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Notes
See David Solomon, ‘Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics.’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 12 (1988): 428–441; Thomas Hurka ‘Aristotle on Virtue: Wrong, Wrong and Wrong,’ in J. Peters (ed.), Aristotelian Ethics in Contemporary Perspective (New York, Routledge, 2013): 9–26; and Tom Angier ‘Aristotle and the Charge of Egoism,’ The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 52, No. 4 (2018): 457–478.
Swanton writes, ‘one would think that by now the self-centredness objection has been well and truly dealt with by virtue ethicists. But the objection never seems to go away. This suggests that it is more serious than virtue ethicists have taken it to be.’ Christine Swanton, ‘Two Problems for Virtue Ethics,’ in N. Snow (ed.), Cultivating Virtue: Perspectives from Philosophy, Theology, and Psychology (New York, Oxford University Press, 2015): 111–134, p. 112.
Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 134.
This is often referred to as a eudaimonistic approach. We may contrast the virtuous agent described here with the Kantian virtuous agent, who, when trying to figure out how to act virtuously, may have to abstract herself from her particular situation, and ask, whether the maxim that she wishes to act on is universalizable.
He writes, ‘I may now introduce the principle I shall call ‘the Eudaemonist Axiom,’ which once staked out by Socrates becomes foundational for virtually all subsequent moralists of classical antiquity. This is [the thesis] that happiness is desired by all human beings as the ultimate end (telos) of all their rational acts.’ Gregory Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist, and Moral Philosopher (New York, Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 203. And, the type of ‘happiness [in this case] is strictly self-referential: it is the agent’s desire for his [or her] own happiness and that of no one else.’ Ibid., p. 203.
Daniel Russell, ‘Virtue Ethics, Happiness, and the Good life,’ in D. Russell (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2013): 7–28, p. 19.
Anne Baril insists that what makes a virtue ethical theory eudaimonistic is its endorsement of what she calls eudaimonism’s central recommendation (ECR): viz. that ‘a human being ought to organize his or her life so that it realizes eudaimonia.’ Anne Baril, ‘Eudaimonia in Contemporary Virtue Ethics,’ in S. Van Hooft (ed.), The Handbook of Virtue Ethics (New York, Routledge, 2014): 17–27, p. 23. That we need not understand neo-Aristotelianism in such a way, see Jeff D’Souza, ‘Welfare-Prior Eudaimonism, Excellence-Prior Eudaimonism, and the Self-Absorption Objection.’ The Journal of Philosophical Research, Vol. 44 (2019): 237–250.
It is important to note that the crux of the self-absorption objection is formal – as opposed to substantive – in nature. That is, the objection is not at all concerned with what the virtuous agent does, but why she does it. If why she does what she does is understood in terms of her own eudaimonia – where the good of others is included because their good is seen as promoting that of the agent – such an account, so the objection goes, is nonetheless self-absorbed. The mere fact that it is her own eudaimonia – as opposed to the eudaimonia of others, or the eudaimonia of the polis, etc. – that ultimately motivates her to act is what proponents of this objection find troublesome.
While proponents of the self-absorption objection differ slightly in their understanding of ‘one’s own eudaimonia,’ many (including Thomas Hurka, for example) are happy to grant that one’s own eudaimonia includes the eudaimonia of at least some others. This does not take away from the fact that reference to one’s own eudaimonia is what really motivates the virtuous agent to act virtuously.
The target here is typically understood as those accounts of moral motivation on which the virtuous agent is described as acting virtuously primarily for the sake of her own eudaimonia. One ought to – proponents of the self-absorption objection insist – act virtuously primarily for non-self-regarding reasons. See Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 55–68.
