Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Confident and Cunning: Negotiator Self-Efficacy Promotes Deception in Negotiations

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Journal of Business Ethics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Self-confidence is associated with many positive outcomes, and training programs routinely seek to build participants’ self-efficacy. In this article, however, we consider whether self-confidence increases unethical behavior. In a series of studies, we explore the relationship between negotiator self-efficacy—an individual’s confidence in his or her negotiation ability—and the use of deception. We find that individuals high in negotiator self-efficacy are more likely to use deception than individuals low in negotiator self-efficacy. We also find that perceptions of the risk of deception mediate this relationship. By identifying negotiator self-efficacy as an antecedent to unethical behavior, our findings offer important theoretical and empirical insights into the use of deception, the role of individual differences in ethical decision making, and the broader consequences of self-confidence in business and society.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Consistent with this definition, we characterize Ellen O’Hara’s lie as a self-interested lie (not a mere “white lie”).

  2. This is sometimes termed “general self-efficacy.”

  3. This is sometimes termed “specific self-efficacy.”

References

  • Adler, R. S. (2007). Negotiating with liars. MIT Sloan Management Review, 48, 69–74.

    Google Scholar 

  • Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 488–500.

    Google Scholar 

  • Angelova, V., & Regner, T. (2013). Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental deception game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 93, 205–218.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aquino, K., & Reed, I. I. (2002). The self-importance of moral identity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83(6), 1423–1440.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arnold, J. A., & O’Connor, K. M. (2006). How negotiator self-efficacy drives decisions to pursue mediation. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 36, 2649–2669.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bandura, A. (1977). Self-efficacy: toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. Psychological review, 84(2), 191–215.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bandura, A. (1993). Perceived self-efficacy in cognitive development and functioning. Educational Psychologist, 28, 117–148.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bandura, A. (1997). Self-efficacy: The exercise of control. New York: Freeman.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical-considerations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173–1182.

    Google Scholar 

  • Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. In R. Witt, A. Clarke, & N. Fielding (Eds.), The economic dimensions of crime (pp. 13–68). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boles, T. L., Croson, R. T. A., & Murnighan, J. K. (2000). Deception and retribution in repeated ultimatum bargaining. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 83, 235–259.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bond, C. F., & DePaulo, B. M. (2006). Accuracy of deception judgments. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10, 214–234.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bornstein, G., & Weisel, O. (2010). Punishment, cooperation, and cheater detection in “noisy” social exchange. Games, 1, 18–33.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brandts, J., & Charness, G. (2003). Truth or consequences: An experiment. Management Science, 49, 116–130.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brooks, A. W., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2011). Can nervous Nelly negotiate? How anxiety causes negotiators to make low first offers, exit early, and earn less profit. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 115, 43–54.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chen, G., Gully, S. M., & Eden, D. (2001). Validation of a new general self-efficacy scale. Organizational Research Methods, 4, 62–83.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chen, G., Gully, S. M., Whiteman, J. A., & Kilcullen, B. N. (2000). Examination of relationships among trait-like individual differences, state-like individual differences, and learning performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85, 835–847.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eden, D. (1988). Pygmalion, goal setting, and expectancy: Compatible ways to raise productivity. Academy of Management Review, 13, 639–652.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eden, D., & Aviram, A. (1993). Self-efficacy training and speed of reemployment: Helping people to help themselves. Journal of Applied Psychology, 78, 352–360.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ekman, P., & O’Sullivan, M. (1991). Who can catch a liar? American Psychologist, 46, 913–920.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ekman, P., O’Sullivan, M., & Frank, M. G. (1999). A few can catch a liar. Psychological Science, 10, 263–266.

