Abstract
What, if anything, directly detracts from well-being? Objective list theorists affirm basic goods such as knowledge, friendship, and achievement, but it is less clear what they should say about opposing bads. In this paper, I argue that false beliefs, unhealthy relationships, and failed projects are not basic bads and do not directly detract from well-being. They can have bad effects or elements, or block the realization of basic goods, but do not themselves carry negative weight with respect to well-being. This is shown by comparing cases where these bads are present and absent, examining their relation to negative overall well-being, and considering the role of these bads in the pursuit of positive goods.
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Notes
Kagan (2014).
Objective list theories or similar views are defended in Finnis (1980); Griffin (1986); Griffin (2000); Chappell (1998); Scanlon (1998); Arneson (1999); Nussbaum (2000); Murphy (2001); Kazez (2007); Oderberg (2008); Hurka (2011); Fletcher (2013); Rice (2013); Couto (2014); Hooker (2015). See also the discussions of objective list theories in Parfit (1984), Appendix I, “What Makes Someone’s Life Go Best”; and Moore (2000).
Moore (2000), p. 77.
Kagan (2014), p. 263.
Kagan (2014), p. 275.
Kagan (2014), p. 263.
Pain may seem obvious as a basic bad, but for an alternative view, see Murphy (2001), pp. 96–100, 118–126.
Hooker (2015), “Separate-Element vs. Combined-Element Theories,” para. 17.
Murphy (2001), pp. 40–43.
Murphy (2001), pp. 43–44. Similarly, outside the well-being debate, Thomas Hurka makes a similar point, stating that “narrow perfectionism… does not permit talk of intrinsic evils. Because an essentialist property cannot be realized to negative degrees, the theory’s scale of quality must have zero as its lowest point.” Hurka (1993).
See, for example, Hooker (2015).
See Clifford (1999).
See Hooker (1998).
Kagan (2014), p. 280.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to stress this point.
This is in part due to my tentativeness on these issues, but also to maintain a perspective that is inclusive of the different theorists surveyed in section 4.
David Benatar is perhaps the thinker most associated with negative well-being, yet even he does not posit false beliefs as a basic bad. In discussing objective list theories and the good of knowledge, he notes how even the brightest humans possess only a very small fraction of all possible knowledge. In this way, he minimizes the value of knowledge, but does not suggest that false beliefs are a basic bad. See Benatar (2017).
Nozick (1974), pp. 42.
Nozick (1974), pp. 43–44.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting that I clarify this.
Parfit (1984), p. 499.
Bradford (2015).
Thanks to an anonymous referee for recommending that I address this issue.
Thanks to Stephen Campbell and William Lauinger for very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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Rice, C.M. Objective List Theories and Ill-Being. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 22, 1073–1085 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-10035-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-10035-5