Here, it is important to note that precisely what is objectionable about this account of moral motivation varies from proponent to proponent of the objection. For Henry Sidgwick, self-regarding motives are morally inferior to other-regarding motives, and we have a duty to swap out lower motives for higher ones, insofar as we can. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981). For H.A. Prichard, the character of individuals is to be assessed essentially in terms of their motivation, and if we all act for self-interested or bad motivations, then there really is no such thing as a good person. H.A. Prichard, ‘Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?.’ Mind, Vol. 21 (1912): 21–37. For Michael Stocker and Peter Railton, the self-absorption objection is problematic because it gives rise to the infamous ‘moral schizophrenia’ that prevents us from living well. See Michael Stocker, ‘The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories’ in R Crisp & M Slote (eds.) Virtue Ethics (New York, Oxford University Press, 1997): 66–78; and Peter Railton, ‘Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 13 (1984): 134–171. For Thomas Hurka, an agent who makes the ultimate end of all her actions her own eudaimonia may accurately be described as selfish, for she takes her own life to be greater and more valuable than the lives of others, whose lives are (roughly) equally valuable. See Thomas Hurka, ‘Self-Interest, Altruism, and Virtue.’ Social Philosophy & Policy, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1997): 286–307. And, for Christopher Toner, the self-absorption objection is problematic because it misrepresents the true standing of the virtuous agent in the world. As a result, such an agent cannot stand in the right relation to the good. See Christopher Toner, ‘The Self-Centredness Objection to Virtue Ethics.’ The Royal Institute of Philosophy, Vol. 81 (2006): 595–617.
For an in-depth analysis of these three approaches, and for detailed arguments for why they fall short, see Jeff D’Souza, ‘The Self-Absorption Objection and Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics. American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 92, No. 4 (2018): 641–668. Many of the more promising attempts to address the self-absorption objection tend to adopt more than one approach. Annas’ attempt, for example, contains elements of a developmental and a reconceptualization approach.
The most famous proponent of this approach is Julia Annas. She writes, ‘we have just seen that it is the fact that virtue is ‘self-effacing’ in the way that practical skills are (that is, that explicit reasons in terms of virtue cease to be explicitly present in the person’s deliberations) that enables us to see how virtue in a eudaimonist account is not egoistic in any way. It also enables us to see how natural it is for us to come to think of living virtuously (at least partly) constituting living happily.’ Julia Annas, Intelligent Virtue (New York, Oxford University Press, 2011) p. 163.
For example, the virtuous agent may be said to act bravely from a firm disposition, and ‘as a result of experience, reflection, and habituation … because people are in danger and need help.’ Ibid., p. 159.
By ‘underlying motivation’ I simply mean a deeper-seated motivation that explains both (1) why an individual begins to cultivate a virtuous disposition, and (2) why an individual may be said to maintain such a disposition throughout one’s life.
The buck cannot stop with the occurrent motivation because as John McDowell correctly emphasizes, any rationale given for why a virtuous agent acts virtuously or cultivates a virtuous disposition must be seen against the agent’s background beliefs regarding how to live. See John McDowell, ‘Virtue and Reason.’ Monist, Vol 62 (1979): 331–350. Or, as Julia Annas puts it, ‘I may want to be healthy to have a career, to have a family, as part of being happy, but I don’t want to be happy as part of a means to something further. It’s just what I want; a terminus to my other goals.’ Annas, Intelligent Virtue, op. cit., p. 124.
This approach was first popularized by Terence Irwin. See Terence, Irwin. Aristotle’s First Principles (New York: Oxford Publishing Company, 1988.) Rosalind Hursthouse, Daniel Russell and Mark Lebar all offer two standpoint approaches that are directed at addressing the self-absorption objection. See, Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, Op. cit.; Daniel, Russell. Happiness for Humans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); and Mark Lebar, ‘Virtue Ethics and Deontic Constraints.’ Ethics, Vol. 119 (2009): 642–671.
This is put in different ways by different philosophers. Some talk in terms of a ‘justification within a practice’ in contrast with a ‘justification outside a practice’ and others adopt a distinction between ‘moral reasoning’ or ‘reasons from virtue’ and ‘prudential reasoning’ or ‘eudaimonistic reasoning.’ Daniel Russell cashes this out in terms of ‘reasons for acting in the virtue of the ends one has,’ and ‘reasons to have those ends in the first place.’ Russell, Happiness for Humans, op. cit., p. 26.
