Abstract
Is choice necessary for moral responsibility? And does choice imply alternative possibilities of some significant sort? This paper will relate these questions to the argument initiated by Harry Frankfurt that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility, and to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's extension of that argument in terms of guidance control in a causally determined world. I argue that attending to Frankfurt's core conceptual distinction between the circumstances that make an action unavoidable and those that bring it about that the action is performed – a distinction emphasised in his recent restatement – provides a new route into an analysis of Frankfurt's argument by showing how it depends on a person's ‘decision to act’ involving the exercise of choice. The implicit reliance of Frankfurt's argument on this notion of choice, however, undermines his claim that the example of the counterfactual intervener strengthens the compatibilist case by providing a counter-example to the principle of alternative possibilities. I also argue that Frankfurt's reliance on the exercise of choice for moral responsibility is also evident in the Fischer/Ravizza argument, and that a close analysis of both arguments shows that such exercise of choice is not available if causal determinism is true.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Ekstrom, L.W., Libertarianism and Frankfurt-style Cases, in R. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 309–322.
Fischer, J.M., Recent Work on Moral Responsibility, Ethics 110 (1999), pp. 93–139.
Fischer, J.M., Frankfurt-type Examples and Semi-Compatibilism, in R. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 281–308.
Fischer, J.M., Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, in D. Widerker and M. McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, pp. 27–52; reprinted from J.M. Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994, ch. 7.
Fischer, J.M., Responsibility and Manipulation, Journal of Ethics 8 (2004), pp. 145–177.
Fischer, J.M. and Ravizza, M., Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Frankfurt, H.G., Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969), pp. 829–39; reprinted in H. Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 1–10, and in D. Widerker and M. McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, pp. 17–25.
Frankfurt, H.G., What We are Morally Responsible For, in H. Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 95–103.
Frankfurt, H.G., Some Thoughts Concerning PAP, in D. Widerker and M. McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, pp. 339–445.
Ginet, C., In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don't Find Frankfurt's Argument Convincing, in D. Widerker and M. McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, pp. 75–90.
Haji, I. and McKenna, M., Dialectical Delicacies in the Debate about Freedom and Alternative Possibilities. Journal of Philosophy 101 (2004), pp. 299–314.
Hunt, D.P., Freedom, Foreknowledge and Frankfurt, in D. Widerker and M. McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, pp. 159–183.
Journal of Ethics 3 (1999), Number 4, Special Issue on Harry Frankfurt, pp. 275–374.
Kane, R. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Kane, R., Responsibility, Indeterminism and Frankfurt-style Cases: A Reply to Mele and Robb, in D. Widerker and M. McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, pp. 91–105.
Locke, J., Essay concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
McKenna, M. Review of J.M. Fischer and M. Ravizza, Responsibility and Control, Journal of Philosophy 98, 2001, pp. 93–100.
McKenna, M., Robustness, Control, and the Demand for Morally Significant Alternatives: Frankfurt Examples with Oodles and Oodles of Alternatives, in D. Widerker and M. McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, pp. 201–217.
McKenna, M. and Widerker, D., Introduction, in D. Widerker, and M. McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, pp. 1–16.
Mele, A.R. and Robb, D., Bbs, Magnets and Seesaws: The Metaphysics of Frankfurt-style Cases, in D. Widerker and M. McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, pp. 127–138.
Palmer, D., New Distinctions, Same Troubles: A Reply to Haji and McKenna, Journal of Philosophy 102 (2005), pp. 474–482.
Pereboom, D., Source Incompatibilism and Alternative Possibilities, in D. Widerker and M. McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, pp. 185–199.
Philosophical Perspectives 14 (2000), Action and Freedom.
Stump, E., Moral Responsibility without Alternative Possibilities, in D. Widerker and M. McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, pp. 139–158.
Watson, G., Reasons and Responsibility, Ethics 111 (2001), pp. 374–394.
Widerker, D., Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Review 104 (1995), pp. 247–261.
Widerker, D., Responsibility and Frankfurt-type Examples, in R. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 323–334.
Widerker, D., Blameworthiness and Frankfurt's Argument Against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, in D. Widerker and M. McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, pp. 53–73.
Widerker, D. and McKenna, M. (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003.
Zimmerman, M., The Moral Significance of Alternate Possibilities, in D. Widerker and M. McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003, pp. 301–325.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Brown, V. Choice, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 9, 265–288 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9018-6
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9018-6