Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Confronting the Truth: Epistemological Conflicts between Early Buddhists and Jains

  • Published:
Journal of Indian Philosophy Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The lay follower Citta’s debate with Mahāvīra in the Nigaṇṭha Sutta reflects not just simple polemic, but a fundamental epistemological division between Early Jains and Buddhists. A close reading of the Ācārāṅga Sūtra shows that the Jains see the truth as a property of the self-knowing purified soul that knows all things. For the Buddhists, consciousness is conditioned and dependent. If truth is a property or relation of consciousness, then it too is conditioned and dependent. In order to maintain that truth is the end of the Buddha’s path, Buddhists sever the connection between consciousness and truth by formulating a negative definition of truth. Truth is that which lacks a deceptive nature and accordingly, Nirvāṇa is the ultimate truth. The Buddha’s path culminates in the discovery of truth through the elimination of deception by the annihilation of consciousness, which the Jains hold is impossible because knowledge is essential to the soul.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Translations here and throughout are by the author.

    Atthi avitakko avicāro samādhi, atthi vitakkavicārānaṃ nirodhoti.

  2. On the interactions between early Jains and Buddhists, see Gombrich (2009, pp. 45–59). On competition between śramaṇa movements, see Sayers (2013, p. 9). On their connections, see Long (2009, p. 42).

  3. See Jayatilleke (1963, pp. 352–353), Phillips (2012, p. 6), Harvey (1995, pp. 119–120), and discussion below.

    Typically, in Indian philosophy, truth is defined as a relation of a cognitive state and not of a sentence or proposition. See Phillips (2012, pp. 6–7). See also Matilal, who explains that in Sanskrit a sentence expresses a thought, that is a cognitive state (1998, p. 19).

  4. On the dependence of consciousness, see Balslev (1988, p. 170), Fink (2015, p. 24), Ganeri (2018, p. 359), Gethin (1986, pp. 46–47), Gombrich (2009, p. 125), Hamilton (1996, p. 85), Shulman (2008, p. 299); cf. Smith 2021, 1–2.

  5. Griffiths (1981, pp. 618, 613); cf. Collins (2010, p. 46), Gombrich (2009, p. 126).

  6. Qvarnström (2012, pp. 398–400).

  7. See Schubring (2004, pp. 16–17), Dundas (2002, pp. 70–73), Kapadia (2000, pp. 55–63), Balcerowicz (2021, p. 665), Jaini (1979, p. 52).

  8. je āyā se vinnāyā, je vinnāyā se āyā: jeṇa vijāṇai se āyā.

  9. Malvania (1981, p. 151); cf. Dundas who claims that the AS’s use of the term ātman rather than jīva for soul is “redolent” of the Upaniṣads (2002, p. 44).

  10. On the diversity of claims about the self in the Upaniṣads, see Olivelle (1998, p. 26), Dubois (2013, p. 357, n. 45), Black (2007, pp. 43, 169), Hirst (2018, pp. 109, 117).

  11. Christopher Chapple asserts that the Vedāntas teach the soul is unchanging (2016, p. 131), but this is only true of some of the Upaniṣads.

  12. See Long (2009, p. 91).

  13. On the development of the Jain notion of the soul, see Bronkhorst (2000, pp. 592–589 (sic)).

  14. Balcerowicz (2016, pp. 69–71); cf. Dundas (2002, p. 94). On the date of Kundakunda, see Soni (2020).

  15. See Balcerowicz (2021, p. 666), Harada (2006, pp. 1126–1127), Long (2009, pp. 91–92), Dundas (2002, p. 93). Cf. Clavel, who notes that cognition is “an innate faculty of the soul” (2015, p. 156, n. 4).

  16. esa maraṇā pamuccai, se hu diṭṭha-bhae muṇī; logaṃsi parama-daṃsī.

  17. [a]ivijjaṃ ‘paramaṃ’ ti, 1.3.2.iv.

    Soni, following Schubring, translates: “[protection] is the highest” (2004, p. 96), where [ ] indicates that “protection” is added. There does not seem to be any good reason for the addition.

  18. aṇanna-parama-nnāṇī no pamāe kayāi vi.

  19. Schubring (2004, p. 97). Jacobi has: “one should never be careless” (1884, p. 32).

  20. se hantā chettā bettā lumpittā vilumpittā uddavettā uttasaittā, 1.2.1.3.

  21. For an example of an optative of future possibility, see Pischel (1981, pp. 386–387).

  22. abhibhūya addakkhū aṇabhibhūe, pahū nirālaṃbaṇayāe je mahaṃ abahī-maṇe.

