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Democracy’s Value: A Conceptual Map

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Figure 1

Notes

  1. See Harry Brighouse, “Egalitarianism and Equal Availability of Political Influence,” The Journal of Political Philosophy, 4(1996), pp. 118–141; Thomas Christiano, The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), “Is Democracy merely a Means to Social Justice?” (in Reeve A. and Williams A. (eds.), Real Libertarianism Assessed: Political Theory after Van Parijs, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 172–200, “Debate: Estlund on Democratic Authority” Journal of Political Philosophy 17(2009), pp. 228–240; Christopher Griffin, “Democracy as a Non-Instrumentally Just Procedure,” Journal of Political Philosophy, 111(2003), pp. 111–121; Lisa Hill, “Voting turnout, Equality, Liberty and Representation: Epistemic Versus Procedural democracy,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 19(2016), pp. 283–300; Maria Paula Saffon and Nadia Urbinati, “Procedural Democracy, the Bulwark of Equal Liberty,” Political Theory 41(2013), pp. 441–481; Nadia Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014).

  2. See Richard Arneson, “Debate: Defending the Purely Instrumental Account of Democratic Legitimacy,” Journal of Political Philosophy, 11(2003), pp. 122–132; Jason Brennan, The Ethics of Voting (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), “The Right to a Competent Electorate,” Philosophical Quarterly, 61(2011), pp. 700–724, Against Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016); Ronald Dworkin, “What is Equality? Part 4: Political Equality,” University of San Francisco Law Review, 22(1987), pp. 1–30; David Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Robert Goodin, Reflective Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Hélène Landemore, Democratic Reason (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017); Claudio López-Guerra, Democracy and Disenfranchisement: The Morality of Electoral Exclusions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Thomas Mulligan, “Plural Voting for the Twenty-first Century,” The Philosophical Quarterly 68(2017), pp. 286–306, “On the Compatibility of Epistocracy and Public Reason,” Social Theory and Practice 41(2015), pp. 458–476); Josiah Ober, Democracy and Knowledge: Innovation and Knowledge in Classical Athens (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Afred A. Knopf Inc, 1999); Ilya Somin, Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government is Smarter (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013); Robert Talisse, Democracy and Moral Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Philippe Van Parijs, “Is Democracy Compatible with Justice?” The Journal of Political Philosophy 4 (1996), pp. 101–117, “The Disenfranchised of the Elderly, and Other Attempts to Secure Intergenerational Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 27(1999), pp. 290–333).

  3. Elizabeth Anderson, “What is the Point of Equality?” Ethics, 103(1999), pp. 287–337, “Democracy: Instrumental vs. Non‐Instrumental Value” (in Christiano T. and Christman J. (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), pp. 213–227; Samuel Scheffler, “What is Egalitarianism?,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 31(2003), pp. 5–39; Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983); Niko Kolodny, “Rule Over None II: Social Equality and the Justification of Democracy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 42(2004), pp. 287–336; Eric Beerbohm, In Our Name: The Ethics of Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Jeffry Howard, “The Labors of Justice: Democracy, Respect, and Judicial Review,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 22(2019), pp. 179–199.

  4. Jack Knight, Hélène Landemore, Nadia Urbinati & Daniel Viehoff, “Roundtable on Epistemic Democracy and Its Critics,” Critical Review 28(2016), p. 141.

  5. See Christine Korsgaard, “Two Distinctions of Goodness,” The Philosophical Review, 92(1983), pp. 169–195; Rae Langton, “Objectivity and the Unconditioned Value,” The Philosophical Review, 116(2007), pp. 157–185.

  6. Despite their differences, both Langton and Korsgaard acknowledge the possible differences between the values of things and how we value things. In their view, it does not follow that a thing has instrumental value from the fact that we value it instrumentally. The former claim in fact tells us something about how the thing is like, while the latter one expresses how we think the thing is like. The debate on the metaphysics of values is complex and it cannot be adequately discussed here. Thus, I remain neutral with respect to this debate.

  7. As democratic theories are the object of this paper, I have been forced to ignore important disagreements in value theory and simplify some theoretical distinctions. Such a taxonomy, therefore, may not be acceptable to all value theorists. However, it should not be too controversial such that it could be accessible to democratic theorists.

