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The Badness of Death for Sociable Cattle

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Abstract

I argue that death can be (and sometimes is) bad for cattle because it destroys relationships that are valuable for cattle for their own sake. The argument relies on an analogy between valuable human relationships and relationships cattle form with conspecifics. I suggest that the reasons we have for thinking that certain rich and meaningful human relationships are valuable for their own sake should also lead us to think that certain cattle relationships are valuable for their own sake. And just as death is bad for us when it destroys our valuable relationships, so death is bad for cattle when it destroys their valuable relationships. This argument is important because it pinpoints something that is bad about death for cattle that is overlooked by popular accounts of the badness of death for non-human animals that focus exclusively on the impact of death on lifetime well-being levels. Thus, the argument reveals an overlooked moral cost of some of our farming practices.

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Notes

  1. Some representative works in this vein include Nussbaum’s argument that social animals are entitled to, among other things, opportunities to form social relationships [3, pp. 325–407]; Monsó’s, Benz‑Schwarzburg’s and Bremhorst’s discussion of the moral capabilities of animals [4]; Delon’s examination of the ways in which captivity undermines the physical and social conditions constitutive of a good and meaningful life [5]; and Fitzpatrick’s and Andrews’s exploration of the significance of culture for animal well-being, both in and outside of captivity [6].

  2. I am here and elsewhere in this section indebted to Bennett Helm [7].

  3. Ideas of this kind can be found in Aristotle [8]. Contemporary writers who have discussed the benefits of friendship on self-understanding or self-esteem include John Cooper [9] and David Annis [10].

  4. This is another idea associated with Aristotle [8], discussed by Cooper [9].

  5. See Aristotle [8] and Shoeman [11]

  6. See Rorty [12] and Cocking and Kennett [13]. All the valuable aspects of relationships mentioned here are related, as these authors note.

  7. See Lem [14], especially pp. 154 ff.

  8. Here and elsewhere in this paper I implicitly draw upon something resembling an Aristotelian value theory, according to which what is valuable for a creature is at least partly determined by its functional organization or characteristic form of life. I have tried to avoid explicitly invoking the details of any particular value theory in order to make my argument as intuitive and ecumenical as possible, but it should be noted that much of what I say about value is inspired by the work of Christine Korsgaard. For discussion of the distinction I draw between intrinsic/extrinsic value on the one hand and final/instrumental value on the other, see Korsgaard [15]. For a schematic discussion of the way in which a creature’s functional organization determines what is valuable for it, see Korsgaard [16], [17].

  9. I owe this example to Dan Korman.

  10. It also shows that something that is for us valuable for its own sake may only have extrinsic value.

  11. Death also involves the destruction of the dier, and this raises an ancient philosophical puzzle about how anything can be bad for someone who does not exist (see [18]). I do not have the space to wade into this problem except to say that I think it is dissolved once we accept the correct metaphysical view of time, see Silverstein [19].

  12. For intriguing discussion of this issue, see Rorty [12], especially pp. 78–79.

  13. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to address this objection.

  14. The preemption problem has been much discussed, in connection with both death and harm more generally (for representative examples of the former, see McMahan [22, pp. 42–49], Feldman [23, pp. 224–225], McMahan [24, pp. 12–127]; of the latter, see Feinberg [25, pp. 150–153]; Hanser [26, pp. 434–437]). Note that the preemption problem is sometimes called the ‘overdetermination problem.’

  15. The Addie example is also an example of preemption. I suspect that it fails to generate intuitions against the comparativism objection (if indeed it does) because Addie’s death is bad for many reasons unrelated to Addie’s career, whereas the preemption cases that tend to generate the strongest intuitions against the comparativism objection are cases where the comparativism condition forces us to say that the preempting event is not bad at all when intuitively it is.

  16. Note that I do not reject the idea that there is a sense in which death is bad for the dier because death deprives the dier of their relationships. After all, a dier is deprived of their relationships by virtue of the fact that those relationships are destroyed by death. Rather, I reject the more specific idea that this destruction (which constitutes (or at least results in) a deprivation) is not bad when it is inevitable, because I think the destruction (which constitutes (or at least results in) a deprivation) is bad in itself.

