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Abilities and Obligations: Lessons from Non-agentive Groups

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Abstract

Philosophers often talk as though each ability is held by exactly one agent. This paper begins by arguing that abilities can be held by groups of agents, where the group is not an agent. I provide a new argument for—and a new analysis of—non-agentive groups’ abilities. I then provide a new argument that, surprisingly, obligations are different: non-agentive groups cannot bear obligations, at least not if those groups are large-scale such as ‘humanity’ or ‘carbon emitters.’ This pair of conclusions is important, since philosophers who endorse large-scale non-agentive groups’ abilities almost universally endorse their obligations. More importantly, the twin arguments (one for abilities, one against obligations) make the following novel contribution: abilities imply agency-involving explanations, while obligations imply action-guidance. This general conclusion should be of interest beyond social ontology.

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Notes

  1. Their abilities are endorsed by Pinkert (2014), Aas (2015), Collins (2019), Schwenkenbecher (2021), and Wringe (2020a), whom I discuss below; their intentions and actions are endorsed by Bratman (2014); their beliefs by Mathiesen (2006).

  2. Their obligations are endorsed by Björnsson (2014), Pinkert (2014), Wringe (2016), and Schwenkenbecher (2021); responsibility by Feinberg (1968), Held (1970), Jackson (1987), May (1987), Isaacs (2011); reasons by Parfit (1984, sec. 26) and Dietz (2016).

  3. List (2014) defends this for beliefs and desires; Lawford-Smith (2015) and Collins (2019) for obligations.

  4. Cripps (2013) posits both collective and individual climate-related obligations. Isaacs (2011) argues individual-level and group-level responsibility can co-exist.

  5. Lawford-Smith (2015) argues for the latter. Wringe (2005, 2020a), Isaacs (2011), Björnsson (2014), Pinkert (2014), Aas (2015), Miller (2015, 2020), and Schwenkenbecher (2021) argue for the former. While Miller (2001, ch. 8) denies collective moral responsibility, his other work seems to view joint abilities and obligations as patterning.

  6. I have previously argued against patterning (Collins 2019), but I will problematise those arguments and provide new ones.

  7. van Inwagen (1983, 8–13), Cross (1986), Brown (1988), Mele (2003), Vihvelin (2004), Fara (2008), Mandelkern et al., (2017) and Maier (2018).

  8. See fn. 5.

  9. I used these premises in earlier work (Collins 2019), but that defence was critiqued extensively by Björnsson (2020), Blomberg (2020), Schwenkenbecher (2020), Wringe (2020b). I will explain two large gaps in my earlier defence (see fn. 39), will provide a different defence.

  10. Rovane (1998, 8, passim).

  11. Gilbert (1989).

  12. Tuomela (2007).

  13. Shapiro (2014) analyses “massively shared agency,” but he utilises Bratman’s analysis, on which shared agency does not imply a group agent. Aas (2015, 2) reasons from individuals’ obligations, to groups’ obligations, to a group agent. However, it’s doubtful groups like ‘emitters’ have the kind of individual obligations Aas uses to start his reasoning.

  14. Maier (2014), van Inwagen (1983, 8–13). I endorse this picture, barring interpretations of it which say each ability belongs to just one agent.

  15. The understanding-versus-speaking example is van Inwagen’s (1983, 10).

  16. Vetter (2015, 105). As Vetter describes the duo, they might never have met, so they fail even the thinnest theory of group agency.

  17. (Hayek, 1969; Smith, 1776)

  18. Elder-Vass (2007) argues emergent effects arise out of relationality, which gives reason for non-reductive realism about the network that causes the emergent effect. In earlier work (Collins 2019, 81–85), I discussed relationality as a reason to posit groups’ abilities, but I didn’t distinguish multiple realisability and explanatory power as I will below.

  19. Putnam (1967) famously used multiple realisability to argue against psycho-physical reductionism. Sawyer (2005), amongst others, extended it to the social.

  20. See fn. 1.

  21. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing this.

  22. I thank an anonymous reviewer for encouraging discussion of these analyses. Isaacs (2011) and Björnsson (2014) also provide examples of groups’ abilities, but they don’t provide analyses (individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions).

  23. 2014, 194. Pinkert also analyses ‘mediated’ and ‘recursive’ joint abilities, but the analysis just quoted is built into them.

  24. Schwenkenbecher (2021, 48–51) raises similar worries, though she interprets Pinkert as not requiring that individuals conceptualise the outcome. Wringe (2020a) raises worries for Pinkert’s belief requirement, though without providing his own analysis.

  25. 2021, 54; similarly 2021, 15.

  26. 2021, 15a, emphasis original.

  27. 2015, 15, emphasis original.