  23. je ajjhatthaṃ jāṇai, se bahiyā jāṇai; je bahiyā jāṇai, se ajjhatthaṃ jāṇai, 1.1.7.1.

  24. āyāṇa-soyam aivāya-soyam.

  25. Schubring (2004, p. 133). Jacobi translates more loosely: “the current of worldliness, the current of sinfulness” (1884, p. 81).

  26. Ghatage (1996–2019, v. 3, 1026 & v. 1, 26).

  27. Monier-Williams (1899, p. 1274).

  28. Jaini (1979, p. 267).

  29. je egaṃ jāṇai, se savvaṃ jāṇai; je savvaṃ jāṇai, se egaṃ jāṇai, 1.3.4.1.

  30. See Sūtrakṛtāṅga 2.2.31, where Mahavira is said to know everything in the world (nāeṇaṃ jagasavvadaṃsiṇā).

  31. On the omniscience of the purified soul in the Jain tradition, see Balcerowicz (2016, pp. 59–71, 91), Long (2009, p. 90), Dundas (2002, pp. 88–89).

  32. Tattvārtha Sūtra 1.29: sarvadravya-paryāyeṣu kevalasya. On Umāsvatī’s dates, see Dundas (2002, p. 86).

  33. Kalupahana (1994, pp. 51–52), Gethin (1992, p. 108), Herman (1983, pp. 241, 244), Jayatilleke (1963, pp. 352–353), Phillips (2012, p. 6), Harvey (1995, pp. 119–120).

  34. Jayatilleke (1963, p. 358), Harvey (1995, pp. 110–112).

  35. Gombrich contends that “it makes no sense in English to say that nirvana is truth” (2009, p. 156), but that is what the Nikāyas assert.

  36. Yañ-ñad-eva bhikkhave paccayaṃ paṭicca uppajjati viññāṇaṃ tena ten’ eva saṅkhaṃ gacchati: cakkhuñ-ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati viññāṇaṃ, cakkhuviññāṇan-t’ eva saṅkhaṃ gacchati. … Seyyathā pi bhikkhave yañ-yad-evā paccayaṃ paṭicca aggi jalati, tena ten’ eva saṅkhaṃ gacchati.

  37. Gombrich (2009, p. 125).

  38. Kellner (2011, p. 414).

  39. Kellner (2010, p. 204).

  40. Albahari (2006, pp. 162–164).

  41. Fink (2015, p. 26).

  42. Yena viññāṇena tathāgataṃ paññāpayamāno paññāpeyya, taṃ viññāṇaṃ tathāgatassa pahīnaṃ ucchinnamūlaṃ tālāvatthukataṃ anabhāvakataṃ āyatiṃ anuppādadhammaṃ; Viññāṇasaṅkhāvimutto kho Vaccha tathāgato, gambhīro appameyyo duppariyogāho seyyathā pi mahāsamuddo, upapajjatīti na upeti, na upapajjatīti na upeti, upapajjati ca na ca upapajjatīti na upeti, neva upapajjati na na upapajjatīti na upetīti.

  43. Harvey (1995, pp. 199–196. Harvey (1989, pp. 80–84) and Tse-fu Kuan (2020, p. 347) each argue that Nirvāṇa consciousness is without object and therefore it is unconditioned, but then it would be a consciousness of nothing, which is no consciousness at all.

  44. See Anālayo (2017, p. 13).

  45. Anālayo (2017, p. 19).

  46. Harvey adopts the reading paha, which he translates as “accessible” or “drawing back”, but still takes the passage to refer to Nirvāṇa (1995, pp. 205–206).

  47. Dīrghāgama 長阿含經, 102c17: 識無形, 無量自有光.

  48. Brahmāli (2009, p. 45, n. 49).

  49. Kattha āpo ca paṭhavī tejo vāyo na gādhati?

    Kattha dīghañ ca rassañ ca aṇuṃ thūlaṃ subhāsubhaṃ?

    Katta nāmañ ca rūpañ ca asesaṃ uparujjhatīti?

  50. Viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ anantaṃ sabbato pahaṃ.

    Ettha āpo ca paṭhavī tejo vāyo na gādhati,

    Ettha dīghañ ca rassañ ca aṇuṃ thūlaṃ subhāsubhaṃ,

    Ettha nāmañ ca rūpañ ca asesaṃ uparujjhati,

    Viññāṇassa nirodhena etth’ etaṃ uparujjhatīti.