    Google Scholar 

  • Erat, S., & Gneezy, U. (2012). White lies. Management Science, 58, 723–733.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fulmer, I. S., Barry, B., & Long, D. A. (2009). Lying and smiling: Informational and emotional deception in negotiation. Journal of Business Ethics, 88, 691–709.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gaspar, J. P., Levine, E. E., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2015). Why we should lie. Organizational Dynamics, 44, 306–309.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gaspar, J. P., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2013). The emotion deception model: A review of deception in negotiation and the role of emotion in deception. Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 6, 160–179.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gino, F., & Ariely, D. (2012). The dark side of creativity: Original thinkers can be more dishonest. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102, 445–459.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gino, F., Ayal, S., & Ariely, D. (2009). Contagion and differentiation in unethical behavior: The effect of one bad apple on the barrel. Psychological Science, 20, 393–398.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gino, F., & Shea, C. (2012). Deception in Negotiations. In G. E. Bolton & R. Croson (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict Resolution (pp. 47–60). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gist, M. E., & Mitchell, T. R. (1992). Self-efficacy: A theoretical analysis of its determinants and malleability. Academy of Management Review, 17, 183–211.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gneezy, U. (2005). Deception: The role of consequences. American Economic Review, 95, 384–394.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grover, S. L. (1993). Lying, deceit, and subterfuge: A model of dishonesty in the workplace. Organization Science, 4, 478–495.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gurchiek, K. (2015). Liar, liar, resume on fire. SHRM. Retrieved from https://www.shrm.org/ResourcesAndTools/hr-topics/talent-acquisition/Pages/lying-exaggerating-padding-resume.aspx.

  • Hannah, S. T., Avolio, B. J., & May, D. R. (2011). Moral maturation and moral conation: A capacity approach to explaining moral thought and action. Academy of Management Review, 36, 663–685.

    Google Scholar 

  • Iezzoni, L. I., Rao, S. R., DesRoches, C. M., Vogeli, C., & Campbell, E. G. (2012). Survey shows that at least some physicians are not always open or honest with patients. Health Affairs, 31, 383–391.

    Google Scholar 

  • Judge, T. A., & Bono, J. E. (2001). Relationship of core self-evaluations traits—self-esteem, generalized self-efficacy, locus of control, and emotional stability—with job satisfaction and job performance: A meta-analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86, 80–92.

    Google Scholar 

  • Judge, T. A., Erez, A., & Bono, J. A. (1998). The power of being positive: The relation between positive self-concept and job performance. Human Performance, 11, 167–187.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kajackaite, A., & Gneezy, U. (2017). Incentives and cheating. Games and Economic Behavior, 102, 433–444.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kennedy, J. A., Kray, L. J., & Ku, G. (2017). A social-cognitive approach to understanding gender differences in negotiator ethics: The role of moral identity. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 138, 28–44.

    Google Scholar 

  • Koning, L., Steinel, W., Van Beest, I., & Van Dijk, E. (2011). Power and deception in ultimatum bargaining. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 115, 35–42.

    Google Scholar 

  • Koning, L., Van Dijk, E., Van Beest, I., & Steinel, W. (2010). An instrumental account of deception and reactions to deceit in bargaining. Business Ethics Quarterly, 20, 57–73.

    Google Scholar 

  • Krueger, N., & Dickson, P. R. (1994). How believing in ourselves increases risk taking: Perceived self-efficacy and opportunity recognition. Decision Sciences, 25, 385–400.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lee, C., & Bobko, P. (1994). Self-efficacy beliefs: Comparison of five measures. Journal of Applied Psychology, 79, 364–369.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levine, E. E., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2014). Are liars ethical? On the tension between benevolence and honesty. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 53, 107–117.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levine, E. E., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2015). Prosocial lies: When deception breeds trust. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 126, 88–106.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewicki, R. J. (1983). Lying and deception: A behavioral model. In M. H. Bazerman & R. J. Lewicki (Eds.), Negotiating in organizations (pp. 68–90). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewicki, R. J., & Hanke, R. (2012). Once fooled, shame on you! Twice fooled, shame on me! What deception does to deceivers and victims: Implications for negotiators when ethicality is unclear. In B. M. Goldman & D. L. Shapiro (Eds.), The Psychology of negotiations in the 21st century workplace: New challenges and new solutions (pp. 211–244). New York, NY: Taylor and Francis.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewicki, R. J., & Robinson, R. J. (1998). Ethical and unethical bargaining tactics: An empirical study. Journal of Business Ethics, 17, 665–682.

    Google Scholar 

  • MacNab, B. R., & Worthley, R. (2008). Self-efficacy as an intrapersonal predictor for internal whistleblowing: A US and Canada examination. Journal of Business Ethics, 79, 407–421.

    Google Scholar 

  • Methasani, R., Gaspar, J. P., & Barry, B. (2017). Feeling and deceiving: A review and theoretical model of emotions and deception in negotiation. Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 10, 158–178.

    Google Scholar 

  • Minson, J. A., VanEpps, E. M., Yip, J. A., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2018). Eliciting the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth: The effect of question phrasing on deception. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 147, 76–93.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moran, S., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2008). When better is worse: Envy and the use of deception. Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 1, 3–29.