Most virtue ethicists hold what Timothy Chappell calls ‘the prudentialistic presumption’: viz., that the moral requires explanatory grounding in the prudential. If virtue ethicists instead held what Chappell calls ‘the moralistic presumption’ – i.e., that the prudential requires explanatory grounding in the moral – then two standpoint approaches could adequately address the self-absorption objection. See Timothy Chappell, ‘Kalou Heneka,’ in J. Peters (ed.), Aristotelian Ethics in Contemporary Perspective (New York, Routledge, 2013), 158–173.
Dennis McKerlie, ‘Aristotle and Egoism.’ The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 36, No. 4 (1998): 531–551, p. 540.
Ibid., p. 540. Or, as Julia Annas puts it, Aristotle is ‘committed to the unity of practical reasoning – not just in the weak sense demanded by any eudaimonist theory that takes practical reasoning to be aimed at a single overall goal, happiness, but in a stronger sense that brings together all kinds of factors in a single kind of unified deliberation.’ Julia Annas, ‘Aristotle and Kant on Morality and Practical Reasoning’ in S. Engstrom & J. Whiting (eds.), Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty. (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1996): 237–260, p. 247.
See Stocker, ‘The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories’, op. cit., p. 67. Or as Peter Railton puts it, ‘we must somehow give an account of practical reasoning that does not merely multiply points of view and divide the self – a more unified account is needed.’ See Railton, ‘Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,’ op. cit., p. 139.
The most common strategy here is to give an account of eudaimonia in terms of human excellence as opposed to human welfare. See Christopher Toner, ‘Virtue Ethics and the Nature and Forms of Egoism.’ Journal of Philosophical Research. Vol. 35 (2010): 275–303.
Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, op. cit., p. 8.
Simply saying, as some have tried, that my eudaimonia must be my ultimate aim because ‘what life can I live other than mine?’ or that ‘it would be absurd as well as objectionable for me to try to live your life’ miss the point. Annas, Intelligent Virtue, op. cit., p. 156. While it is true that I can only live my own life, the ultimate end that I adopt – unless one is a psychological egoist – need not be my living well or my own eudaimonia. E.g. as Christine Swanton correctly points out, ‘the life of a courageous freedom fighter; that of the charitable worker whose suffering is not mitigated by religious purpose, the virtuously creative and persevering artist whose work is unrecognized in his lifetime, and the persevering environmentalist who is ahead of his time in foreseeing environmental disaster but is not listened to’ all may be understood as acting virtuously in ways that do not promote one’s own eudaimonia. See Christine Swanton, ‘Eudaimonist Versus Target Centred Virtue Ethics.’ Teoria, Vol. 38 No. 2 (2018): 42–53, p. 44.
To be sure, making one’s ultimate aim the giving of oneself a good life, need not lead to one having a good life. Following Hursthouse, it could simply be one’s most ‘reliable bet’ at living well. See Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, op. cit., p. 173.
She writes, ‘but my happiness is my living happily, and what life can I live other than mine?’ See Annas, Intelligent Virtue, op. cit., p. 156.
Lebar, ‘Virtue Ethics and Deontic Constraints,’ op. cit., p. 645.
Toner, ‘Virtue Ethics and the Nature and Forms of Egoism,’ op. cit., p. 279.
I.e., so long as rationality – which aims at one’s own good – and morality – which aims at something akin to the human good – cannot come apart, the pursuit of one entails the pursuit of the other, and the self-absorption objection cannot be adequately addressed. It also, as I show below, cannot really get off the ground.
Anne Baril, ‘The Role of Welfare in Eudaimonism.’ The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 51, No. 4 (2013): 511–535, p. 531
Hurka, Perfectionism, op. cit., p. 55. It is important to note that even among neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists there is disagreement on precisely how we ought to understand the virtuous agent’s final end. While all seem to agree that it ought to be understood essentially as a good life for the one living it, some understand the goodness of such a life in an ‘excellence-prior’ sense and others in a ‘welfare-prior’ sense. For more on this distinction, see Baril, ‘The Role of Welfare in Eudaimonism,’ op. cit., p. 511–535. (2013). For an excellent rebuttal of Baril’s view, see Christopher Toner ‘Virtue Ethics and Egoism,’ in L. Besser-Jones & M. Slote (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Virtue Ethics (New York: Routledge, 2015): 345–356.
