Abstract
Against the reason holists (e.g. Dancy 2014), it has been contended by many reason atomists that while many features might well change their reason statuses or valences in different contexts in the way suggested by reason holists, they are merely secondary rather than primary reasons. In these atomists’ scheme of things, there are features that function as primary reasons whose reason statuses remain invariant across contexts. Moreover, these features provide the ultimate source of explanations for why some features, qua secondary reasons, are variable in their reason statuses. Against the background of reason holism, this two-level picture of moral reason has been highly influential as an alternative theory of how moral reasons behave, and has been championed by several eminent philosophers such as Roger Crisp, Brad Hooker, David McNaughton and Piers Rawling. Call this theory ‘primary reason atomism’ (or PRA). Since its advancement, it has been met with lots of challenges, yet most, if not all, of these challenges remain unaddressed, insofar as I could see. This article will pick up the slack, and argues that none of its existing powerful criticisms works that can be derived from Swanton’s target-center view of the virtues, Stangl’s virtue variabilism, Dancy’s bottom-up holism, and coverage challenge, McKeever & Ridge, and Väyrynen’s double-counting objection, and Scanlon’s buck-passing account of values. This may not prove PRA to be right, but at least shows PRA to be a serious contender for the right theory of how moral reason behaves.
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Notes
It is no wonder that reason holism has won many supporters. See for instance Dancy (1993, 2000, 2004); Darwall (2013); Schroeder (2011); Swanton (2001, 2003); Scanlon (2015); Bader (2016); McKeever & Ridge (2006); Väyrynen (2006a), Lance and Little (2008). It is to be noted that Scanlon, McKeever & Ridge, Väyrynen, Lance & Little and arguably Schroeder hold that reason holism is compatible with the existence of principles of one form or another, and therefore does not lead straightforwardly to moral particularism. See Tsu (2018) for a useful recent survey on the issue of whether reason holism leads to moral particularism.
Kirchin (2017, pp. 1–2) makes a similar observation about the morally thick. In addition, Kirchin, along with a few others (e.g. Elstein & Hurka 2009), offers illuminating discussions of whether the descriptive component of the morally thick can be disentangled or separated from the evaluative component. We need not go into them here. Cf. Roberts (2013).
The morally thick are typically contrasted with the morally thin, features that are purely evaluative, or features such as goodness/badness or rightness/wrongness. On the other hand, in contrast with the purely descriptive features (such as stealing or lying), the morally thick do not merely describe the characteristics of actions (or character traits for that matter), but also evaluate them as good or bad. For instance, in calling an action dishonest, we do not seem to be merely describing a characteristic it has, but also condemning it.
In this regard, the PRAs distinguish their position from that of Little (2000), who also holds the view that reason holism is a local phenomenon, true only of the purely descriptive, but not of the morally thick, but does not thereby treat the morally thick as primary in their reason statuses in the sense just explained. That is, Little is not committed to the view that the variable reason statuses of the purely descriptive features in different contexts are explained by whether they bring about the morally thick. Caveat: Little’s view seems to have altered a little in Little and Lance (2008), where they maintain that rules of the morally thick (e.g. cruelty is wrong) are defeasible generalisations.
Mutatis mutandis, the remark here also applies to Dancy’s famous ‘Contraband’ example which Dancy (1993, pp. 60–61) uses to show that the feature of telling a lie is not a reason against action in the context of the Contraband game. Yet, the PRAs have a ready explanation for this: doing so is not dishonest (as it is permitted by the rules of Contraband) and therefore does not constitute a reason against action in that context, as it normally would in other contexts.
One reviewer also made a very observant comment about a military spy who might be commended for his/her deceiving the Nazi officers to save the Jews. This might well show, as the reason holists would like to maintain, that deception is not a reason against action in that context, Yet, this does not harm PRA, as the PRAs agree, as I have pointed out earlier, that reason holism might well be true of descriptive properties such as telling a lie or deceiving, but such properties’ reason status is merely secondary in the sense that it is dependent on how the descriptive properties relate to the morally thick. In the case of spies at hand, it is not unimaginable that the PRAs would explain it away by contending that deceiving the Nazi officers to save the Jews is not a reason against action because it is not dishonest (Honesty does not require you to reveal your identity in this case).
One reviewer perceptively remarked that rule-utilitarianism of the sort advocated by Brad Hooker (2000a) might well be regarded as a version of this alternative type of primary reason atomism as well. See Woodard (2022), especially Sections 3 and 4, for relevant illuminating discussions. The reviewer also remarked that this alternative type of primary reason atomism might also be endorsed by (on a certain interpretation) contractualism or Kantianism; I am very sympathetic and would think that this alternative sort of primary reason atomism is prevalent and worth considering in its own right (independently from the sort discussed in this paper).