  51. Brahmāli (2009, pp. 45–47, 45, n. 50), Collins (1982, p. 207).

  52. Taṃ hi, bhikkhu, musā, yaṃ mosadhammaṃ. Taṃ saccaṃ yaṃ amosadhammaṃ nibbānaṃ; Tasma evaṃ samannāgato bhikkhu iminā paramena saccādhiṭṭhānena samannāgato hoti. Etaṃ hi, bhikkhu, paramaṃ ariyasaccaṃ, yadidaṃ amosadhammaṃ nibbānaṃ.

  53. 756. Anattani attamānaṃ passa lokaṃ sadevakaṃ,

    Niviṭṭhaṃ nāmarūpasmiṃ ‘idaṃ saccan’ ti maññati.

    757. Yena yena hi maññanti tato taṃ hoti aññathā.

    Taṃ hi tassa musā hoti, mosadhammaṃ hi ittaraṃ.

  54. Ñāṇamoli (1995, p. 1093).

  55. On apoha, see Coseru (2012, p. 18); Matilal (1986, pp. 1–2, 15–16), Matilal (1971, p. 44), Shah (1981, p. 253).

  56. Although there is some disagreement about the precise meeting of avisaṁvādin, it is clearly a negative form. Helmut Krasser takes it to be “reliable”, but that is not a very literal translation (2001, p. 174). Shoryu Katsura takes it to be a criterion of non-contradiction from experience (1984, p. 215), but that is circular since Dharmakīrti is defining pramāṇa, and experience is based on perception that is itself one of the two pramāṇas. Jonathan Stoltz’s interpretation of the criterion as “nondeceptiveness” is best since it clearly fits the meaning of avisaṁvādin and provides a sufficient criterion for truth (2021, pp. 28–30); so also Hayes (1988, p. 315); cf. Franco (1997, p. 45, n.10).

  57. Katsura (1984, p. 227).

  58. Coseru (2012, p. 18).

  59. kāye kāyānupassī … vedanāsu … citte … dhammesu dhammānupassī.

  60. As Lambert Schmithausen, insight is largely negative, concerning the dependence and impermanence of the world (1981, p. 219). On the jhanas ability to deepen insight, see Arbel (2017, p. 200). On concentrative meditation as “indispensable” in the Suttas, see Gombrich (2009, p. 171). Gunaratana distinguishes between the mundane and supermundane jhanas and argues that only the latter are “essential” (1992, p. 213), but the distinction between mundane and supermundane jhanas is not found in the Suttas.

References

Primary texts (listed by abbreviation)

  • AS    Ācārāṅga Sūtra. In Walther Schubring. 1910. Ācārâṅga-Sūtra, Erster Śrutaskandha: Text, Analyse und Glossar. Leipzig: Brockhaus.

  • AU   Aitareya Upaniṣad. In Olivelle. 1998.

  • BU Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. In Olivelle 1998.

  • CU Chāndogya Upaniṣad. In Olivelle 1998.

  • DN   Dīgha Nikāya. In T.W. Rhys Davids & J. Estlin Carpenter, eds. 1890–1911. London: Pāli Text Society.

  • Dīrghāgama 長阿含經. In Junjirō Takakusu & Kaigyoku Watanabe, eds. 1924. Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo, vol. 1. Tokyo: Taisho Shinshu Daizokyo Kanko Kai.

  • Jacobi, Hermann. 1884. Jaina Sutras, Part II. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  • Jambuvijaya, Muni. 1977. Ācārāṅgasūtraṃ Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtraṃ ca: with the Niryukti of Ācārya Bhadrabāhu Svāmī and the Commentary of Śīlāṅkācārya. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

  • KU Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad. In Olivelle 1998.

  • MN   Majjhima Nikāya. In Vilhelm Trenckner & Robert Chalmers, eds. 1888–1925. London: Pāli Text Society.

  • Ñāṇamoli, Bhikkhu and Bhikkhu Bodhi, trans. 1995. The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha. Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society.

  • Olivelle, Patrick. 1998. The Early Upaniṣads. New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Sn Sutta Nipāta. In Dines Andersen and Helmer Smith, eds. 1913. London: Pāli Text Society.

  • SN   Saṃyutta Nikāya. In Léon Feer, ed. 1884–1904. London: Pāli Text Society.

  • SU Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. In Olivelle 1998.

  • Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra. In Jambuvijaya 1977.

  • Umāsvāti. 1976. Tattvārthasūtra Vivecanasahita. Sukhalāla Saṅghavī, ed. Vārāṇasī: Pārśvanātha Vidyāśrama Śodha Saṃsthāna.

