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Europe’s “democratic culture” in the fight against corruption

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Abstract

This study investigates the influencing factors of corruption in Europe over the period of 1995–2013. Considering corruption as a cultural, multilevel phenomenon, the project proposes the design of models at both the micro and macro levels, allowing for panel-analyses as well as cross- and within-national comparisons. The findings reveal that a bundle of factors adding up to a specific “democratic culture” in Europe that hinders the growth of corruption by generating strong democratic institutions and fostering citizen norms and values aimed at monitoring and sanctioning corrupt actors. As a result, democracy promotion was and it is still the best remedy against corruption spread in Europe. The article emphasizes the relevance and need of area- and cultural-specific knowledge of factors affecting corruption.

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Notes

  1. This public-office-centered definition focusses on corruption in the public sector or actions that involve public officials, civil servants or politicians. Yet, in this context, private corruption is not necessarily excluded, because the public sector is often in exchange with the private industry, particularly when government contracts are awarded. In general, corruption occurs where private wealth and public power overlap.

  2. For instance, Della Porta and Vannucci [19] focus on corruption in the Italian party system and explicitly describe the involvement of certain political parties in the organization of corrupt practices, while Pujas and Rohdes [21] compare party finance and political scandals in Italy, Spain and France. Additionally, Angermund [23] undertakes a historical study of corruption under German National Socialism and depicts corruption as a structural and supportive element of the Nazi-regime and its politics. Although case studies exist and country based evidence is available, these studies are often limited to a specific country’s experience.

  3. Culture is often considered a product of whole societies that consists of attitudes and behaviors. It is essentially observed as a collective concept, applicable to social groups, composed of shared meanings and interpretations [35].

  4. Gottfredson and Hirschi ([47], 149) claim that women seem to be more honest or more risk-averse than men by nature, which may be because they feel that there is a greater probability of being caught. Second, they are typically more involved in raising children, an activity in which they practice honesty in order to teach their children appropriate values. Third, it is assumed that “women may feel more than men- the physically stronger sex, that laws exist to protect them and therefore be more willing to follow rules.” Fourth, “girls may be brought up to have higher levels of self-control than boys which affects their propensity to indulge in criminal behaviour”.

  5. Kostadinova [18] claims that” Because of the multifaceted character of postcommunist transition, numerous opportunities emerged for illicit payments, patronage, allocation of public contracts, black market interactions, and covert networks. These could spread and grow in the Eastern Europe societies, already suffering from endemic bribery and lack of elite integrity” (see also [6]).

  6. To measure corruption at the individual level I finally use data from the World Values Survey that refer to the perception of corruption by individuals from multiple countries. This is in contrast to the data from the macro level based on survey data by experts. For this reason, I call the dependent variable of the micro level “extent of perceived corruption”. Both variables are highly correlated.

  7. Hunt [59] suggests that “A higher probability of detection and a greater value of reputation within networks could lead to honesty rather than implicit quid pro quos, although there is no clear dividing line between the two. In the context of the links between crime and trust, trust should lead to honesty, rather than a network for mutually beneficial but possibly illegal exchange.”

  8. Uslaner [5] finds strong support for the claims that: (1) inequality depresses trust; (2) low trust leads to high levels of corruption; and (3) a high level of corruption leads to more inequality—thus forming a “loop” with lower trust and more corruption in turn.

  9. Even though some researchers suggest that societies with high levels of trust also tend to be more tolerant of corrupt practices. Moreno [68] argues that high levels of interpersonal trust support corruption because trust plays an important role in the relationship between corrupt individuals who usually operate with high levels of interpersonal trust necessary to maintain their relationship and decreases the risk of disclosure.

  10. The Corruption Perception Index compiled by Transparency International has become one of the most reliable and widely used indicators of corruption around the world. The meta-index was first launched in 1995 and ranks almost 200 countries based on the degree to which corruption is perceived among public officials and politicians. The CPI is a composite index drawing on 14 different polls and surveys from seven independent institutions and is carried out among business people and country experts. It also includes surveys of local residents and expatriates who rank countries on a scale from zero (high corruption) to ten (low corruption), according to the level of perceived corruption.

  11. Excluded states are either not considered by most other data sources such as Andorra, Liechtenstein and Malta, or are outliers within the dataset, such as Turkey or Russia.

  12. More precisely, it is striking, that there are still significant differences between Western and Eastern European states. The average score of the Western countries is 2.06. With this score, Western Europe is found at the bottom of corruption values in Europe. Contrary to this, the average corruption level of Eastern states is 6.37 and thereby considerably higher. A comparison of Northern (2.28) and Southern Europe (5.33) show a similar picture. Notably, levels of corruption are not exceptionally lower in Southern Europe than in post-communist societies. Countries such as Greece (5.53), Italy (5.36), Portugal (3.64) or Spain (3.65) are similarly rated by the Corruption Perception Index as post-communist countries such as Romania (6.79), Hungary (5.01), Slovenia (3.88) or Estonia (3.91).

  13. Contrary to the panel analyses at the macro level, countries such as Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Georgia, Greece, Denmark, France, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom have to be excluded because of missing data.

  14. These cross-level variables encompass an individual’s satisfaction with financial situation and a country’s degree of democracy; an individual’s interpersonal trust and a country’s degree of democracy; the percentage of women in parliaments and a country’s degree of democracy; and a country’s duration and degree of democracy.

  15. The sample of Western Europe only includes Germany and Switzerland. As a result of the exclusion of a lot of Western countries such as Belgium, France or Luxembourg this sample is comparatively underrepresented. This only serves as an illustration.

  16. Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Ukraine and belong to the sample of Eastern Europe.

  17. Northern Europe includes Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Norway and Sweden.

  18. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Macedonia and Slovenia belong to the sample of Southern Europe [71].

  19. This also confirms Kostadinova’s [18] assumption that “the desire to join the European Union was a much more effective driving force for implementation of anticorruption policies. […] Ironically, many people in the admittedly more corrupt Romania and Bulgaria think that only the Union can save them from corrupt politicians”.

  20. Social empowerment means “strengthening civil society in order to enhance its political and economic vitality, providing more orderly paths of access and rules of interaction between state and society, and balancing economic and political opportunities” ([82], 85).

  21. Tavits [84] finds out that governments can have a significant impact on people’s well-being. Examining the effect of corruption and representation on people’s subjective well-being she demonstrates that people report higher levels of subjective well-being when especially their governments perform well (i.e., are clean rather than corrupt).

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Georg Plattner and Jessica Flakne as well as the anonymous reviewer for their valuable comments.

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  1. Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science, Tel Aviv University, Naftali Building, Ramat Aviv, 6997801, Tel Aviv, Israel

    Ina Kubbe

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Kubbe, I. Europe’s “democratic culture” in the fight against corruption. Crime Law Soc Change 70, 217–240 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-017-9728-9

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