  28. 2015, 16.

  29. 2019, 69.

  30. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this distinction between ability simpliciter and ability in obligation-implies-ability.

  31. 2019, 71.

  32. Maier (2014).

  33. I thank two anonymous reviewers for pressing me on this point, one of which provided the journalists example.

  34. Stemplowska (2016, 276–277).

  35. Similarly Pinkert (2014, 196), Schwenkenbecher (2021, 57).

  36. I assume ‘hitting the bull’s eye’ is not an intentional behaviour, but an outcome of intentional behaviour; if I’m wrong, then it’s false that each member has the ability to their part, so the group’s ability still rightly gets excluded.

  37. The darts example and modal conception of ‘flukiness’ come from Southwood and Wiens’ (2016) argument that ‘actual’ does not imply ‘feasible.’ I suggest that—for the same reasons Southwood and Wiens give regarding feasibility—‘actual’ does not imply ‘was able’.

  38. I thank an anonymous reviewer for asking this.

  39. See fn. 5.

  40. I have addressed these premises is earlier work (Collins 2019, ch. 3), but those earlier arguments are contestable in two important places. First, my previous argument for (1) was that there is no group-level decision-making in cases with Gilbert’s ‘plural subjects’ or Bratman’s ‘joint intentions.’ But non-agentive groups are far more diverse than these two group-types. My (2019) argument for (1) was therefore radically incomplete. In the present paper, I will demonstrate an absence of group-level decision-making in three broad types of non-agentive group, which plausibly subsume all non-agentive groups in which one might think there is decision-making; this argument is far more encompassing than my earlier argument. Second, my earlier argument for (2) relied on a contestable idea of ‘moral worth,’ whereby (1) morally worthy behaviours must derive from decisions and (2) fulfilling duties entails moral worth. This has generated multiple counterexamples and counterarguments (see fn. 9). My argument for (2) will rely on no such concept.

  41. Núñez (2019) argues that it is rational for individuals to intend ‘social’ ends in this way.

  42. Control is also emphasised by Lawford-Smith (2015), who suggests control-over-X is necessary for obligation-over-X. This is unnecessarily strong.

  43. List (2014) says likewise about beliefs and desires.

  44.  Velleman (1997, 48)

  45. Velleman would perhaps agree. He adds two conditions, discussed below. Even with those conditions, it’s not clear Velleman believes the group decides. But someone might use his example to argue this.

  46.  Velleman (1997, 38, 47–8)

  47. Velleman doesn’t say this.

  48. 1997, 36, emphasis added.

  49. Darwall (2006, 8).

  50. Strawson (1974, 5).

  51. My emphasis on the forward-looking aspects of the participatory stance differs from my earlier arguments (Collins, 2019), where I focused on backward-looking judgments of ‘moral worth,’ and without use of the second-personal or participatory stance. My earlier use of ‘moral worth’ was more traditionally Kantian, rather than contractualist, in flavour. See also fn. 39.

  52. Darwall (2006, 10).

  53. Described by Williams (1985).

  54. List (2014) argues against non-agentive groups’ beliefs and preferences.

  55. Björnsson (2014) argues individuals can share an obligation, because the group can have “motivational sensitivities.” But he says “the sensitivities required need not be sensitivities of the group, understood as something beyond the … individuals, as opposed to sensitivities of the individuals within the group.” (2014, 117) This makes his proposal more reductionist than the one I’m considering.

  56. This is implicit in arguments from political philosophers that ‘idealised’ theories of justice are not obligation-generating because they’re not action-guiding (Gheaus 2013, pp. 456–457; Wiens 2014).

  57. Pinkert (2014), Schwenkenbecher (2021). I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this.

  58. 2021, 92–93.

  59. 2021, 152, emphasis added.

  60. Pinkert (2014, 190)

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Acknowledgements

For helpful comments, I thank audiences at Social Ontology 2019 (Tampere University), Deakin University, Lingnan University, and Leeds University. For comments on written drafts, I thank Judith Martens, Felix Pinkert, Wolfgang Schwarz, the Dianoia Institute of Philosophy at the Australian Catholic University, the ‘Fair Limits’ project at Utrecht University, and the project ‘The Normative and Moral Foundations of Group Agency’ at the University of Vienna. I worked on this paper while a Visiting Research Professor at the University of Vienna, for which research for this article was funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 740922, ERC Advanced Grant ‘The Normative and Moral Foundations of Group Agency.’ I did further work on the paper while receiving financial support under the Australian Research Council’s DECRA scheme (project number DE200101413).

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    Stephanie Collins

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Collins, S. Abilities and Obligations: Lessons from Non-agentive Groups. Erkenn 88, 3375–3396 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-021-00507-5

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