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Connor, K. M., & Carnevale, P. J. (1997). A nasty but effective negotiation strategy: Misrepresentation of a common-value issue. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 504–515.

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Connor, K. M., & Arnold, J. A. (2001). Distributive spirals: Negotiation impasses and the moderating role of disputant self-efficacy. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 84, 148–176.

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Hara, E. (2010). A little white lie in salary negotiation. Daily Worth. Retrieved from https://www.dailyworth.com/posts/456-salary-negotiation-post-retraction

  • Olekalns, M., Horan, C. J., & Smith, P. L. (2014a). Maybe it’s right, maybe it’s wrong: Structural and social determinants of deception in negotiation. Journal of Business Ethics, 122, 89–102.

    Google Scholar 

  • Olekalns, M., Kulik, C. T., & Chew, L. (2014b). Sweet little lies: Social context and the use of deception in negotiation. Journal of Business Ethics, 120, 13–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Olekalns, M., & Smith, P. L. (2007). Loose with the truth: Predicting deception in negotiation. Journal of Business Ethics, 76, 225–238.

    Google Scholar 

  • Olekalns, M., & Smith, P. L. (2009). Mutually dependent: Power, trust, affect and the use of deception in negotiation. Journal of Business Ethics, 85, 347–365.

    Google Scholar 

  • Paglis, L. L., & Green, S. G. (2002). Leadership self-efficacy and managers’ motivation for leading change. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 23, 215–235.

    Google Scholar 

  • Paternoster, R., & Simpson, S. (1996). Sanction threats and appeals to morality: Testing a rational choice model of corporate crime. Law & Society Review, 30, 549–584.

    Google Scholar 

  • Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. Behavior Research Methods, 40, 879–891.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reynolds, S. J. (2006). A neurocognitive model of the ethical decision-making process: Implications for study and practice. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91, 737–748.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reynolds, S. J. (2008). Moral attentiveness: Who pays attention to the moral aspects of life? Journal of Applied Psychology, 93, 1027–1041.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reynolds, S. J., & Ceranic, T. L. (2007). The effects of moral judgment and moral identity on moral behavior: An empirical examination of the moral individual. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92, 1610–1624.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reynolds, S. J., Leavitt, K., & DeCelles, K. A. (2010). Automatic ethics: The effects of implicit assumptions and contextual cues on moral behavior. Journal of Applied Psychology, 95, 752–760.

    Google Scholar 

  • Robinson, R. J., Lewicki, R. J., & Donahue, E. M. (2000). Extending and testing a five factor model of ethical and unethical bargaining tactics: Introducing the SINS scale. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 21, 649–664.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schweitzer, M. E., Brodt, S. E., & Croson, R. T. A. (2002). Seeing and believing: Visual access and the strategic use of deception. The International Journal of Conflict Management, 13, 258–375.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schweitzer, M. E., & Croson, R. (1999). Curtailing deception: The impact of direct questions on lies and omissions. The International Journal of Conflict Management, 10, 225–248.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schweitzer, M. E., DeChurch, L. A., & Gibson, D. E. (2005). Conflict frames and the use of deception: Are competitive negotiators less ethical? Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 35, 2123–2149.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schweitzer, M. E., Hershey, J. C., & Bradlow, E. T. (2006). Promises and lies: Restoring violated trust. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 10, 1–19.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schweitzer, M. E., & Hsee, C. K. (2002). Stretching the truth: Elastic justification and motivated communication of uncertain information. The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 25, 185–201.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shalvi, S., Dana, J., Handgraaf, M. J., & De Dreu, C. K. (2011). Justified ethicality: Observing desired counterfactuals modifies ethical perceptions and behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 115, 181–190.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sherer, M., Maddux, J. E., Mercandante, B., Prentice-Dunn, S., Jacobs, B., & Rogers, R. W. (1982). The Self-Efficacy Scale: Construction and validation. Psychological Reports, 51, 663–671.

    Google Scholar 

  • Steinel, W. (2015). Social value orientation and deception: Are proselfs liars? Current Opinion in Psychology, 6, 211–215.

    Google Scholar 

  • Steinel, W., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2004). Social motives and strategic misrepresentation in social decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 419–434.

