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Compensation in personal injury cases: mean or median income?

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If the injurer blinded the victim’s eye, cut off his hand, broke his leg, we view him as if he were a slave sold in the marketplace, and we evaluate how much he was worth prior to the injury and how much he is worth now.

Mishna Baba Kama 8:1 (Circa 200 CE)

Abstract

Courts typically base compensation for loss of income in personal injury cases on either mean or median work income. Yet, quantitatively, mean and median incomes are typically very different. For example, in the US, median income is 65% of mean income. In this paper we use economic theory to determine the relation between the appropriate make-whole (full) compensation and mean and median work incomes. Given that consumption uncertainty associated with compensation generally exceeds that associated with work income, we show that the appropriate make-whole compensation exceeds mean (and therefore median) work income. Hence, if the compensation must be either the mean or the median work income, then mean work income should generally be selected.

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Notes

  1. Liu (2011) finds that in ten OECD countries, the stock of human capital is on average 4.7 times greater than the stock of physical capital.

  2. For a perspective, this figure is 81.5% of the revenue of all US architects, and 72% of the revenue of the US movie and video production industry.

  3. To the best of our knowledge, when courts have used statistical measures of work income, they have only based them on the mean and/or the median.

  4. See also Spizman (2013).

  5. We even found a case where a court awards the mean and then proceeds to call it a median. See Lai Kin Wah v Hip Hing Construction Company Limited and Ng Man carrying on business under the name Ng Man Company, Supreme Court of Hong Kong, 1996, No. PI255. Dates of hearing: 16, 17 December 1996 and 10 January 1997. Date of handing down judgment: Friday, 31 January 1997.

  6. Donriel A. Borne v Celadon Trucking Services, Inc. No. W2013-01949-Coa-R3-Cv, Court of Appeals of Tennessee, At Jackson. Filed July 31, 2014.

  7. Aquanetta Demery v The Housing Authority of New Orleans, A/K/A Hano, No. 96-Ca-1024, Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit, February 12, 1997. Landrieu, Judge.

  8. Appeals Commission for Alberta Workers’ Compensation, Docket No.: AC0903-13-33, Decision No.: 2015-0113. The policy referred to is based on the Workers’ Compensation Act, Chapter W15.

  9. Rosniak v Government Insurance Office Bc9702453 Australia, Judgment Date 12 June 1997.

  10. Waqar Rashid v Mohammed Iqbal, Case No: MK 022191, High Court of Justice Queen’s Bench Division, 21 May 2004.

  11. Gordon v Greig, 46 C.C.L.T. (3d) 212 (Ont. S.C.), 2007.

  12. Statistics Canada (2011) and Social Security Administration (2014).

  13. Some estimates of the difference between mean and median work income are even larger. For example, see Spizman (2013) who states that “ Comparing ACS [median] and PINC-04 [mean] tables show that mean earnings are always greater than median earnings. The magnitude of the difference varies from a low of 9.74% to a high of 59.48% depending on the plaintiff’s age and educational level.”

  14. Spizman (2013) considers the issue but provides no meaningful economic answers.

  15. For example, a person whose supporting spouse has been killed or a person who has been wrongfully imprisoned. Of course, in the event of death of a person without dependents, there may be no claimant for an income-related loss.

  16. We use a one period model such that income and consumption are identical. Realistically, the term “work income” refers to the present value of all future income derived from work in a non-injured state. In the appendix to this paper we show that our results can be extended to a multi-period model.

  17. For evidence of a lognormal income distribution, see, for example, Atkinson and Bourguignon (2014). For evidence that relative risk aversion is constant, see Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) and Chiappori and Paiella (2011).

  18. We assume that there are no “ intermediate” accidents that reduce but do not eliminate a person’s income-generating capacity. This will not alter the essence of our results.

  19. See the mishnaic citation above. Also, as Coleman (1995) succinctly states: “corrective justice is the principle that those who are responsible for the wrongful losses of others have a duty to repair them, and that the core of tort law embodies this conception of corrective justice.”

