Abstract
A speaker utters the grammatically correct phrase ‘x y’, and the hearer understands its meaning. The Naiyāyika claims that the only epistemic instrument (pramāṇa) that generates the semantic connection (anvaya) between the meaning of x (henceforth |x|) and the meaning of y (henceforth |y|) is testimony (śabda). This connection is essentially the phrase-meaning. The Vaiśeṣika wants inference (anumāna) to generate this connection. After presenting the Vaiśeṣika view on this topic, this paper will argue that, the hearer considers the generic categories of |x| and |y|, and infers their ontic relation which finally will figure in the testimonial cognition. For example, when John tells Smith that ‘Jones smokes’, Smith first cognizes the meanings of the words, i.e., the individual called Jones and the activity of smoking. Then Smith infers that ‘John intends to say that the activity of smoking inheres in Jones, since an activity inheres in an individual.’ Thus, inherence which appears as the sematic connection is inferred in this case. If John is a reliable speaker (āpta), Smith will have a piece of testimonial knowledge. This is how the Vaiśeṣika’s inference could possibly support linguistic creativity.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Ganeri (2011: 92)
Thus, for this paper, the primary meaning of ‘Lincoln’ is part of the word-generated awareness caused by the sentence. The phrase ‘word-generated awareness’ is borrowed from Chakrabarti (1992).
See Matilal (1990: 32–34) for a useful discussion.
See Jetly and Parikh (1991: 499, 502) for Śrīdhara’s comment where this theory is discussed.
See Śrīdhara’s comment in Jetly and Parikh (1991: 503).
Śrīdhara writes: na kevalaṃ laukika āmnāyaḥ, śruti-smṛti-lakṣaṇo ’py āmnāyo vaktuḥ prāmāṇyam apekṣya pratyāyakaḥ (Jetly and Parikh 1991: 506).
Translation: Not only the ordinary words, but also the words of Veda and the Codes of Law yield knowledge only when the speaker is correct and reliable.
A reliable speaker must have a few virtues including knowledge of the relevant topic and the intention to inform correctly.
The semantic connection is the phrasal meaning whereas the meaning of a single morpheme ‘x’ is |x|.
Long before the formation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika syncretic school, the classical Nyāya school raised objections against the inferential model of meaning. Here is a translation of a passage from Nyāyamañjarī (Chapter III) of Jayantabhaṭṭa (Śukla 1936: 140):
A phrase, whose relational content is not known before [hearing it], is capable of generating its meaning. This is evident from the fact that one, who knows the meanings of the words of a newly composed verse, understands its sentential meaning. On the contrary, the relation that constitutes the base for an inference, has to be known before making the inference. Such being the case, how is testimony the same as inference?
In this paper, the entire discussion on formal semantics is based on semantic models presented in Dowty, Wall and Peters (1980). There are a few conventional differences. [|snores|] in Dowty et al. would be the following: \(\left[ {\begin{array}{*{20}c} r & \to & 1 \\ j & \to & 0 \\ m & \to & 1 \\ a & \to & 1 \end{array} } \right]\)
See Dowty et al. (1980: 8).
Langacker (2008: 27).
Langacker (2008: 30).
I shall discuss this later in this paper.
Space Builders such as ‘X believes’, ‘X knows’, prepositional phrases like ‘in x’ etc. would set up Belief Space, Knowledge Space, Spatio-temporal Space etc.
The discussion of specific cases is based on Evans & Green (2006: 372-4).
Dowty, Wall and Peters (1980: 7–10).
We have seen this in the case of ‘Ram snores.’
Cognitive Semanticists too argue against the autonomy of syntax. See Langacker (2008: Section 1.3).
This quote translates a sentence from Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvalī: yena padena vinā yat-padasya anvyayānanubhāvakatvaṃ tena padena saha tasya ākāṅkṣā (Śāstrī 2015: 312–313).
The technical terms in the translation have been borrowed from Ganeri (1999: 56).
According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy, this attempt (kṛti or prayatna) is an attribute, like all other attributes, it is related to the self through inherence. See Nyāyakośa s. v. prayatna in Jhalakīkar (1928: 568)
See Upaskāra in Gough (1873: 286).
Gough (1873: 287): gaur astīti-vākya-śravaṇānantaraṃ gaur astitā-vān, sva-dharmikāstitvānvaya-bodhānukūlākāṅkṣāśraya-pada-smāritatvāt.
The Vaiśeṣika uses their own ontology for determining these relations. The point here is this: our hearer in this case is somebody who is aware of the ontological relations between two ontological categories such as an attribute and a substance.
For a discussion on sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa inference, see Matilal (2005: 72).
Nyāyakośa s. v. yogytā in Jhalakīkar (1928: 676)
There are wonderful articles by Michael C. Frank, Noah D. Goodman and Joshua B. Tenenbaum in this research area.
“Commentarial interest in the ancient ur-text of the Vaiśeṣika system is far less pronounced. While the Maithilī scholar Saṃkara Miśra wrote his well-known Upaskāra, the only philosophers in the post-Raghunātha ‘new reason’ known to have attempted something like a commentary is Raghudeva” (Ganeri 2011: 92).
References
Bronkhorst, J. (2019). A Śabda Reader: Language in Classical Indian Thought. Columbia University Press.
Chakrabarti, A. (1992). On Knowing by Being Told. Philosophy East and West, 42, 421–439.
Dowty, D. R., Wall, R. E., & Peters, S. (1980). Introduction to Montague Semantics. D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Evans, V., & Green, M. (2006). Cognitive Linguistics: An Introduction. Edinburgh University Press.
Ganeri, J. (2011). The Lost Age of Reason: Philosophy in Early Modern India 1450-1700. Oxford University Press.
Ganeri, J. (1999). Semantic Powers: Meaning and the Means of Knowing in Classical Indian Philosophy. Clarendon Press.
Gough, A. E. (1873). The Vaiśeshika Aphorisms of Kaṇāda. E. J. Lazarus & Co.
Guha, N. (2020). Through the Logician’s Strainer: A Nyāya Technique. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 48, 385–400.
Jackendoff, R. (1983). Semantics and Cognition. The MIT Press.
Jetly, J. S., & Parikh, V. G. (Eds.). (1991). Nyāyakandalī. Oriental Institute.
Jhalakīkar, B. (1928). Nyāyakośa or Dictionary of Technical Terms of Indian Philosophy. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.
Langacker, R. W. (2008). Cognitive Grammar: A Basic Introduction. Oxford University Press.
Matilal, B. K. (1990). The Word and the World: India’s Contribution to the Study of Language. Oxford University Press.
Matilal, B. K. (2005). Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis. J. Ganeri (Ed.). Oxford University Press.
Śāstrī, H. S. (Ed.). (2015). Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī. Chaukhamba Prakashan.
Śukla, S. N. (1936). Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa. Jayakrishna Das Haridas Gupta. The Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series Office.
Acknowledgements
I acknowledge my indebtedness to Prof. Achla Raina and Prof. Gautam Sengupta for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Guha, N. The Inferential Model of Meaning: An Abandoned Route. J Indian Philos 49, 641–655 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-021-09478-x
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-021-09478-x