As Dennis McKerlie writes, ‘readers may think that egoistic eudaimonism is the natural way of understanding Book I of the Ethics. Book I picks out eudaimonia as the uniquely fundamental goal. Other important goals, including the virtues, are envisaged as falling under it, either being treated as means to eudaimonia or included inside it as constituents. And it seems to many that when Aristotle discusses eudaimonia in Book I, he is thinking of an agent deciding how to realize eudaimonia in his own life. What should I aim at (my) pleasure, or (my) honor, or (my) contemplation?’ McKerlie, Dennis, ‘Aristotle and Egoism.’ The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 36, No 4 (1998): 531–551, p. 541
I.e., nowhere in Aristotle’s writings does he explicitly state that the virtuous agent ought to make his ultimate aim his own eudaimonia. Whiting writes, ‘the NE does not actually specify the agent’s own eudaimonia as the ultimate end of all of her actions.’ Jennifer Whiting, ‘The Nicomachean Account of Philia,’ in R. Kraut (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (Massachusetts, Blackwell Publishing, 2006): 276–304, p. 277.
Richard, Kraut. Aristotle on the Human Good (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 145. Cp. Timothy Chappell’s account. He writes, ‘Aristotle makes it quite clear that his initial question ‘what is eudaimonia?’ is very close in sense to the question ‘‘what is the human good?’ (See e.g. 1098a17)… At this point in his argument, eudaimonia is his name for the good human life, whatever that turns out to be. It is as if he starts with a sentence-frame that runs ‘eudaimonia is….’ and is looking for something to fill in the dots. In this sense, he can equally well start with a sentence-frame that runs ‘the human good is… or the best life for humans is… and look to fill that in.’ Timothy Chappell, ‘Eudaimonia, Happiness, and the Redemption of Unhappiness.’ Philosophical Topics, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2013): 27–52, p. 36.
Whiting, ‘The Nicomachean Account of Philia,’ op. cit., p. 277. And, the list goes on. McKerlie claims that ‘Aristotle believes that I should consider my own eudaimonia when my own life is in question, and that I am also obligated to make the good of others – their eudaimonia a fundamental aim.’ Dennis McKerlie, ‘Friendship, Self-Love, and Concern for Others in Aristotle’s Ethics.’ Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 11 (1991): 85–101, p. 87.
For a full defense of these two claims, see D’Souza, ‘Welfare-Prior Eudaimonism, Excellence-Prior Eudaimonism, and the Self-Absorption Objection.’ op. cit., p. 242–243.
The altruistic eudaimonist account of motivation is intended to illuminate the kind of thought process and reasoning the person on the road to virtue might experience before ultimately deciding to cultivate and maintain a virtuous disposition because doing so is good qua human goodness. To be sure, it is not meant to describe a particular individual, and is not meant to prescribe a single route that all wishing to acquire virtue in the strict sense must take. In keeping with the neo-Aristotelian tradition, the person on the road to virtue is to be understood as an exemplar.
This sketch is based loosely on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (EN). Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin. (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999.) All references to the EN in this paper are from Irwin’s translation.
Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, trans. Anthony Kenny. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 1214b: 7–11. Cf. Thomas Hobbes. He writes, ‘for there is no such thing as a Finis ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor Summum Bonum, (greatest Good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Morall philosophers… I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power that ceaseth onely in Death.’ Thomas, Hobbes. Leviathan. (New York: Penguin Books Ltd, 1985), p. 160–161.
The criteria I have in mind here are the same as Aristotle’s: viz, that such a life ought to be something active, in one’s own control, stable, self-sufficient, final, and distinctly human. Aristotle, EN. op. cit., 1097a15–1098a21.