  17. Multiple discrete, closed herds will not form within a population of cattle if that population is not large enough or if there is not enough space. Many feral cattle populations studied are small and only support a single herd.

  18. It should be noted that the importance of amicable relationships varies across different cattle populations and contexts; see [39 p. 214]. Sometimes dominance-submission relationships are hard to distinguish from amicable relationships. This sort of ambiguity is familiar to human beings.

  19. Martha Nussbaum has advanced a similar argument for the conclusion that painless death can be bad for animals like cattle, but her argument focuses on the “termination of many and varied functioning,” including social functioning, rather than the destruction of valuable relationships per se [3 pp. 384–386].

  20. Those who reject this response and insist on a more restrictive theory of well-being (or value) than I am inclined to endorse cannot accept my argument as it stands. However, even someone with a rather restrictive value theory, such as hedonism or a desire theory (see [45]), can acknowledge the ethical relevance of the fact that cattle can form rich relationships with conspecifics since these relationships are very likely going to be associated with goods that are recognized from the perspective of these more restrictive theories. And since death curtails such goods, death can be bad for cattle. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to make this point.

  21. A categorical desire is a desire whose content is not conditioned on one’s being alive and thus can give one a reason to go on living (or to kill oneself). These contrast with desires whose content is conditioned on one’s continued existence and thus cannot give one reason to go on living (or to kill oneself). For example, my desire to visit space is a categorical desire whereas my desire to get my cavity filled is a conditional desire. If I were to discover that I will die tomorrow, the former desire would be a source of disappointment. But the latter desire would not, since the content of the desire is implicitly predicated upon a condition I would know is no longer satisfied, something like: I get my cavity filled (assuming that I will continue to live for a while). See Williams [51].

  22. I have a more general worry about attributing any non-categorical desires to cattle given Cigman’s and Belshaw’s assumptions. As I understand it, if a desire is not categorical, then by definition its content is conditioned on one’s continued existence, at least implicitly. Note that the difference between categorical and non-categorical desires must be a matter of conditional content, since the existence of all desires is trivially conditioned on the desirer’s continued existence. Yet it seems inconsistent to both affirm that cattle have desires with content containing conditionals concerning their continued life and deny that cattle understand themselves as creatures who persist through time. I am inclined to conclude that the categorical/non-categorical distinction is not as useful as it appears in this context. Then again, it may be that my understanding of this distinction is unorthodox or confused.

  23. A related issue which many ethicists have taken to be important is whether animals such as cattle form valuable relationships with humans in captivity. Many ethicists argue that it is possible for humans and animals like cattle to become friends and that these friendships, or the possibility of these friendships, generate special reasons against eating, mistreating, objectifying, or killing some animals (proponents of views in this vicinity include [54], [55], [56], [57], [58]; cf. Torres [59], who argues that Aristotle is committed to this view, and Carter and Charles [60], who tackle the topic from a sociological perspective). Suffice to say that if captive cattle form friendships with humans (and this may not happen very often, see Causey [61]), then the fact that death destroys these friendships is probably another thing that makes death bad for cattle.

  24. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.

  25. Cf. Kolbe [63], who argues that because of how the meat and dairy industries are structured, consuming dairy is in some ways ethically worse than consuming meat.

  26. My thinking in this paragraph and elsewhere has been heavily influenced by Draper [67]. Draper argues that “a complete account of the evils in death must be pluralistic,” p. 396. Cf. Scheffler [20 pp. 21–22].

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Acknowledgements

The idea for this paper originated out of several conversations I had with Julie Huzzey, an animal scientist at Cal Poly, SLO, who generously taught me about cattle, gave me a tour of Cal Poly’s dairy farm, and introduced me to some lovely cows and calves. I thank her for her time and attention. Thanks are also due to my intimates (especially Catelynn Kenner) who over the last few years repeatedly and generously indulged my screeds about cattle. Finally, thanks to three anonymous reviewers who provided me with incisive comments, which greatly strengthened the paper.

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Story, D. The Badness of Death for Sociable Cattle. J Value Inquiry (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-023-09945-6

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