A caveat: Crisp (2008, p. 37) maintains that the primary/ultimate reason might well be provided by well-being (a non-morally-thick feature). Yet, this only illustrates that the sort of primary reason atomism I’m interested in defending in this paper might be distinct from the one espoused by Crisp. But Crisp is certainly not against the idea that the primary reason or ultimate reason might well be provided by the morally thick as well, as is clearly shown by his (2000). As I see it, one might well be a pluralist about primary/ultimate reasons, upholding the view that the sources of primary/ultimate reasons need not be confined to a plurality of the morally thick (or virtues and vices), but can extend to properties such as well-being. Yet, for the purpose of this paper, I focus on the sort of primary reason atomism that employs exclusively the morally thick as primary reason.
As an exegetical observation, some (e.g. Jordan 2013, p. 252; Sandis 2021) have noted that the thick variabilists merely maintain that the virtues, qua morally thick features of an action, have variable valences, but do not endorse the claim that the virtues, qua morally thick character traits, have variable valences. If this interpretation is right, then it’s good news for the thick invariablists, for they would only have to tackle with the purported variable valences of virtues qua morally thick features of actions. However, I suspect that it is the more global claim that the thick variablists want to make. After all, in the case of Blackburn, he explicitly states so; for Blackburn (1992, p. 286), Dutch courage is still courage. In the case of Dancy, he also seems to agree. After all, if courage, qua feature of action, is sometimes right-making, and sometimes wrong-making, it is hard to see why courage, qua character trait, is invariably positively-valenced. Also, the virtuous character trait of caring, for Dancy (1992), isn’t invariably good either. So in this paper, I’ll construe thick variabilism as endorsing the more global claim that virtues, qua features of actions and character traits, are variable in their valences.
One reviewer suggests, following W. D. Ross, that while such an action might well be right or morally permissible, (as an action’s moral permissibility/rightness is determined entirely by its own characteristics rather than by the agent’s motives, according to Ross), yet is not truly benevolent (as motives can affect or even determine the goodness (benevolence) or badness (arrogance) of the action, according to Ross). With this suggestion, I’m very sympathetic. As I will presently argue in the main text, even by Swanton’s own light, she does not appear to be fully confident that helping the poor in dire needs with bad grace is truly benevolent.
As regards the ‘wrong-making’ and ‘right-making’ terminology, I follow an entrenched practice in regarding them as ‘tendency’ notions rather than ‘success’ ones. For instance, if a feature is wrong-making, it has a tendency to make the action that possesses it wrong. It might or might not succeed in making the action overall wrong, depending on what other features the action has; the moral significance of wrong-making features might well be outweighed by that of right-making features. Thanks to a reviewer for his/her suggestion to clarify this.
The original word Swanton used was ‘beneficent’, yet I think she should have used ‘benevolent’ consistently in her article to make the point that benevolent actions can be wrong-making. By the by, Swanton put scare quotes around ‘beneficent’ as well.
We might say the protagonist is ‘too kind’, but for Aristotle, that is misleading – there are no deficiencies or excesses of virtue. Thanks to Roger Crisp for suggesting this point.
Roughly speaking, from a McDowellian perspective, our perceptual apparatus is at the higher level in the sense that it does not merely passively receive the sensations of the descriptive physical properties from the bottom, but also actively interprets them (in terms of concepts).
Eklund (2020, pp. 197–198) made a similar observation about thin concepts such as ‘right’ and ‘good’.
The analogy with twin earth, being what it is, is not meant to prove that dishonesty cannot be a positive reason for action, but is only meant to highlight the fact that things or features that have the same name, for instance ‘water’ or ‘dishonesty’ for that matter, does not therefore mean that the things or features which have very different substances but happen to have the same name are therefore identical. If so, the opponents of PRA cannot maintain that the fact that ‘dishonesty’ that has a non-negative valence in a different form of life is identical with that sort of ‘dishonesty’ that has a negative valence in our form of life, merely on the ground that the sort of features they pick up are both called ‘dishonesty’. If so, the thick variablists, by contending that ‘dishonesty’ has a non-negative valence in a different form of life, hasn’t shown that ‘dishonesty’ as construed in our form of life also has a non-negative valence. In short, the thick variabilists haven’t shown that ‘dishonesty’ as construed in our form of life can have variable reason status. So the PRAs could still dig in their heels by maintaining that ‘dishonesty’ as construed in our form of life is still invariably negatively-valenced (rather than positively-valenced), just as we earthlings could still dig in our heels by maintaining that ‘water’ as construed on earth is still invariably made up of ‘H2O’ (rather than ‘XYZ’).
I thank David McNaughton for suggesting this point.