    Google Scholar 

  • Steinel, W., Utz, S., & Koning, L. (2010). The good, the bad and the ugly thing to do when sharing information: Revealing, concealing and lying depend on social motivation, distribution and importance of information. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 113, 85–96.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sullivan, B. A., O’Connor, K. M., & Burris, E. R. (2006). Negotiator confidence: The impact of self-efficacy on tactics and outcomes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42, 567–581.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tenbrunsel, A. E. (1998). Misrepresentation and expectations of misrepresentation in an ethical dilemma: The role of incentives and temptation. Academy of Management Journal, 41, 330–339.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tierney, P., & Farmer, S. M. (2002). Creative self-efficacy: Its potential antecedents and relationship to creative performance. Academy of Management Journal, 45, 1137–1148.

    Google Scholar 

  • Treviño, L. K., & Weaver, G. R. (2003). Managing ethics in business organizations: Social scientific perspective. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Treviño, L. K., Weaver, G. R., & Reynolds, S. J. (2006). Behavioral ethics in organizations: A review. Journal of Management, 32, 951–990.

    Google Scholar 

  • Walumbwa, F. O., Mayer, D. M., Wang, P., Wang, H., Workman, K., & Christensen, A. L. (2011). Linking ethical leadership to employee performance: The roles of leader-member exchange, self-efficacy, and organizational identification. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 115, 204–213.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wang, C. S., Galinsky, A. D., & Murnighan, J. K. (2009). Bad drives psychological reactions, but good propels behavior: Responses to honesty and deception. Psychological Science, 20, 634–644.

    Google Scholar 

  • Warren, D. E., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2018). When lying does not pay: How experts detect insurance fraud. Journal of Business Ethics, 150, 711–726.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wasieleski, D. M., & Hayibor, S. (2008). Breaking the rules: Examining the facilitation effects of moral intensity characteristics on the recognition of rule violations. Journal of Business Ethics, 78, 275–289.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wasieleski, D. M., & Weber, J. (2009). Does job function influence ethical reasoning? An adapted Wason task application. Journal of Business Ethics, 85, 187–199.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weber, J. (1990). Managers’ moral reasoning: Assessing their responses to three moral dilemmas. Human Relations, 43, 687–702.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weber, J. (1996). Influences upon managerial moral decision making: Nature of the harm and magnitude of consequences. Human Relations, 49, 1–22.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weber, J., & Wasieleski, D. (2001). Investigating influences on managers’ moral reasoning: The impact of context and personal and organizational factors. Business and Society, 40, 79–110.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weber, J., & Wasieleski, D. M. (2013). Corporate ethics and compliance programs: A report, analysis and critique. Journal of Business Ethics, 112, 609–626.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yip, J. A., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2015). Trust promotes unethical behavior: Excessive trust, opportunistic exploitation, and strategic exploitation. Current Opinion in Psychology, 6, 216–220.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yip, J. A., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2016). Mad and misleading: Incidental anger promotes deception. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 137, 207–217.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zhao, H., Seibert, S. E., & Hills, G. E. (2005). The mediating role of self-efficacy in the development of entrepreneurial intentions. Journal of Applied Psychology, 90, 1265–1272.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

We thank Sargent Shriver, the Wharton Dean’s Fund, the QU School of Business Research Fund, and the Wharton Behavioral Laboratory for their support and assistance.

Funding

These studies were funded by the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania and the School of Business at Quinnipiac University.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of HMOL, School of Business, Quinnipiac University, 275 Mt. Carmel Ave., Hamden, CT, 06518, USA

    Joseph P. Gaspar

  2. Operations, Information, and Decisions Department, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 544 JMHH, Philadelphia, PA, 19104, USA

    Maurice E. Schweitzer

Authors
  1. Joseph P. Gaspar
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Maurice E. Schweitzer
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Joseph P. Gaspar.

Ethics declarations

Conflict of interest

All authors declare that he has no conflict of interest.

Ethical Approval

All procedures performed in studies involving human participants were in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and with the 1964 Helsinki Declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Appendices

Appendix A

Negotiation Aptitude Test (Negotiator Self-Efficacy Manipulation)

  1. 1.

    Imagine that you want to purchase a house that has a list price of $500,000, but comparable prices for homes range from $350,000 to $450,000. You can afford to pay $400,000. The housing market is rising (house prices are increasing), and there are three other buyers interested in the same house. Of the following options, which is best? a. Wait for another buyer to make an initial offer. b. Offer $400,000 before the other buyers make offers. c. Offer $350,000 before the other buyers make offers. d. Look for a different house that has fewer interested buyers.

  2. 2.

