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Morality of Lobbying for Tax Benefits: A Kantian Perspective

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Abstract

Multinationals’ aggressive tax lobbying that involves free-riding behaviour and results in disproportional benefits to the disadvantage of other taxpayers, is problematic for several reasons. Such lobbying undermines the legitimacy of tax legislation and has a negative impact on trust in the tax system. Based on Immanuel Kant’s ethical theory, this article first suggests a new normative basis for a moral duty that requires multinationals and their leaders to be transparent about their political activities and tax lobbying. Next, it introduces a new concept of transparency in respect of tax lobbying. ‘Deliberative transparency’ requires multinationals and their leaders not only to be open about their reasons for tax lobbying, but also to deliberate with stakeholders and, maybe even more importantly, to provide evidence supporting their lobbying positions. Finally, based on these new understandings, additional government interventions against aggressive tax lobbying are suggested, for example mandatory stakeholder consultation, reporting on stakeholder attitudes and perception, and evidence-based lobbying requirements.

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Notes

  1. See at https://abc.xyz/investor/pdf/uk-tax-strategy.pdf.

  2. See at https://www.elsevierweekblad.nl/nederland/achtergrond/2019/05/shell-bevestigt-geen-winstbelasting-betaald-in-nederland-689265/.

  3. The term lobbying in this article is very broad and refers to the European connotation of lobbying, which implies political action in general, as well as the US or other non-European connotations implying “the provision of information to policy makers by individuals representing the firms interest-that is, by lobbyists; this information may be conveyed through informal meetings, formal settings, and social settings” (Hillman & Hitt, 1999).

  4. Governments raise taxes for funding their activities, including the creation and provision of certain public goods. Multinationals also benefit from public goods, and by mitigating their tax contribution, they shift social costs related to such public goods to others (Christensen & Murphy, 2004, p. 39; Jallai, 2020, p. 10). Public goods are for example physical infrastructure, access to vital information (transparency), rule of law, social capital (trust in interpersonal relations and social institutions), relatively corruption-free business practices, relatively conflict-free (peaceful) environments, safety in the transportation system, liberal prerequisites for innovation, etc. (Enderle, 2018, p. 625; Kaul et al., 1999, p. 81).

  5. According to the Code of Professional Conduct in Relation to Taxation of the UK Chartered Institute of Taxation tax advisors have to upheld the profession’s reputation and also need to take account of the wider public interest.

  6. Or more specifically to the ‘corporate firm’, if it is assumed that, as suggested by Ciepley (2020), a distinction should be made between the corporation as abstract legal entity without members on the one hand, and the corporate firm on the other.

  7. See at www.globalreporting.org/.

  8. See at https://www.globalreporting.org/how-to-use-the-gri-standards/gri-standards-english-language/.

  9. And this is also the reason why taxation of people’s commerce and of the economy is justified, according to Kant (Kant, 1797, at 6:325).

  10. Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics feature the same idea (Geenens, 2017; Iwasa, 2013; Morris, 2009; Thorseth, 2008).

  11. https://www.jnj.com/about-jnj/company-statements/tax-policy-statement.

  12. BE: Parliamentary documents, Explanatory Memorandum, Doc 51 3058/015, 14 (2007); UK: Lobbying Wins Tax Break for Breeders' Rights, Horticulture Week (23 March 2012).

  13. BE: Vif-L’Express (23 November 2012), see at www.levif.be/actualite/magazine/comment-gsk-s-est-taille-une-loi-fiscale-sur-mesure/article-normal-910511.html?cookie_check=1602054766.

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    Anne Van de Vijver

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Van de Vijver, A. Morality of Lobbying for Tax Benefits: A Kantian Perspective. J Bus Ethics 181, 57–68 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-021-04911-3

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