948-3

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-023-09948-3

Search

Navigation