Abstract
For many of the moral beliefs we hold, we know that other people hold moral beliefs that contradict them. If you think that moral beliefs can be correct or incorrect, what difference should your awareness of others’ disagreement make to your conviction that you, and not those who think otherwise, have the correct belief? Are there circumstances in which an awareness of others’ disagreement should lead you to suspend a moral belief? If so, what are they, and why? This paper argues that three principles, taken together, give us a good answer to these questions; that they license a form of provisional moral self-trust; and that they reveal an interestingly distinctive form of pragmatic encroachment in relation to the epistemic standards governing moral belief.
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Notes
For discussion, see (Buchak 2014).
For the introduction of the term “epistemic peer” to refer to those who have similar “intelligence, perspicacity, honesty, thoroughness, and other relevant epistemic virtues”, see (Gutting 1982): 83. For two-condition definitions of epistemic peers, see (Matheson 2015); (Kelly 2005): 173–4. For a three-condition definition, see (Gowans 2010): 40.
See (Frances 2014): 22–6.
On good forms of inarticulate responsiveness to morally relevant reasons, see Cullity (2018).
For a critical overview of the debate between epistemological internalism and externalism, see (Kornblith 2001).
See (Schroeder 2011): 2–9; (Wedgwood 2006). This does not require saying that “ought” is ambiguous, with different senses. One might instead think that sentences containing “ought” can express different propositions although the word itself is univocal – as is true of indexical words like “I” and “here” (following the treatment applied to modal terms by (Kratzer 1977)).
Under normal circumstances, this disposition will be one that he has good reasons to try to rectify. There can be exceptions to this; but even so, we can still have good reasons to maintain an evaluative standard with respect to which his imprudence is faulty. For further discussion of the relationship between normative reasons and evaluations of rationality, see Cullity (2008).
In a further twist, suppose that although I am better placed, my belief is false. Then the “ought” of advice can also be used to advise me that I ought to believe it is right to take the car.
For the stronger view that moral understanding and not mere true moral opinion is the epistemic ideal for moral belief, see (Hills 2009).
(Sidgwick 1981): 342.
Moreover, he immediately goes on to say that the state is only temporary – he oscillates between suspending and reaffirming his judgement. I don’t claim that Sidgwick himself held the “Sidgwickian” principles that follow –only that they are suggested by what he says. For an account of Sidgwick’s moral epistemology, see (Skelton 2010)—on his treatment of disagreement, see pp. 496, 500–501. Compare (Wedgwood 2010), Section 2, for the rejection of what he calls “Sidgwick’s principle” on different grounds.
For extension and elaboration of this list, see (Montmarquet 1993).
On the epistemic value of diversity among those who form convergent beliefs, see (Audi 2011b): 16.
This does not make the controversial coherentist claim that the justification of a set of beliefs consists solely in its coherence. It only makes the claim, accepted by most non-coherentists, that one source of justification of a belief can be its coherence with other justified beliefs. For discussion, see (Audi 2011a): 216–36.
Compare (Audi 2008): 489–90.
This formulation of the principle leaves room for stronger and weaker specifications, depending on what it takes for you to have evidence. I myself favour a weak specification, on which this does not require that you are aware of it, but just that you could reasonably be faulted for not being aware of it. But different treatments of this issue are compatible with the argument in the text.
For a more general discussion of the epistemology of disagreement about epistemological principles, see (Elga 2010).
I am grateful to an anonymous reader for Ethical Theory and Moral Practice for this example.
That is one way to phrase the objection: another is to insist that there are no practical reasons for believing or not believing things—only for causing yourself to be in those states. For a survey of that debate, see (Reisner 2018).
For an in-depth study, see (Stanley 2005).
I am grateful to two anonymous readers for Ethical Theory and Moral Practice whose detailed comments greatly improved the final version of this article. Earlier versions were presented to audiences at ACU Melbourne, Boston University, Reading and ANU: comments from Robert Audi, Max De Gaynesford, Bob Goodin, James Hart, Brian Hedden, Brad Hooker, Colin Klein, Esther Klein, David Oderberg, Tyler Paytas, Philip Pettit, Pamela Robinson, Chris Ryder, Adam Shmidt, Nic Southwood, Daniel Star, Daniel Stoljar, Sarah Stroud, Philip Stratton-Lake and Brandon Yip were especially helpful.
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Cullity, G. Moral Disagreement, Self-Trust, and Complacency. Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-021-10209-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-021-10209-0