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Utilitarianism and the Moral Status of Animals: A Psychological Perspective

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Abstract

Recent years have seen a growing interest among psychologists for debates in moral philosophy. Moral psychologists have investigated the causal origins of the opposition between utilitarian and deontological judgments and the psychological underpinnings of people’s beliefs about the moral status of animals. One issue that remains underexplored in this research area is the relationship between people’s disposition to engage in utilitarian thinking and their attitudes towards animals. This gap is unfortunate considering the tight philosophical connection between utilitarianism and the claim that animals have the same moral status as humans. Indeed, the principle of utility leads naturally enough to the view that animals count every bit as much as human beings. In this paper, we report two empirical studies dedicated to bridging this gap. In Study 1, we looked at the relationship between attitudes towards animals and utilitarian judgments in the context of sacrificial dilemmas. In Study 2, we bypassed the problems raised by the use of such dilemmas as a measure of utilitarianism by relying on other types of thought experiments. Overall, our results suggest no strong correlation between utilitarianism and attitudes towards animals. Rather, the existence of a correlation between utilitarianism and attitudes towards animals very much depends on how both are measured.

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Notes

  1. Several studies investigated people’s intuitions about sacrificial dilemmas involving animals (Petrinovich et al. 1993; O’Neill and Petrinovich 1998; Caviola et al. 2021, 2022), but they did not investigate the relationship between attitudes towards animals and the utilitarian weighing of human lives.

  2. The original study is described in Gouiran MD, Cova F, Moral leniency as a possible mediator for the link between reflective cognitive style and utilitarian moral judgment (unpublished manuscript).

  3. Gouiran MD, Cova F, Moral leniency as a possible mediator for the link between reflective cognitive style and utilitarian moral judgment.

  4. This is quite a high average, suggesting that the “moral suboptimality” of certain decisions in the congruent dilemmas described in this measure might not be as obvious as intended.

  5. This analysis was not pre-registered and was added during the analysis.

  6. Jaquet F, Cova F, Beyond moral dilemmas: Investigating utilitarian moral judgment on five separate moral issues (unpublished manuscript).

  7. Jaquet, F. & Cova, F. (2022). Beyond moral dilemmas: Broadening the Psychology of Utilitarian Moral Judgment. Unpublished manuscript, University of Geneva.

  8. The original study is described in Jaquet F, Cova F, Beyond moral dilemmas.

  9. Jaquet F, Cova F, Beyond moral dilemmas.

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation (under Eccellenza grant “Eudaimonic emotions and the (meta-)philosophy of well-being”) and the Université de Strasbourg. For helpful comments, we would like to thank two anonymous referees for this journal, as well as the editors of this special issue, David Killoren and Emilian Mihailov.

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Correspondence to François Jaquet.

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Appendix: Measures of Attitudes Towards Animals

Appendix: Measures of Attitudes Towards Animals

A1. Bègue and Laine (2017)’s two-item measure:

  1. 1)

    Animals are things, livestock.

  2. 2)

    I like animals as if they were beings having a personality. [reverse coded]

A2. Caviola et al. (2019)’s Speciesism Scale:

  1. 1)

    Morally, animals always count for less than humans.

  2. 2)

    Humans have the right to use animals however they want to.

  3. 3)

    It is morally acceptable to keep animals in circuses for human entertainment.

  4. 4)

    It is morally acceptable to trade animals like possessions.

  5. 5)

    Chimpanzees should have basic legal rights such as a right to life or a prohibition of torture. [reverse coded]

  6. 6)

    It is morally acceptable to perform medical experiments on animals that we would not perform on any human.

A3. Jaquet (2021)’s Speciesism Scale:

  1. 1)

    We should always elevate human interests over the interests of animals.

  2. 2)

    When human interests conflict with animal interests, human interests should always be given priority.

  3. 3)

    We should strive to alleviate human suffering before alleviating the suffering of animals.

  4. 4)

    The suffering of animals is just as important as the suffering of humans. [reverse coded]

  5. 5)

    Having extended basic rights to minorities and women, it is now time to extend them also to animals. [reverse coded]

  6. 6)

    Just like discriminating against other races or genders, discriminating against other species is wrong. [reverse coded]

  7. 7)

    Too much fuss is made over the welfare of animals these days when there are many human problems that need to be solved.

  8. 8)

    Animals should be granted the same rights as humans with comparable mental capacities (such as babies and people with severe mental disabilities). [reverse coded]

  9. 9)

    I am as much concerned about pain and suffering in animals as I am about pain and suffering in humans. [reverse coded]

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Jaquet, F., Gouiran, M. & Cova, F. Utilitarianism and the Moral Status of Animals: A Psychological Perspective. Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10322-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10322-8

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