  20. Typically, unless the court determines that the victim is incapable of making rational decisions concerning her finances, the court will award lump-sum compensation rather than annuities.

  21. Real compensation is the term we use for the consumption facilitated by the original compensation when the uncertainty in the real rate of return has been resolved.

  22. Chiappori and Paiella (2011) find that relative risk aversion is likely to exceed two, and Barro and Jin (2011) estimate relative risk aversion to be four. Meyer and Meyer (2006) provide a list of estimates.

  23. Not all individuals will have a profession, or indeed, an education or a work history. For example, a child will typically not have a profession. Nonetheless, a child’s future work income will be a random variable drawn from a particular distribution.

  24. Van Wijck and Winters (2001) and Singh (2004) focus on economic efficiency and optimal care, which topics are not addressed in this paper.

  25. This point is addressed in an empirical paper by Philipsen (2009).

  26. As mentioned above, we abstract from a victim’s pain and suffering. Our results do not change if these are incorporated either multiplicatively or additively in the utility function.

  27. The distribution of the real make-whole compensation, Az, is \(\Lambda \left( \ln M+S\delta -\frac{1}{2}s^{2},s^{2}\right)\), which has mean \(Me^{S\delta }\) and median \(Me^{S\delta -s^{2}/2}\). It is straightforward to show that an individual’s expected utility decreases with the likelihood of an accident, \(\phi\), and with both uncertainty measures, \(\sigma ^{2}\) and \(s^{2}\).

  28. See also Palacios-Huerta (2003).

  29. There is an ongoing discussion in the literature concerning the variance in awards. Some view verdicts as highly random. See, for example, Atiyah (1997). Others view court verdicts as predictable and meaningfully based on economic considerations. See, for example, Osborne (1999).

  30. See Osborne (1999).

  31. Thus, the one-time compensation A provides the victim with the same expected utility as an annuity that pays \(A_{t}\) in period t. See footnote 20.

  32. For simplicity we assume that a person spends the income in the period in which it is received.

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We thank the editors and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.

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Appendix

Appendix

The main body of this paper presents a simple one-period framework that abstracts from the fact that the mean value of work income is likely to vary over time, and that both work income and the consumption attainable from the compensation may follow random processes that evolve over time. In particular, the uncertainty of both work income and the consumption attainable from the compensation are likely to increase over time. However, our model can be extended to incorporate these considerations.

Thus, suppose that the victim had \(T\ge 1\) remaining periods of working life when the accident happened. A natural generalization of the person’s one-period work-income uncertainty is to assume that the work income in period \(t=1,2,\ldots ,T\), denoted by \(y_{t}\), is lognormally distributed with \(y_{t}\sim {\varvec{\Lambda }}\left( \ln M_{t}-\tfrac{1}{2}\sigma ^{2}t,\sigma ^{2}t\right)\). That is, the mean of \(y_{t}\) is \(M_{t}\), which may vary over time; the coefficient of variation of \(y_{t}\) is \(\left( e^{\sigma ^{2} t}-1\right) ^{1/2}\), which increases over time; and the median of \(y_{t}\) is \(M_{t}e^{-\sigma ^{2}t/2}\), which increases (decreases) from period t to period \(t+1\) if \(\ln (M_{t+1}/M_{t})>(<)\tfrac{1}{2}\sigma ^{2}\).