One may wonder on what particular type of philosophy of action can ‘recognizing and understanding that something is good’ lead to an agent bringing about said good. Here, I have in mind what Gavin Lawrence calls ‘The Traditional Conception of Practical Reason’ which he (I think correctly) attributes to Aristotle’s virtuous agent. See Gavin Lawrence, ‘The Rationality of Morality’ in G. Lawrence & R. Hursthouse (eds.) Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995): 89–148.
In Hurka’s terms, this account is best described as an ‘outside-in’ approach – as opposed to an ‘inside-out’ approach – because the virtuous agent acts virtuously not because doing so is good for her, or constitutive of her own living well, but because of ‘normative factors’ (viz., human goodness) that the virtuous agent is directed toward. Hurka, ‘Aristotle on Virtue: Wrong, Wrong and Wrong,’ op. cit., p. 24–25.
For example, Daniel Russell writes, ‘in a word, and in the terms I have briefly introduced here, I shall say that happiness is a life of embodied virtuous activity.’ See Russell, Happiness for Humans, op. cit., p. 7.
As Hursthouse writes, ‘the Aristotelian view of human nature is that, qua rational, it can be perfected by getting our inclinations into harmony with our reason. If my inclinations are not in harmony with my reason, and if getting them into harmony is something that human rationality can achieve, then the people whose inclinations are in harmony are, ceteris paribus, better human beings, closer to excellence (virtue), than I am.’ Rosalind Hursthouse, ‘Are Virtues the Proper Starting Point for Morality?,’ in J. Driver (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory (Massachusetts, Blackwell Publishing, 2005): 97–112, p. 104.
This is necessary for the virtuous agent to meet what Annas refers to as the ‘articulacy requirement.’ See Annas, Intelligent Virtue, op. cit., p. 16–51.
As Jennifer Whiting, I think correctly points out, ‘instead of taking the legitimacy of brute self-love for granted and seeking – as on rational egoist readings – to extend it to others, Aristotle argues in IX.8 that brute self-love is not justified.’ Whiting, ‘The Nicomachean Account of Philia,’ op. cit., p. 291.
As T.H. Irwin notes, ‘for it is plausible to assume that answers to the questions ‘What is the good for F?’ and ‘What is a good F?’ both depend on the answer ‘What is F?’ Both the good for a dog and goodness of a dog seem to depend on the sort of thing a dog is.’ Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles, op. cit., p. 352.
Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, op. cit., p. 403.
N.B. It does not follow that just because the person on the road to virtue is not partial to her own eudaimonia when trying to decide the kind of life she wishes to lead, results in her being committed to acting impartially toward all. As Aristotle correctly reflects, ‘should you do a service for your friend rather than for an excellent person, and return a favour to a benefactor rather than do a favour for a companion, if you cannot do both?’ … surely it is not easy to define all of these matters exactly. For they include many differences of all sorts – in importance and unimportance, and in the fine and in the necessary.’ Aristotle, EN 1164b: 25–29.
The examples to choose from are many. For instance, she may think of having to throw herself on a grenade to save her comrades, or donating an organ with significant risks to her own health, or risking injury protesting an unjust law.
I take it that sometimes promoting the eudaimonia of others will also promote my own eudaimonia, and sometimes promoting my own eudaimonia will also enhance the eudaimonia of others. However, I think common-sense pushes us to accept the fact that at least sometimes the two can come apart. For a defense that the two – acting virtuously and acting in accordance with one’s own eudaimonia – can come apart, see Christine, Swanton. Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) p. 80–81.
A full neo-Aristotelian defense of such a view would need to show that acting virtuously is (1) more complete, (2) more choiceworthy (3) more distinctly or characteristically human, and so on, than securing one’s own eudaimonia. Such a defense is forthcoming by the author.