It’s been put to me that another way to reply is to maintain that the dishonesty in some case consists in the lying and other contextual features. These lower-order properties are reason-giving only insofar as they constitute the higher-order property of dishonesty. Yet the potential problem with this reply is this: suppose that the lower-order properties are indeed (secondary-)reason-giving (i.e. when they indeed constitute the higher-order property of dishonesty), would the higher property of dishonesty constitute another reason (i.e. a primary reason)? If it would, then the problem of double-counting recurs. If it wouldn’t, the PRAs’ claim that dishonesty in this sort of case constitutes the primary reason is self-refuted.
I would be glad if Bader were right (for this would actually help the PRAs make their case). Yet, I have no intention to get myself embroiled in the thorny dispute between Argle and Bargle (Cf. Lewis & Lewis (1970)). Nor do I think it is in the interest of PRAs to do so.
One reviewer suggested that one shouldn’t follow the reason holists in excluding, as a matter of principle, ‘the absence of disablers’ (which is equivalent to ‘the enablers’ by Dancy’s light (2004, p. 41; 2007, p. 90)) out of the ‘complete’ ground. (Cf. Dancy (2004, pp. 47–48)). According to the reviewer, the notion of ‘complete ground’ for/against an action, being what it is and distinguished from partial ground, is supposed to include both features that play the reason role as well as those that play the ‘enabling’ or ‘disabling’ role. In maintaining that the ‘enablers’ or ‘disablers’ do not, as a matter of principle, play a grounding role, reason holism is left with the implausible self-defeating consequence, according to the reviewer, that the reasons cannot be complete grounds (as the notion of ‘complete ground’ entails ‘enablers’ and ‘disablers’ as well). I am very sympathetic with the reviewer’s suggestion (given this construal of ‘complete ground’); perhaps this is another reason for the PRAs not to follow Bader’s metaphysical principle, apart from its inherent controversy. The fallback position for the PRAs is the second route I elaborate in the text: although the morally thick might in theory be incomplete in terms of their reason status (especially when ‘the absence of disablers’ is essentially entailed in the notion of ‘complete ground’), they are in fact complete because they do not, as a matter of principle, have any disablers; ‘the absence of disablers’ is already built into (and therefore included in) the notion of the morally thick, as it were.
A caveat: a hermeneutical difficulty we might encounter here is whether the analogy to Horgan’s position on supervenient mental causation commits us to interpreting buck-passers (such as Scanlon) as taking a specific stand on the debate between naturalism and non-naturalism. After all, as one reviewer shrewdly observes, many take buck-passers to be agnostic about whether naturalism is true or not. In reply, the analogy, as I construe it, is merely meant to illustrate how a supervening/grounded property could still be a reason or a cause without adding an (extra) reason or cause in addition to those already provided by the supervenient base or ground properties. This may or may not have some implications for the debate between naturalism and non-naturalism, depending on whether the relationship of supervenience or grounding is compatible with the supervening/grounded property being reducible to the supervenient base properties/grounding properties. This would be far too complicated to be dealt with properly within the scope of this paper, but can be a very worthwhile topic for a different paper.
Here is Scanlon (2000, p. 97) in What We Owe to Each Other: “The alternative, which I believe to be correct, is to hold that being good, or valuable, is not a property that itself provides a reason…Rather, to be good or valuable is to have other properties that constitute such reasons” (emphasis added). As I have indicated, Scanlon in his 2002 article admits that the evaluative could provide reasons themselves. Yet, as one reviewer shrewdly observes, even in the latter part of What We Owe to Each Other, Scanlon (pp. 206–213) already appears to think the property of fairness, qua evaluative property, can itself provide a reason.
This doesn’t rule out the possibility that some potential criticisms are deadly. This article might well be seen as issuing a challenge to the anti-PRAs to come up with fatal criticisms. Until such criticisms are provided, PRA still remains plausible.
One reviewer makes the very helpful suggestion that a positive argument for primary reason atomism could perhaps be developed from Horgan and Timmons’s ‘morphological rationalism’, according to which the constancy of the reason status of primary reasons might be reflected “in the standing structure of a typical individual’s cognitive system” (Horgan & Timmons 2007, p. 279), “illuminating the situation where moral judgments gets fallen” (Strahovnik 2016, p. 18). I am fully sympathetic but do not have enough space to develop it here. I would leave this for another paper.
I thank the two anonymous reviewers of this journal for their insightful comments. I am also greatly indebted to David McNaughton and Roger Crisp for their generosity in providing illuminating feedback on the earlier versions of this paper. I also thank the following people for very helpful discussions: Kazunobu Narita, Shunsuke Sugimoto, Ryo Chonayabashi, Kaoru Ando, Renjune Wang, Hahn Hsu, Chang Liu, and Sung Hung. Finally, I thank Taiwan’s National Science and Technology Council for financial support for relevant research.
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Tsu, P.SH. What Doesn’t Kill Primary Reason Atomism Will Only Make It Stronger: A Limited Defense. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 26, 431–446 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10364-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10364-6