  • TU Taittirīya Upaniṣad. In Olivelle 1998.

Secondary sources

  • Albahari, M. (2006). Analytical Buddhism: The two-tiered illusion of self. Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Anālayo, B. (2017). The luminous mind in Theravāda and Dharmaguptaka discourses. Journal of the Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies, 13, 10–51.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arbel, K. (2017). Early Buddhist meditation: The four Jhanas as the actualization of insight. Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Balcerowicz, P. (2016). Extrasensory perception (yogi-pratyakṣa) in Jainism, proofs of its existence and its soteriological implications. In C. K. Chapple (Ed.), Yoga in Jainism (pp. 48–108). Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Balcerowicz, P. (2021). Beginnings of Jain ontology and its models. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 49, 657–697.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Balslev, A. N. (1988). An appraisal of I-consciousness in the context of the controversies centering around the no-self doctrine of Buddhism. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 16(2), 167–175.

    Google Scholar 

  • Black, B. (2007). The character of the self in Ancient India: Priests, Kings, and Women in the early Upaniṣads. State University of New York Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brahmāli, B. (2009). What the Nikāyas say and do not say about Nibbāna. Buddhist Studies Review, 26(1), 33–66.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bronkhorst, J. 2000. Abhidharma and Jainism. In Committee for the felicitation of Professor Doctor Junsho Kato’s sixtieth birthday, Nagoya, ed. Abhidharma and Indian Thought. Shuju-sha: 398–381 (sic).

  • Chapple, C. K. (2016). The Jaina Yogas of Haribhadra Virahāṅka’s Yogabindu. In C. K. Chapple (Ed.), Yoga in Jainism (pp. 125–138). Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clavel, A. (2015). Sensuous cognition—Pratyakṣa or Parokṣa? Jinabhadra’s reading of the Nandīsūtra. In P. Flügel & O. Qvarnström (Eds.), Jaina scriptures and philosophy (pp. 145–163). Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Collins, S. (1982). Selfless persons: Imagery and thought in Theravāda Buddhism. Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Collins, S. (2010). Nirvana: Concept, imagery, narrative. Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Coseru, C. (2012). Perceiving reality: Consciousness, intentionality, and cognition in Buddhist philosophy. Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Dubois, J. A. (2013). The hidden lives of Brahman. State University of New York Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dundas, P. (2002). The Jains (2nd ed.). Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fink, C. K. (2015). Clinging to nothing: The phenomenology and metaphysics of Upādāna in early Buddhism. Asian Philosophy, 25, 15–33.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Franco, E. (1997). Dharmakīrti on compassion and rebirth. Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ganeri, J. (2018). Attention and self in Buddhist philosophy of mind. Ratio, 31, 354–362.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gethin, R. (1986). The five Khandhas: Their treatment in the Nikāyas and early Abhidhamma. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 14, 35–53.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gethin, R. (1992). The path to awakening: A study of the thirty-seven Bodhipakkhiyā Dhammā in the Nikāyas and Abhidhamma. Brill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ghatage, A. M., et al. 1996–2019. A comprehensive and critical dictionary of the Prakrit Languages, vol. 1–8. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

  • Gombrich, R. (2009). What the Buddha thought. Equinox.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Griffiths, P. (1981). Concentration or insight: The problematic of Theravāda Buddhist meditation-theory. Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 49(4), 605–624.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gunaratana, H. 1992. The path of serenity and insight: An explanation of the Buddhist Jhanas. Motilal Banarsidass.

  • Hamilton, S. (1996). Identity and experience: The constitution of the human being according to early Buddhism. Luzac Oriental.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harada, Y. (2006). Mokṣa in Jainism—with special reference to Haribhadra Sūri. Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 54(3), 1126–1132.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harvey, P. (1989). Consciousness mysticism in the discourses of the Buddha. In K. Werner (Ed.), The Yogi and the mystic: Studies in Indian and comparative mysticism (pp. 82–102). Curzon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harvey, P. (1995). The selfless mind: Personality, consciousness and Nirvana in early Buddhism. Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hayes, R. P. (1988). Dignaga on the interpretation of signs. Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Herman, A. L. (1983). An introduction to Buddhist thought: A philosophical history of Indian Buddhism. University Press of America.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hirst, J. S. (2018). Ātman and Brahman in the principal Upaniṣads. In S. Cohen (Ed.), The Upaniṣads: A complete guide (pp. 107–120). Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jaini, P. S. (1979). The Jaina path of purification. University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jayatilleke, K. N. (1963). Early Buddhist theory of knowledge. Allen & Unwin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kalupahana, D. J. (1994). A history of Buddhist philosophy. Motilal Banarsidass.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kapadia, H. R. [1941] 2000. A history of the canonical literature of the Jains, Revised. Sharadaben Chimanbhai Educational Research Centre.