  8. This view of friendship is similar to the Aristotelian idea of friendship based on character. Aristotle thought that “[t]hose who wish good things to their friends for the sake of the latter are friends most of all, because they do so because of their friends themselves, and not coincidentally” (David Ross, Nichomachean Ethics, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 1156b9–1156b11).

  9. Rae Langton, “Objectivity and the Unconditioned Value,” The Philosophical Review, 116(2007), p. 163.

  10. My definition of symbolic values is similar to Ben Bradley’s notion of ‘signatory value’. According to Bradley, this latter is something that “could be good not because of what it causes or is a means to, but rather because of what it signifies” (“Extrinsic Value,” Philosophical Studies 91(1998), p. 110). For discussions on symbolic values as extrinsic and non-instrumental values, see Shelly Kogan, “Rethinking Intrinsic Value,” Journal of Ethics 2(1998), p. 109, and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, “Instrumental Values: Strong and Weak,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5(2002), p. 33.

  11. Clarence I. Lewis suggested the presence of contributory values in his work An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (Indianapolis: Open Court, 1946). Lewis’ notion was subsequently elaborated by Robert Olson’s “The Good”, in P. Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: MacMillan Co. & the Free Press, 1967).

  12. In debates on democratic theory, these background conditions are represented by the main features of a pluralistic post-industrial society.

  13. Philippe Van Parijs, “Hybrid Justice, Patriotism and Democracy: A Selective Reply”(in Andrew Reeve and Andrew Williams (eds.), Real Libertarianism Assessed: Political Theory after Van Parijs, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), p. 213.

  14. For some claims to the intrinsic value of democracy, see Charles Beitz, Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Harry Brighouse, “Political Equality and the Funding of Political Speech,” Social Theory and Practice, 21(1995), pp. 473–500; “Egalitarianism and Equal Availability of Political Influence,” Journal of Political Philosophy 4(1996), pp. 118–141, “Democracy and Inequality,” (in A. Carter A. & G. Stokes, (eds.), Democratic Theory Today, Cambridge: Cambridge Polity Press, 2002); Allen Buchanan, “Political Legitimacy and Democracy,” Ethics, 122(2002), pp. 689–719; Thomas Christiano, The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory, “Is Democracy Merely a Means to Social Justice?” (in Andrew Reeve and Andrew Williams, (eds.), Real Libertarianism Assessed: Political Theory after Van Parijs, New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2003), The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Christopher G. Griffin, “Democracy as a Non-instrumentally Just Procedure,” Journal of Political Philosophy 111(2003), pp. 111–121; Joshua Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy” (in Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit (eds.), The Good Polity, Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), “Democratic Equality,” Ethics 99(1989), pp. 727–775; Maria Paula Saffon and Nadia Urbinati, “Procedural Democracy, the Bulwark of Equal Liberty,” Political Theory 41(2013), pp. 441–481; Nadia Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured.

  15. Harry Brighouse, “Political Equality and the Funding of Political Speech,” Social Theory and Practice, 21(1995), pp. 473–500, “Egalitarianism and Equal Availability of Political Influence,” Journal of Political Philosophy 4(1996), pp. 118–141, “Democracy and Inequality,” (in A. Carter A. & G. Stokes (eds.), Democratic Theory Today, Cambridge: Cambridge Polity Press, 2002); Thomas Christiano, The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory, “Is Democracy Merely a Means to Social Justice?” (in Andrew Reeve and Andrew Williams (eds.), Real Libertarianism Assessed: Political Theory after Van Parijs, New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2003), The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and its Limits; Christopher Griffin, “Democracy as a Non-instrumentally Just Procedure,” Journal of Political Philosophy 111(2003), pp. 111–121.

  16. Thomas Christiano, The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and its Limits, p. 13.

  17. Thomas Christiano, The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and its Limits, p. 88.

  18. Christopher Griffin, “Democracy as a Non-instrumentally Just Procedure,” Journal of Political Philosophy 111(2003), p.119.

  19. Thomas Christiano, The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory, p. 67.

  20. Thomas Christiano, “The Authority of Democracy,” Journal of Political Philosophy 12(2004), p. 86.

  21. Thomas Christiano, The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and its Limits, p. 88.

  22. Christopher Griffin, “Democracy as a Non-instrumentally Just Procedure,” Journal of Political Philosophy 111(2003), p.119.

  23. Daniel Viehoff, “The Truth in Political Instrumentalism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. CXVII, Part 3(2017), p. 277.

