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What to make of Mendeleev’s predictions?

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Abstract

I critically examine Stewart’s (Found Chem, 2018) suggestion that we should weigh the various predictions Mendeleev made differently. I argue that in his effort to justify discounting the weight of some of Mendeleev’s failures, Stewart invokes a principle that will, in turn, reduce the weight of some of the successful predictions Mendeleev made. So Stewart’s strategy will not necessarily lead to a net gain in Mendeleev’s favor.

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Notes

  1. For some reason, Stewart discusses only 15 predictions, not the sixteen that Scerri lists in his Table (see Scerri 2007, 142, Table 5).

  2. The Bayesian program in philosophy of science is concerned with this same question. That is, Bayesians want to provide a framework and set of principles for determining how we should update our beliefs in a theory or hypothesis in light of new evidence, which may include evidence derived from predictions. This is a controversial research program, and the framework has been criticized on a number of grounds. Still, it enjoys an enthusiastic following (see, for example, Howson 2014).

  3. The role of accident and contingencies in the development in science is explored in greater detail in Scerri’s A Tale of Seven Scientists and a New Philosophy of Science (see Scerri 2016).

  4. My point is predicated on the fact that chemists were wholly unaware of the existence of isotopes until the early twentieth century (see Scerri 2007; Wray 2017).

  5. The predictivism/accommodation debate originated with an exchange between William Whewell and John Stuart Mill (see Barnes 2008, 8–9).

References

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Acknowledgements

I thank Eric Scerri for constructive feedback on an earlier draft of this paper. I also thank the referee for Foundations of Chemistry for their comments on the paper.

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Correspondence to K. Brad Wray.

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Wray, K.B. What to make of Mendeleev’s predictions?. Found Chem 21, 139–143 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10698-018-9313-z

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