  • Katsura, S. (1984). Dharmakīrti’s theory of truth. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 12, 215–235.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kellner, B. (2010). Self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) in Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya and -vṛtti: A close reading. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 38, 203–231.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kellner, B. (2011). Self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) and infinite regresses: A comparison of arguments by Dignāga and Dharmkīrti. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 39(4/5), 411–426.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krasser, H. (2001). On Dharmakīrtiʼs understanding of Pramāṇabhūta and his definition of Pramāṇa. Vienna Journal of South Asian Studies, 45, 173–199.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuan, T. (2020). Conscious of everything of consciousness without objects? A paradox of Nirvana. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 48, 329–351.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Long, J. D. (2009). Jainism: An introduction. I.B. Tauris.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Malvania, D. (1981). Beginnings of Jaina philosophy in the Ācārāṅga. In K. Bruhn & A. Wezler (Eds.), Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus (pp. 151–153). Franz Steiner.

    Google Scholar 

  • Matilal, B. K. (1971). Epistemology, logic, and grammar in Indian philosophical analysis. Mouton.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Matilal, B. K. (1986). Buddhist logic and epistemology. In B. K. Matilal & R. D. Evans (Eds.), Buddhist logic and epistemology: Studies in the Buddhist analysis of inference and language (pp. 1–30). Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Matilal, B. (1998). The character of logic in India. J. Ganeri & H. Tiwari (eds.). State University of New York Press.

  • Monier-Williams, M. (1899). A Sanskrit-English dictionary. Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Phillips, S. H. (2012). Epistemology in classical India: The knowledge sources of the Nyāya school. Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pischel, R. [1900] 1981. A grammar of the Prākrit Language (2nd Edn). S Jhā, trans. Motilal Banarsidass.

  • Qvarnström, O. (2012). Sāṃkhya as portrayed by Bhāviveka and Haribhadrasūri: Early Buddhist and Jain criticisms of Sāṃkhya epistemology and the theory of reflection. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 40(4), 395–409.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sayers, M. R. (2013). Feeding the dead: Ancestor worship in ancient India. Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Schmithausen, L. (1981). On some aspects of descriptions or theories of ‘liberating insight’ and ‘enlightenment’ in early Buddhism. In K. Bruhn & A. Wezler (Eds.), Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus (pp. 199–250). Franz Steiner.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schubring, W. (2004). Mahāvīra’s Words. W. Bollée & J. Soni, trans. L. D. Institute of Indology.

  • Shah, N. J. (1981). Essentials of Dharmakīrti’s theory of knowledge (Based on the Pramāṇavārttika). In K. Bruhn & A. Wezler (Eds.), Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus (pp. 251–259). Franz Steiner.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shulman, E. (2008). Early meanings of dependent-origination. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 36, 297–317.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith, S. M. (2021). The negation of the self in Indian Buddhist philosophy. Philosophers’ Imprint, 21(13), 1–23.

    Google Scholar 

  • Soni, J. 2020. Kundakunda. In J. E. Cort, et al., eds. Brill's Encyclopedia of Jainism Online. Denison University, University of Edinburgh, University of Bergen, University of California, Berkeley. 2023. https://doi.org/10.1163/25902768_BEJO_COM_045649

  • Stoltz, J. (2021). Illuminating the mind: An introduction to Buddhist epistemology. Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Matt Sayers and an anonymous reviewer from the Journal of Indian Philosophy for their helpful comments that greatly improved the paper. Also thanks to Deven Patel for his assistance with research materials and to Guy Welbon and Ludo Rocher for their patient and insightful instruction.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Lebanon Valley College, Annville, PA, USA

    J. Noel Hubler

Authors
  1. J. Noel Hubler
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to J. Noel Hubler.

Ethics declarations

Conflict of interest

The author declare that there are no conflicts of interest that could potentially influence or bias the author’s work.

Research involving human rights

No material has been omitted from the presentation and no experiments on human tissue were conducted.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Hubler, J.N. Confronting the Truth: Epistemological Conflicts between Early Buddhists and Jains. J Indian Philos 51, 263–281 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-023-09534-8

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-023-09534-8

Keywords

Search

Navigation