  24. Daniel Viehoff, “The Truth in Political Instrumentalism,” p. 195.

  25. Maria Paula Saffon and Nadia Urbinati, “Procedural Democracy, the Bulwark of Equal Liberty,” Political Theory 41(2013), pp. 441–481.

  26. Nadia Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p. 147.

  27. Maria Paula Saffon and Nadia Urbinati, “Procedural Democracy, the Bulwark of Equal Liberty,” p. 468.

  28. Eric Beerbohm, In our Name: The Ethics of Democracy.

  29. Eric Beerbohm, In our Name: The Ethics of Democracy, p. 36.

  30. Eric Beerbohm, In our Name: The Ethics of Democracy, p. 37.

  31. Thomas Christiano, “Reply to Critics of the Constitutions of Equality,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2011), p. 2.

  32. Thomas Christiano, “Reply to Critics of the Constitutions of Equality,” p. 3.

  33. Thomas Christiano, The Constitutions of Equality, p. 276.

  34. Corey Brettschneider, “Judicial Review and Democratic Authority,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2011), p. 8.

  35. Corey Brettschneider, “Judicial Review and Democratic Authority,” p. 6.

  36. Corey Brettschneider, Democratic Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 143–144.

  37. Philippe Van Parijs, “Hybrid Justice, Patriotism and Democracy: A Selective Reply”, p. 212–214.

  38. Furthermore, Van Parijs points out that democracy can be unjust also with respect to immigrants who may have immigrated due to economic hardships in their home-country. Since the global economic disparities are mainly due to state boundaries (somebody might experience economic difficulties only because she happened to be born in one country rather than another), justice would require letting capital and workers move freely. However, contrary to justice, democratic political systems tend to defend the interests of the majority by endorsing closed-border policies to discourage the arrival of new immigrants (Philippe Van Parijs, “Justice and Democracy: Are they Incompatible?” Journal of Political Philosophy, 4(2), pp. 108–109).

  39. This is Christiano’s standpoint in “Is Democracy Merely a Means to Social Justice?”, pp. 172–197.

  40. Richard Arneson, “Democracy Is Not Intrinsically Just” (in Keith Dowding, Robert E. Goodin and Carole Pateman (eds.), Justice and Democracy: Essays for Brian Barry, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004), p. 42.

  41. Richard Arneson, “Debate: Defending the Purely Instrumental Account of Democratic Legitimacy,” Journal of Political Philosophy, 11(2003), pp. 122–132.

  42. According to Sen, the superiority of democratic forms of governance is proven also by the fact that “no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press”, Development as Freedom, p. 152.

  43. For an instrumental justification of democracy on the basis of its ability to guarantee decent socio-economic living conditions for citizens, see Ronald Dworkin, “What is Equality? Part 4: Political Equality,” University of San Francisco Law Review, 22(1987), pp. 1–30; Philippe Van Parijs argues that democratic institutions are truly desirable only if they can bring social justice (See his “Justice and Democracy: Are they Incompatible?” Journal of Political Philosophy, 4(1996), pp. 101–117).

  44. David Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework,; Robert Goodin, Reflective Democracy; Hélène Landemore, Democratic Reason; Robert Talisse, Democracy and Moral Conflict.

  45. David Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework, p. 160.

  46. Jason Brennan, The Ethics of Voting (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), “The Right to a Competent Electorate,” Philosophical Quarterly, 61(2011), pp.700–724, Against Democracy; Claudio López-Guerra, Democracy and Disenfranchisement: The Morality of Electoral Exclusions; Thomas Mulligan, “Plural Voting for the Twenty-first Century,” The Philosophical Quarterly 68(2017), pp. 286–306, “On the Compatibility of Epistocracy and Public Reason,” Social Theory and Practice 41(2015), pp. 458–476); Ilya Somin, Democracy and Political ignorance: Why Smaller Government is Smarter.

  47. For a detailed defense of the average voter’s ignorance thesis, see Brian Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007) and Jason Brennan, The Ethics of Voting.

  48. Also Van Parijs, who values democracy instrumentally, suspects that other approaches may maximize the required value better than democracy. See Van Parijs’ “The Disenfranchised of the Elderly, and Other Attempts to Secure Intergenerational Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 27(1999), pp. 290–333.

