Abstract
Recent philosophical discussions of our capacity to attribute mental states to other human beings, and to produce accurate predictions and informative explanations of their behavior which make reference to the content of those states have focused on two apparently contrasting ways in which we might hope to account for these abilities. The first is that of regarding our competence as being under-girded by our grasp of a tacit psychological theory. The second builds on the idea that in trying to get a grip on the mental lives of others we might be able to draw on the fact that we are ourselves subjects of mental states in order to simulate their mental processes. Call these the theory view and the simulation view. In this paper I wish to discuss an argument—which I shall call Collapse—to the effect that if our capacities can be explained in the way that the simulationist supposes then they can also be explained along lines that the advocate of the theory view favours. I am not the first person with simulationist sympathies to have addressed this argument. However, my response is somewhat less concessive than others in the literature: while they attempt to soften its force by attempting to reformulate the simulationist view in a way that evades the conclusion of the argument, I attempt to meet it head on and to show that it does not even succeed in refuting the version of simulationism which it takes as its target.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Some early discussions of these topics focus entirely on our capacity to predict and explain the behaviour of others. However, following Morton (1996), I take this focus to be unduly narrow.
As was suggested to me in conversation by Mark Ashton Smith.
At least, in the absence of a successful argument along the lines of Collapse.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for Erkenntnis for making me clarify this.
Nicholls and Stich (2003, pp. 131–132).
See for example Hutto (2004).
One slight wrinkle in this account demands attention here. One might take it that ascriptions of mental states involve the possession of mental state concepts, and have a theory of concept possession on which possessing a concept of X involves having a theory about X’s. Simulationists should, I think, resist such theories of concept possession. They can do so even if they are, like Heal (1996b), tempted by and committed to inferentialist theories of concept possession of the sort put foward by Peacocke (1992), provided that they do not allow every set of inferential dispositions to count as a theory. One principled reason for such a refusal might be thinking that it is possible to distinguish between canonical and non-canonical inferences involving a concept. Another might be thinking that there is a prima facie case for holding that inferential dispositions involving normative concepts should not be counted as instances of theory possession and taking it that the inferential concepts constitutive of the possession of mental state concepts have this feature.
I would like to thank an anonymous referee for Erkenntnis for persuading me of the need to be clearer about this.
Thanks again to the same anonymous referee for persuading me that an earlier presentation was too brief.
See, Davies (1987). I shall take for granted that Davies’ account is the best available. The account is certainly widely cited, and as far as I know, no advocates of the simulationist view have advocated a more plausible alternative If it turns out to be unsatisfactory in some respect, that would in one sense be grist to my mill, insofar as it would further undermine the case against simulationism; but it would make the present paper otiose.
Morton (2003) suggests that this may be a problem for the theory view. Thanks to an anonymous referee for Erkenntnis for drawing my attention to this.
Some examples of responses which fail to respect this constraint: Goldman’s suggestion that we should discard Davies account of tacit knowledge (Goldman 2006); Heal’s resort to uncodifiability (Heal 1998a); Ravenscroft’s suggestion that simulation should concentrate on theoretical deliberation rather than practical deliberation (Ravenscroft 2003); and Heal’s retreat to personal level simulation (Heal 1994).
Putnam (1975).
It’s been suggested to me (by Rachel Cooper) in discussion that in a case like this we may simply want to accept that the two explanations have different, competing explanatory virtues and that both explanatory programs are worth pursuing for different purposes. I think that this would be enough for most proponents of simulationism. But it’s far from clear to me that the theory view really does score over the simulation view in respect of any significant explanatory virtue.
Goldman (2006). Mazviita Chirimuuta raised this issue with me in discussion at an Open Session of the Joint Session of the Mind Association and Aristotelian Society at Bristol in 2007.
References
Carruthers, P. (1996). Simulation and self-knowledge: A defense of the theory theory. In P. Carruthers & P. K. Smith (Eds.), Theories of theories of mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Davies, M. (1987). Tacit knowledge and semantic theory: Can a five percent difference matter. Mind, 96, 441–462. doi:10.1093/mind/XCVI.384.441.
Davies, M. (1994). The mental simulation debate. In C. Peacocke (Ed.), Objectivity, simulation and the unity of consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press.
Davies, M., & Stone, T. (2001). Mental simulation, tacit theory and the threat of collapse. Philosophical Topics, 29, 27–173.
Friedman, M. (1974). Explanation and scientific understanding. The Journal of Philosophy, 71, 5–19. doi:10.2307/2024924.
Goldman, A. (2006). Simulating minds: The philosophy, psychology and neuroscience of mind-reading. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Heal, J. (1994). Simulation vs theory theory: What is at issue? In C. Peacocke (Ed.), Objectivity, simulation and the unity of consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press.
Heal, J. (1996a). Simulation, theory and content. In P. Carruthers & P. K. Smith (Eds.), Theories of theories of mind Cambridge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Heal, J. (1996b). Review: Belief, simulation and the first person: Comments on a study of concepts by Christopher Peacocke. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56, 413–417. doi:10.2307/2108532.
Heal, J. (1998a). Understanding other minds from the inside. In A. O’Hear (Ed.), Current issues in the philosophy of mind (pp. 83–99). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Heal, J. (1998b). Co-cognition and off-line simulation. Mind and Language, 13, 477–498. doi:10.1111/1468-0017.00088.
Hutto, D. (2004). The limits of spectatorial folk psychology. Mind and Language, 19, 548–573. doi:10.1111/j.0268-1064.2004.00272.x.
Kitcher, P. (1981). Explanatory unification. Philosophy of Science, 48, 507–531. doi:10.1086/289019.
Morton, A. (1996). Folk psychology is not a predictive device. Mind, 105, 119–137. doi:10.1093/mind/105.417.119.
Morton, A. (2003). The importance of being understood: Folk psychology as ethics. London: Routledge.
Nicholls, S., & Stich, S. (2003). Mindreading—An integrated account of pretence, self awareness and understanding other minds. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Peacocke, C. (1992). A study of concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Putnam, H. (1975). Philosophy and our mental life. Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ravenscroft, I. (2003). Simulation, collapse and human motivation. Mind and Language, 18(2), 162–174. doi:10.1111/1468-0017.00219.
Wringe, B. (2003). Simulation, co-cognition and the attribution of emotional states. European Journal of Philosophy, 11, 354–373. doi:10.1111/1468-0378.00190.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Jane Heal, Adam Morton and Radu Bogdan for advice and encouragement, and to Josh Cowley, Hilmi Demir, Max de Gaynesford and Mark Ashton Smith and two referees for Erkenntnis for useful discussion and feedback.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Wringe, B. Simulation, Theory and Collapse. Erkenn 71, 223–232 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-008-9123-0
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-008-9123-0