Abstract
This paper is a preliminary study of Bhāviveka’s Svātantrika-Mādhyamika justifications for taking non-existent things as the subject (pakṣa) of an inference, based on his Dacheng Zhangzhen Lun (*Karatalaratna). Bhāviveka’s treatment of inference is similar to that of Dignāga in that the subject is required to be existent. Bhāviveka also holds that, in a conventional sense, words refer to universals and to the existent entities that possess them, while the two are cognised together. However, in his inference for the unreality of unconditioned things, he likens these things (the subject) to a sky-flower (the example, dṛṣṭānta) that never arises and is unreal even conventionally. This paper first demonstrates how taking unconditioned things (being non-existent) as the subject of an inference can be problematic for Bhāviveka. Then, it discusses Bhāviveka’s attempts to address the problems by subsuming the unconditioned things under the domain of conventional reality. The paper concludes that these attempts show his flexibility in terms of what is taken as conventionally real.
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Fong, L.Y. Non-existent Things as Subject of Inference in Bhāviveka’s Dacheng Zhangzhen Lun. J Indian Philos 47, 795–810 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-019-09404-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-019-09404-2