  49. Thomas Mulligan, “Plural Voting for the Twenty-first Century,” The Philosophical Quarterly 68(2017), pp. 286–306; Jason Brennan, The Ethics of Voting; Claudio López-Guerra, Democracy and Disenfranchisement: The Morality of Electoral Exclusions.

  50. Nadia Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured, p. 82.

  51. Jack Knight, Hélène Landemore, Nadia Urbinati & Daniel Viehoff, “Roundtable on Epistemic Democracy and Its Critics,” Critical Review 28(2016), p. 152.

  52. Niko Kolodny, “Rule Over None II: Social Equality and the Justification of Democracy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 42(2014), p. 292; Elizabeth Anderson, “What is the Point of Equality?,” Ethics 103(1999), pp. 287–337, “Democracy: Instrumental vs. Non‐Instrumental Value”, (in Christiano T. and Christman J. (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), pp. 213–227.

  53. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983), p. 29.

  54. Niko Kolodny, “Rule Over None II: Social Equality and the Justification of Democracy,” p. 287.

  55. Niko Kolodny, “Rule Over None II: Social Equality and the Justification of Democracy,” p. 306.

  56. Elizabeth Anderson, “What is the Point of Equality?” Ethics, 103(1999), pp. 312.

  57. Niko Kolodny, “Rule Over None II: Social Equality and the Justification of Democracy,” p. 309.

  58. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Edited by Erin Kelly, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), pp. 130–131.

  59. Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 197. For a recent defense of the relation of an egalitarian distribution of rights and resources and social equality, see Christian Schemmel, “Why Relational Egalitarians Should Care about Distributions,” Social Theory and Practice 37(2011), pp. 365–90.

  60. See Christian Schemmel, “Why Relational Egalitarians Should Care about Distributions,” pp. 365–90.

  61. See Ferreira F., Messina J., Rigolini J., López-Calva L., Lugo M. and Vakis R., Economic Mobility and the Rise of the Latin American Middle Class (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Publications, 2012); López-Calva Luis F. and Nora Lustig, Declining Inequality in Latin America: A Decade of Progress? (Harrisonburg: Brookings Institute Press, 2010).

  62. Eric Beerbohm, In Our Name: The Ethics of Democracy; Jeffry Howard, “The Labors of Justice: Democracy, Respect, and Judicial Review,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 22(2019), pp. 179–199.

  63. Eric Beerbohm, In Our Name: The Ethics of Democracy, p. 37.

  64. Eric Beerbohm, In Our Name: The Ethics of Democracy, p. 29.

  65. Eric Beerbohm, In Our Name: The Ethics of Democracy, p. 29.

  66. Eric Beerbohm, In Our Name: The Ethics of Democracy, p. 37.

  67. Eric Beerbohm, In Our Name: The Ethics of Democracy, p. 42.

  68. Eric Beerbohm, In Our Name: The Ethics of Democracy, p. 36–37.

  69. Jeffry Howard, “The Labors of Justice: Democracy, Respect, and Judicial Review,” p. 186.

  70. Jeffry Howard, “The Labors of Justice: Democracy, Respect, and Judicial Review,” p. 182.

  71. Jeffry Howard, “The Labors of Justice: Democracy, Respect, and Judicial Review,” p. 196, note 17.

  72. Jeffry Howard, “The Labors of Justice: Democracy, Respect, and Judicial Review,” p. 186.

  73. According to Howard, these deviations should be democratically justified. First, because of the pervasive fallibility of human beings’ evaluations, and second, because it is difficult to believe that the duty of justice can justify permanent deviations in practice (Jeffry Howard, “The Labors of Justice: Democracy, Respect, and Judicial Review,” p. 182–183).

  74. Jeffry Howard, “The Labors of Justice: Democracy, Respect, and Judicial Review,” p. 182.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Sor-hoon Tan, Adrian Blau as well as the anonymous reviewer at the Journal of Value Inquiry, for extremely helpful comments on previous versions of this paper. I would like to thank also the organizers and the participants of the political theory workshop held at King's College London in 2016, the 2016 Annual project on Equality at the Centre for Moral and Political Philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and the Philosophy Reading Group at the National University of Singapore for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay.

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    Elena Ziliotti

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Ziliotti, E. Democracy’s Value: A Conceptual Map. J Value Inquiry 54, 407–427 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-019-09717-1

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