Abstract
The term “clear and distinct” is used by both Descartes and Husserl when they talk about the truth of an idea and the evidence of judgment. Although the words “clear” and “distinct” are juxtaposed with the conjunction “and,” this does not mean that their status is equal. If the concept of “evidence” can be used to characterize the hierarchical relationship between them, then we can say that, for Descartes, distinct evidence is higher than clear evidence. For Husserl, on the contrary, clear evidence is higher than distinct evidence. Their opposing views concerning the hierarchy between clarity and distinctness is symptomatic of the differences between their two understandings of the epistemological relationship between intellect and sensibility, as well as of their respective ontological reach.
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Notes
We should not forget that, in German, Vorstellung has been the term used to translate the Latin idea. We cannot, here, analyze this issue with due regard. It suffices to point out that, similarly to Descartes' ideas, Husserl's representations are ways to refer to reality. However, while in Descartes it seems that ideas never “directly” put us into touch with reality, in Husserl there are intuitive modes of representation, and signally sensuous perceptions, that are considered to be able to give the things themselves. This is an aspect of difference between Husserl's and Descartes' general epistemology which has to be kept in mind in order to understand the difference in their ordering of clarity and distinctness. We will say more about this in the conclusions. In addition, we should also note that an authoritative interpreter, Steven Nadler, has proposed to read Descartes' theory of ideas as a form of Direct Realism (Nadler 1989, 2006). I will not consider this view here, however, and will endorse the more classical “representationalist” reading of Descartes' theory.
The most extensive studies of Husserl's theory of evidence I am aware of where the issue of clarity and distinctness is pointedly considered are those of George Heffernan (1983, 1988, 1997, 1998, 2009). Heffernan points out that Husserl's theory is actually closer to the Leibnizian refinement of Descartes' theory than to Descartes' theory itself. In my view, however, Heffernan does not analyze the specific reasons for Husserl's reversal, and the broader bearing this has for the difference between Husserl's and Descartes' epistemologies and ontologies in general. Also MacDonald (1999), which to my knowledge is still the only monograph devoted to the influence of Descartes on Husserl, does not propose a thorough analysis of the Husserlian reversal of Descartes' order between clarity and dinstinctness. This is the task I have assigned to this article.
We put “demonstrative” within inverted commas because, as is well-known, Descartes often insists that he does not want to properly demonstrate God in the same way we come from true premises to deduce some previously unknown truths. Rather, its “demonstration” should be understood in heuristic terms, as helping us to consider better what we already know, i.e. to “clarify” our mind, or better, our ideas—ideas which, indeed, were already there. On Descartes' argumentative strategy, and on the, at least apparent, flawed circularity of Descartes' argument, the literature is more than abundant. See, in particular, Nolan (2014).
On this, see the insightful analyses of Hintikka (1962).
Obscurity can concern the expression by means of which a logical or mathematical idea is expressed, but once we manage to decipher it, then the idea is clear. As we will see in the last part, Descartes does not properly consider the distinction between “signitive” and “intuitive” ideas.
In this sense, a “direct realist” reading of Descartes' theory of ideas seems to have solid reasons on its side. As previously mentioned, though, I will not follow this interpretative line here.
The other writing in which Husserl most directly deals with the process of “clarification” is Ideas III, signally Ch. 4 (Hua V, pp. 94–105). I thank an anonymous referee for directing me to this text, which basically confirms my reading of Husserl's reversal of Descartes' hierarchy between clarity and distinctness as being grounded on a different hierarchy between sensibility and intellect as regards their ontological reach.
In the English translation of Formale und Transzendentale Logik, Dorion Cairns translates the term “Bedeutung” as “signification”, and “Meinung” as “meaning”; however, in the translation of Logische Untersuchungen, J. N. Findlay translates “Bedeutung” as “Meaning”, “Meinung” as “meaning”.
Husserl does not provide any reason as to why he replaced the term meaning with the term judgment. However, according to Suzanne Bachelard, the reason for doing so is clear, namely, “to employ the term judgment is to adhere to a strictly logical terminology, which is appropriate to the scope of Formal and Transcendental Logic” (Bachelard 1968, p. 11.) In my opinion, when Husserl in LU dealt with the formal laws of meaning, he was dealing with the laws of combination and modification not only of words or singular meanings, but also of propositions or judgments. However, in FTL, he deals mainly with the formal laws of derivation, combination, and modification of propositions or judgments. Hence, he replaced the term meaning with judgment.
In this regard, consider that for Husserl all judgments are ultimately predicative judgments, including existential judgments. See Husserl (1999, §§73–75).
Some might argue that this level does not refer to the truth of the “stuff” or “material” of judgment. However, it seems to me that Husserl brings in the material content when he discusses truth-logic.
In German, the form of the adjective is the same as the form of the adverb, while in English they are different. As an adverb it refers to the subjective activity of how we achieve the judgment, and by implication it can also refer to the judgment that is given (then it would be an adjective, but only because of the activity that brought it about).
It is obvious that Husserl is speaking here of “blind” intentions, i.e. (merely) linguistic intentions. According to Husserl, the evidence of vagueness already presupposes the givenness of a formation of language, which is received passively as “judgment”, as categorial thought, by associative synthesis (Hua XVII, p. 323/325). For “without the definite articulation of vague judgments by means of the sensuous articulations of verbal signs, no theory of forms, no logic whatever, would be possible—and, of course, no science either” (Hua XVII, pp. 75–76/71). See also Lohmar (2000, p. 49).
It is clear that in such cases “to judge” has a generally different meaning that it has in Descartes. It simply means to formulate a complex thought but not necessarily to affirm the existence of the corresponding state of affairs.
This is one of Husserl’s fundamental insights, namely that when our judgments are vague we may be holding contradictory judgments; only when we bring them to distinctness does the issue of contradiction arise.
In Husserl’s view, though a belief could be cancelled by the ego, it remains in our consciousness in a particular manner—as our earlier beliefs or “habits” (Habitualitäten), as a part of our history of meanings.
This is an important distinction, between actually fulfilling the judgment by having a perception that fulfills it, and seeing that the judgment can be fulfilled but not actually fulfilling it.
Lohmar claims that “the clarity of anticipation is, on the contrary, supposed to signify the turn of the distinct judgment-performing to an interest in the capacity of truth of judging, an interest, which is also possible in the framework of formally defined forms of statement” (Lohmar 2000, p. 56).
Lohmar holds that in a theory of science (Wissenschaftslehre), the possible truth of a judgment has to be called into question. It must clarify to what extent its possible statements can reach. Here the fulfillment of the cognitive intention to the things themselves is not involved (Lohmar 2000, p. 47). The logic of truth, then, is connected with, and has as its key element, the method of so-called “eidetic variation”.
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Zhang, H. Descartes and Husserl on “Clear and Distinct”. Husserl Stud 35, 51–72 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-018-9236-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-018-9236-5