Abstract
It has been suggested that a functionalist understanding of the metaphysics of psychological typing eliminates the prospect for psychological laws. Kim, Millikan, and Shapiro have each separately argued that, if psychological types as functional types are multiply realized, then the diversity of realizing mechanisms demonstrates that there can be no laws of psychology. Additionally, Millikan has argued that the role of functional attribution in the explanation of historical kinds limits the formulation of psychological principles to particular taxa; hence, psychological laws applicable to any cognitive being are not possible. Both arguments against the possibility of psychological laws, I want to suggest, only succeed at showing that certain types of empirical principles will not be laws. I will suggest that a further type of empirical principle, grounded in the general constraints on the sustainability of population types, remains in the running as a candidate law. Importantly, the formulation of these principles presupposes a functionalist understanding of psychological typing.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Shapiro (2004, 2005) has come to reject this argument. He now argues that, if causally distinct systems are capable of producing the same effects (i.e., are capable of satisfying the causal description of a function), then we could have generalizations that range over these shared effects. My suggestion here is in keeping with the position now endorsed by Shapiro, and the aim is to expose how the empirical reasoning for such generalizations might operate.
I see no in principle reason why the form of empirical reasoning suggested below to underwrite psychological laws could not be applicable to other classic forms of functionalism, such as the “machine functionalism” of, say, Putnam (1967) or the “analytic functionalism” of, say, Lewis (1972) or Armstrong (1968). Following Block (1980), both forms of functionalism can be understood as proposing that a psychological type is specified by its Ramsey functional correlate, and that the substantive difference between the two is that, while machine functionalism treats the functional analysis of the input-output structure to be a substantive scientific thesis, analytic functionalism is limited to, say, the platitudes of common sense psychology. It is in principle possible, I assume, that certain physical and biological constraints on sustainable populations might constrain the possible realizations of sufficiently specified Ramsey functional correlates. That said, I also don’t see a reason to think that either form of functionalism would generate psychological laws, because I don’t see (and I think that I am in the consensus here) that either serve the explanatory projects of the biological sciences, cognitively-oriented or otherwise. So, I ignore both of these forms of functionalism herein.
For a recent review, see Wouters (2005).
See Millikan (1984, Chaps 1 and 2) for a detailed exposition of the explanatory role of functional ascription.
Learning will be favored when the rate of environmental change outpaces mutation rate—that is, when the environment shifts faster than evolutionary processes can produce adaptive response. Individual learning will be favored over social learning in general when the rate of environmental change outpaces reproductive rate. Adults just by being adults are experts at making a living in local conditions. But, if the environment is shifting rapidly during the course of individuals’ lives, that local expertise possessed by adults will be quickly out-of-date and can be less reliable than what the ignorant juvenile might discover on its own. So, for social learning to be favored, the rate of environmental change needs to be sufficiently high for learning to be favored at all, but the rate of environmental change needs to be sufficiently low that there is something worthwhile to learn by attending to the behavior of local adults.
As these principles are not causal principles of the ‘A causes B’ form, they are not subject to Rupert’s (2006) problem of metaphysically necessary effects. Echoing a classic concern from philosophy of action, Rupert writes, “functionalist causal generalizations would seem to have the following problematic structure: the state of being, among other things, a cause of e (under such and such conditions) causes e under those conditions. The connection asserted lacks the contingency one would expect of a causal generalization.” (2006, p. 256). But, with the cognitive principles scouted above, Rupert’s concern does not arise. For example, the functional specification of a social learner in the behavioral ecological literature is an individual able to acquire traits through interaction with conspecifics. The tendency not to modify socially acquired behavior is not part of that functional specification. Further, Boyd and Richarson’s principle tells us neither that a population of social learners must have a tendency not to modify socially acquired behavior nor that social learning causes such a tendency. What their principle does tell us is that social learning will be sustainable in those populations with that tendency. That this is the case reflects the metaphysically contingent fact that the world happens to be so structured to make some populations sustainable and others not.
References
Armstrong, D. (1968). A materialist theory of mind. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Aubin, T., Joventin, P., & Hildebrand, C. (2000). Penguins use the two-voice system to recognize each other. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B, 267, 1081–1087.