From the properties of the lognormal distribution, the individual’s no-injury expected utility in period t is

$$\begin{aligned} \left\{ \begin{array} [c]{llll} {\displaystyle \int _{0}^{\infty }} \dfrac{y_{t}^{1-S}-1}{1-S}\Lambda \left( \ln M_{t}-\tfrac{1}{2}\sigma ^{2}t,\sigma ^{2}t\right) dy_{t} &{} =\dfrac{\left( M_{t}e^{-S\sigma ^{2} t/2}\right) ^{1-S}-1}{1-S} &{} \quad \text {if} \ S\ne 1, &{} \\ {\displaystyle \int _{0}^{\infty }} \ln y_{t}d\Lambda \left( \ln M_{t}-\tfrac{1}{2}\sigma ^{2}t,\sigma ^{2}t\right) dy_{t} &{} =\ln M_{t}-\tfrac{1}{2}\sigma ^{2}t &{} \quad \text {if} \ S=1. &{} \end{array} \right. \end{aligned}$$
(4)

Assume that the total lump-sum compensation paid in the period of the accident (i.e., in period \(t=1)\) must ensure that the victim can be made whole in each of the T periods. Let the amount \(A_{t}\) be the make-whole compensation received (in the period of the accident) for period t. That is, the total compensation A can be divided into \(A_{1},A_{2},\ldots ,A_{T}\) with \(A=\sum _{t=1}^{T}A_{t}\).Footnote 31 In keeping with the assumptions made in the main body of the paper, let the real value of the make-whole compensation for period t be \(A_{t}e^{r(t-1)}z_{t}\), where r is the interest rate and \(z_{t}\) is lognormally distributed according to \(z_{t}\sim \Lambda \left( -\tfrac{1}{2}s^{2}t,s^{2}t\right)\). Therefore, the mean of \(z_{t}\) is unity for all t while its coefficient of variation, \(\left( e^{s^{2}t}-1\right) ^{1/2}\), increases over time. The make-whole compensation \(A_{t}\) therefore enables the individual to obtain a compensated injury expected utilityFootnote 32 in period t that is equal to

$$\begin{aligned} \left\{ \begin{array} [c]{llll} {\displaystyle \int _{0}^{\infty }} \dfrac{\left[ A_{t}e^{r(t-1)}z_{t}\right] ^{1-S}-1}{1-S}d\Lambda \left( -\tfrac{1}{2}s^{2}t,s^{2}t\right) dz_{t} &{} =\dfrac{\left\{ A_{t}e^{\left[ r(t-1)-Ss^{2}/2\right] t}\right\} ^{1-S}-1}{1-S} &{} \quad \text {if} \ S \ne 1, &{} \\ {\displaystyle \int _{0}^{\infty }} \ln \left[ A_{t}e^{r(t-1)}z_{t}\right] d\Lambda \left( -\tfrac{1}{2} s^{2}t,s^{2}t\right) dz_{t} &{} =\ln A_{t}+r(t-1)-\tfrac{1}{2}s^{2}t &{} \quad \text {if} \ S=1. &{} \end{array} \right. \end{aligned}$$
(5)

In view of (4), (5), certainty-equivalence between the expected utility from work income and from the make-whole income from the accident compensation for each t requires that \(A_{t}=M_{t}e^{-r(t-1)+\delta St}\). That is, the accident compensation for the first period is \(A_{1} =M_{1}e^{\delta S}\) (the same as in the one-period case) and then changes at a rate of \(\ln (M_{t+1}/M_{t})-r+\delta S\) from period t to period \(t+1\). The rate of change in \(A_{t}\) reflects the rate of change in the mean value of work income and is reduced by the interest rate r, while the period-to-period effects of \(\delta\) and S are the same as their one-period effects.

We therefore have that

$$\begin{aligned} A=\sum _{t=1}^{T}M_{t}e^{-r(t-1)+\delta St}. \end{aligned}$$

It follows immediately that the total make-whole compensation, A, increases with each \(M_{t}\) and decreases with r. Additionally, just as in the one-period setting, A decreases with \(\sigma ^{2}\) and increases with \(s^{2}\), with their impacts increasing with S.

Moreover, within a multi-period setting, for each period’s make-whole compensation, the insights presented within the context of the one-period model concerning the relation between mean and median work income and the make-whole compensation remain valid. Hence, the results derived for the one-period model can be generalized.

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Danziger, L., Katz, E. Compensation in personal injury cases: mean or median income?. Eur J Law Econ 48, 291–303 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-019-09623-8

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