Abstract
This article makes a contribution to the debate over the interconnectedness between democratization, corruption and resource dependence by way of a qualitative analysis of three African states, Ghana, Nigeria and South Sudan, in various stages of democratization, from post-conflict transition to increasingly consolidated democracies. The underlying question guiding the analysis is to assess how both the practice and perception of corruption change in the course of democratization. Using survey data, secondary literature and empirical observations, the article juxtaposes empirical findings with theories of the African state and finds neo-patrimonialism and the concept of the gatekeeper state the most satisfactory explanatory models for the sources and types of corruption in African democracies afflicted by the resource curse.
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Notes
In some countries such as Kenya, railing against corruption may in fact be a smokescreen for the actual grievance that is ethnic inequality [6].
South Sudan’s population is also arguably the most under-educated in the entire world which may be a factor that significantly complicates the awareness of corruption and the fight against it (see [8]).
GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) is an imperfect measure but gives an indication of a country’s wealth. In 2015, Nigeria’s per capita GDP in PPP stood at 6000 USD, Ghana’s at 4200 USD and South Sudan’s at 1850 USD [10].
Lancaster and Montinola [25] identify this as a key problem for corruption research because the socially acceptable level of corruption and thus of what is deemed corruption in the first place differs from country to country.
This finding is not unique to Africa. Research on post-communist countries found that societies accustomed to patronage also expect their democratically elected representatives to provide patronage [26].
The conduct of mining companies involved in bauxite extraction in Guinea illustrates the role of international companies exceedingly well [32].
An illustrative if fairly extreme example of this dynamic is Equatorial Guinea where the president and his entourage receive payments to foreign bank accounts from oil companies that also cover their families’ health and education costs. At the same time, the oil revenue is used to co-opt or coerce political opponents into submission ([39], 435f.).
Interview with Oscar Yawson, professor at the University of Cape Coast, Ghana, April 2017.
While Nigeria as a united state has indeed been preserved, the long-running rebellion in the Niger delta and Boko Haram’s insurgency in the North point to the strategy’s limited overall success.
Buhari’s promise to show a more ruthless approach to the Boko Haram rebels in the country’s Northern states also contributed to his election victory.
While officially there are subsidiary anti-corruption commissions in all of South Sudan’s states, at the time of my visit in 2013 only the one in Central Equatoria in the capital Juba was operational. And even they had had to move their location several times due to repeated attacks on their building.
For a detailed outline of media repression in South Sudan, see the website of the Committee to Protect Journalists, available from https://cpj.org/africa/south-sudan/.
Interview with an international NGO employee in the health sector, Juba, October 2013.
This chimes with Michael Rock’s [97] finding that corruption becomes less prevalent after about 10–12 years of democratic rule.
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The author would like to thank the Centre of African Studies at the University of Edinburgh where much of the article was written during the author’s stay as a visiting scholar in the spring of 2017.
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Frahm, O. Corruption in sub-Saharan Africa’s established and simulated democracies: the cases of Ghana, Nigeria and South Sudan. Crime Law Soc Change 70, 257–274 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-017-9730-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-017-9730-2