It is important to note that the only deviation proposed herein from standard neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics – such as Rosalind Hursthouse’s articulation in On Virtue Ethics – is the particular underlying motivation of the virtuous agent. All other features – such as virtue ethics being concerned with ‘being’ as opposed to ‘doing,’ it’s focus on one’s life as a whole, the importance of emotions, intent, disposition, and character, and the use of virtue vocabulary, such as saying that someone acted ‘admirably,’ ‘justly,’ ‘kindly,’ ‘charitably,’ ‘generously,’ etc. – is left intact.
The altruistic eudaimonist account of motivation, as it stands, is open to being labelled ‘anthropocentric,’ insofar as it does not address the way in which plants, non-human animals, the environment, etc. ought to factor in and motivate the virtuous agent to act virtuously. Some may insist that such an account while perhaps not ‘self-absorbed’ is ‘species-absorbed,’ and given the current rate at which we are destroying our planet is equally, if not more troubling. Here, there are two important points to note. First, recall, the main aim in this paper was to introduce a fourth type of approach that can adequately address the self-absorption objection as understood by its critics. Insofar as proponents of the-self absorption objection only take issue with the virtuous agent prioritizing her own eudaimonia over the eudaimonia of others, the focus and contents of this paper, and the three theses discussed are justifiable. That said, a full account of the altruistic eudaimonist account of motivation would have to show how it can adequately capture non-anthropocentric concerns, and such a project is forthcoming by the author. Second, this paper almost exclusively deals with the underlying motivation of the virtuous agent; i.e. the last and ultimate reason one can give for deciding to cultivate and maintain a virtuous disposition. Precisely, what makes a virtue a virtue – e.g. individual flourishing, human flourishing, standing in the right relation to the good, a targeted-centred account, etc. – what the virtues are, or whether the virtues should be applied in a self-referential or impartial manner, I have remained silent on. Even if non-human concerns do not feature in the underlying motivation of the virtuous agent, this does not mean that the moral virtues do not require the virtuous agent to act in non-anthropocentric, virtuous ways.
See Nicholas, White. Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics (New York: Oxford University Publishing Company, 2002).
Perhaps John McDowell is one such example. He writes, ‘with the equation understood this way round, it is because a certain life is a life of exercises of human excellence, or, equivalently, because it is a life of doing what it is the business of a human being to do, that the life is in the relevant sense the most satisfying life possible for its subject, circumstanced at each point as he is.’ John McDowell, ‘The Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle’s Ethics,’ in A. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (California, University of California Press, 1980): 359–370, p. 370.
As Michael Slote has emphasized, it is unclear how, say, a general concern for all humankind may be said to promote one’s own flourishing or eudaimonia. It may very well be that one can get along quite well without any such concern. See Michael, Slote. Morals from Motives (New York, Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 3–9.
Such other-regarding actions may, no doubt, contribute somewhat to the agent’s own eudaimonia – e.g., it could bring her pleasure to do good, or could provide her with an opportunity to act virtuously – but the thought behind the fusionist’s argument is that it essentially contributes to her own eudaimonia.
Such a view seems to be more Stoic than Aristotelian. For further examples of the difficulty in trying to understand what most of us would deem as self-sacrificial acts as being good for us, see Dan Haybron, ‘Well-being and Virtue,’ Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2007): 1–27.
It is important to note that most virtue ethicists reject fusionism. As Daniel Russell correctly emphasizes, ‘lastly, how far is this emphasis on human fulfillment to go? If we keep pushing this thought, we might end up characterizing happiness as ‘being a good specimen of humanity,’ for instance; but that sounds more like our goodness than like our good. The life of a good human specimen is obviously some sort of ‘good life,’ but recall that happiness is a good life for the one living it, and being a good specimen is not that sort of good.’ Russell, ‘Virtue Ethics, Happiness, and the Good life,’ op. cit., p. 19.
Swanton, ‘Eudaimonistic versus Target Centred Virtue Ethics,’ op. cit., p. 49.
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I would like to thank Dr. Mark Johnstone for his comments on a previous version of this paper.
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D’Souza, J. Altruistic Eudaimonism and the Self-Absorption Objection. J Value Inquiry 55, 475–490 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-020-09748-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-020-09748-z