Abstract
The discussion of the debate on the two approaches to Husserl’s phenomenology and of the debate between David Carr and Dan Zahavi on the paradox of subjectivity signify a fundamental problem: What is the relationship between subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and the world? For this problem, I argue that subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and the world are Co-originary in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, in the sense of their structural necessity. I define this co-originary relationship from the perspective of unification of constitution and givenness—this unification establishes their equiprimordial relationship. According to this co-originariness, subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and the world are not three isolated and independent origins, but are interdependent and absolute origins of sense of being in their own right. In sum, this essay proposes that transcendental co-originariness can be recognized as another way of reading Husserl’s phenomenology.
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Notes
Patricio Perkins sorts out various theories of the ways to Husserl’s phenomenology and makes a classified analysis (see Perkins 2017.
Husserl (1954). Die Krisis der Europäsichen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie. Edited by W. Biemel. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff (Hua 6); (1970). The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. Translated by D. Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press (abbr. Crisis).
This view of Sokolowski inspires me to understand “constitution” in the sense of transcendental dialectic of the poles and to develop a theory of the unification of givenness and constitution, which will be discussed later.
Welton proposes the co-originariness of subjectivity and the world from the perspective of intentionality (2000: 93). I discern the merits of Welton’s theory, but he does not include intersubjectivity in the co-originariness. Husserl believes that intersubjectivity is the transcendental condition for the possibility of the constitution of subjectivity in the full-fledged subjectivity and of the constitution of the objective world. Intersubjectivity contributes to the possibility of the co-originariness of subjectivity and the world. The important role of intersubjectivity playing in transcendental constitution and also in the co-originariness of subjectivity and the world is discussed in the following passages.
It should be noted that Smith has a discussion of the relationship between subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and objectivity. He argues that subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and objectivity are integrated and interdependent, and claims that Husserl has a systematic philosophy of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and objectivity, see Smith (2013, 2019).
To a large extent, I agree with Smith. But I care more about the relationship between subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and the world from the perspective of structural necessity in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. I define their relationship as transcendental co-originary. The investigation of the transcendental co-originariness and of the transcendental condition for them to be origins is my research focus. Particularly, I mainly interpret this idea of Co-originariness from the perspective of the unification of constitution and givenness.
The German term Gleichursprünglichkeit is first used by Heidegger in an adjectival form only four times, see GA 2: 223, 270, 408, 509. This term is translated by Maquarrie & Robinson as “equiprimordial” in Being and Time. I translate it as “co-originary” or “co-original”. Husserl does not use the concept by himself. However, he does use the term “original” [Ursprünglich] frequently, see Hua. 1: 14, 35, 37, 44, 62, 72, 132, 135, 140, 141, 166, 193; Hua. 6: 172, 197, 321, 358, 423. I think this concept of “co-originary” is also applicable to Husserl to prescribe the relationship between subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and the world.
The co-originariness of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and the world means that the three cannot be separated from each other, and should be understood as a structural totality. But in order to illustrate this idea clearly, I artificially divide them into three pairs of co-originariness. I will fully discuss these three pairs of co-originariness in other papers.
I am thankful to the anonymous reviewer of the Human Studies for this interesting suggestion.
For me, there is one important difference between Husserl and Jean-Luc Marion on givenness. I argue that givenness for Husserl is not absolute but unified with constitution. For Marion who proposes to go back to the thing itself, givenness is absolute with unconditional primacy, and he claims that the phenomenological breakthrough lies solely in unconditional primacy of the givenness of the phenomenon, see Marion (1998: 32f.).
Constitution can be understood in two senses. In the general sense, its first meaning refers to the subjective activity of consciousness to reveal the sense of intentional objects. Its second meaning, besides the first meaning, also includes the givenness of subjective horizon, intersubjective horizon, and the horizon of the world. In the narrow sense, constitution refers to the first meaning of constitution used in the general sense, mainly referring to the subjective experience to make things meaningfully show to subjectivity. The general sense of constitution is broader than and contains the narrow sense of constitution. In the unification of constitution and givenness, constitution is mainly used in the narrow sense. In other cases, especially when we generally talk about Husserl’s transcendental constitution, constitution refers to the second meaning in the general sense.
Both of the two meanings of givenness are frequently used, but particularly in discussing the unification of givenness and constitution, I mainly use givenness in the second sense.
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Zhang, J. Transcendental Co-originariness of Subjectivity, Intersubjectivity, and the World: Another Way of Reading Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology. Hum Stud 44, 121–138 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-021-09573-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-021-09573-8