Block, N. (1980). Troubles with functionalism. In N. Block (Ed.), Readings in the philosophy of psychology (Vol. 1 and 2, pp. 268–305). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Boorse, C. (1976). Wright on functions. Philosophical Review, 85, 70–86.
Boyd, R. (1999). Homeostasis, species, and higher taxa. In R. Wilson (Ed.), Species: New interdisciplinary essays (pp. 141–186). Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Boyd, R., & Richarson, P. (1989). Social learning as an adaptation. Lectures on Mathematics in the Life Sciences, 20, 1–26.
Boyd, R., & Richarson, P. (1996). Why culture is common but cultural evolution is rare. Proceedings of the British Academy, 88, 77–93.
Cummins, R. (1975). Functional analysis. The Journal of Philosophy, 72, 741–760.
Fodor, J. (1974). Special sciences. Synthese, 2, 92–115.
Fodor, J. (1997). Special sciences: Still autonomous after all these years. Philosophical Perspectives, 11, 149–163.
Galef, B., & Laland, K. (2005). Social learning in animals: Empirical studies and theoretical models. BioScience, 55, 489–499.
Insley, S. (2001). Mother–offspring vocal recognition in northern fur seals is mutual but asymmetrical. Animal Behavior, 61, 129–137.
Kim, J. (1992). Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52, 1–26.
Lange, M. (2000). Natural laws in scientific practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lange, M. (2002). Who’s afraid of Ceteris Paribus laws? (or: How I learned to stop worrying and love them). Erkenntis, 57, 407–423.
Lewis, D. (1972). Psychophysical and theoretical identification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50(3), 249–258.
Lycan, W. (1981a). Form, function, and feel. Journal of Philosophy, 78, 24–49.
Lycan, W. (1981b). Psychological laws. Philosophical Topics, 12, 9–38.
Mateo, J. (2003). Kin recognition in ground squirrels and other rodents. Journal of Mammalogy, 84, 1163–1181.
Maynard Smith, J., & Harper, D. (2003). Animal signals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mayr, E. (1975). Evolution and the diversity of life. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Michod, R., Nedelcu, A., & Roze, D. (2003). Cooperation and conflict in the evolution of individuality (IV): Conflict mediation and evolvability in Volvox carteri. Biosystems, 69, 95–114.
Millikan, R. (1984). Language, truth and other biological categories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Millikan, R. (1999). Historical kinds and the ‘special sciences’. Philosophical Studies, 95, 45–65.
Nagel, E. (1977). Teleology revisited. The Journal of Philosophy, 74, 261–301.
Putnam, H. (1967). Psychological predicates. In W. Capitan & D. Merrill (Eds.), Art, mind, and religion. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Rupert, R. (2006). Functionalism, mental causation, and the problem of metaphysically necessary effects. Nous, 40, 256–283.
Shapiro, L. (2000). Multiple realizations. Journal of Philosophy, 47, 635–654.
Shapiro, L. (2004). The mind incarnate. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Shapiro, L. (2005). Can psychology be a unified science. Philosophy of Science, 72, 953–963.
Shettleworth, S. (1998). Cognition, evolution, and behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sober, E. (1980). Evolution, population thinking, and essentialism. Philosophy of Science, 47, 350–383.
Sober, E. (1999). The multiple realizability argument against reduction. Philosophy of Science, 66, 542–564.
Tamis-LeMonda, C., Adolph, K., Lobo, S., Karasik, L., Ishak, S., & Dimitropoulou, K. (2008). When infants take mother’s advice: 18 month-olds integrate perceptual and social information to guide motor action. Developmental Psychology, 44, 734–746.
Van Bergen, Y., Coolen, J., & Laland, K. (2004). Nine-spined sticklebacks exploit the most reliable source when public and private information conflict. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B, 271, 957–962.
Walsh, D. (1996). Fitness and function. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 47, 553–574.
Wimsatt, W. (1972). Teleology and the logical structure of function statements. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 3, 1–80.
Wouters, A. (2005). The function debate in philosophy. Acta Biotheoretica, 53, 123–151.
Wright, L. (1973). Functions. Philosophical Review, 82, 139–168.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Dylan Sabo and a reviewer for a number of helpful suggestions.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Bauer, M. Psychological Laws (Revisited). Erkenn 73, 41–53 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-009-9196-4
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-009-9196-4