    Imagine that you want to buy a house that has a list price of $200,000, but comparable prices for homes range from $150,000 to $250,000. You can afford to pay $300,000. The housing market is falling (house prices are decreasing), and there are three other buyers interested in the same house. Of the following options, which is best? a. Wait for another buyer to make an initial offer. b. Make a full price offer of $200,000 before the other buyers make offers. c. Offer $150,000 before the other buyers make offers. d. Look for a different house that has fewer interested buyers.

  3. 3.

    Imagine you have been offered a new job. The company has offered you a salary of $70,000/year. New hires with similar experience, education, and skills are paid $75,000/year on average. If you do not take the new job, you will go back on the job market, and the unemployment rate is 10% (very high). You have no other outside options. Of the following choices, which is best? a. Tell the company you will only accept the job for $80,000/year. b. Tell the company you will only accept the job for $75,000/year. c. Accept the offer at $70,000/year. d. Reject the offer and go back on the job market.

  4. 4.

    Imagine you have been offered a new job. The company has offered you a salary of $70,000/year. New hires with similar experience, background, education, and skills are paid $75,000/year on average. If you do not take the new job, you will go back on the job market, and the unemployment rate is 1% (very low). You have no other outside options. Of the following choices, which is best? a. Tell the company you will only accept the job for $80,000/year. b. Tell the company you will only accept the job for $75,000/year. c. Accept the offer at $70,000/year. d. Reject the offer and go back on the job market.

  5. 5.

    Imagine that you are buying a new car. You have found the exact car that you want, and the dealer has it in stock. The list price is $35,000, and from your research the dealer invoice is $28,000. You really like this car, and you would be willing to pay up to $35,000 for it. You The Anxious Negotiator 40 suspect that other buyers are interested in this same car and that the dealership is not very eager to sell this car. What amount would you make for your first offer? a. $28 K b. $30 K c. $33 K d. Make the dealership offer the next price.

  6. 6.

    Imagine that you are buying a new car. You have found the exact car that you want, and the dealer has it in stock. The list price is $35,000, and from your research the dealer invoice is $28,000. You really like this car, and you would be willing to pay up to $35,000 for it. You suspect that other buyers are not interested in this same car and that the dealership is very eager to sell this car. What amount would you make for your first offer? a. $28 K b. $30 K c. $33 K d. Make the dealership offer the next price.

  7. 7.

    Imagine that you are organizing a large party. You are working with a caterer for a sit-down dinner for 200 people. The caterer is charging you $100 per person and asks you to commit to the exact number of guests. This caterer is the best in town. You can pay $20,000, but you would prefer to pay less. How would you respond to this caterer? a. Pay full price to ensure good service. b. Offer the caterer $80 per person and commit to 200 people. c. Offer the caterer $100 per person, but insist on paying for only the guests who show up. d. Shop for alternative caterers to use as competitive leverage.

  8. 8.

    Imagine that you are organizing a large party. You are working with a caterer for a sit-down dinner for 200 people. The caterer is charging you $100 per person and asks you to commit to the exact number of guests. This caterer is NOT the best in town. You can pay $20,000, but you would prefer to pay less. How would you respond to this caterer? a. Pay full price to ensure good service. b. Offer the caterer $80 per person and commit to 200 people. c. Offer the caterer $100 per person, but insist on paying for only the guests who show up. d. Shop for alternative caterers to use as competitive leverage.

  9. 9.

    Imagine you are getting married to the man or woman of your dreams. Your fiancé wants you to sign a prenuptial agreement before you wed because s/he is fairly wealthy. In the case of divorce, the prenuptial offer is to split your wealth and assets 80% for your spouse, 20% for you because that is the ratio of your current wealth. What should you do? a. Agree to sign the prenuptial agreement with the 80/20 division. b. Agree to sign the prenuptial agreement only with a 50/50 division of wealth and assets to be equitable. c. Consult with a lawyer and then make a counter-offer. The Anxious Negotiator 41 d. Refuse to sign the prenuptial agreement because marriage is about love, not material wealth.

  10. 10.

    To what extent are the following statements true? a. Almost always true b. Often true c. Rarely true -In general, it is better to live with some conflict. -Not all conflict needs to be managed. -In reality, most things in life are negotiable. -Many people are willing to provide the same goods or services for a lower price. -If you offer someone a low price, they are likely to provide worse service or get insulted. -When people say that a price is their absolute lowest price, they are telling the truth. Once people have their mind set on a certain deal, you cannot change their mind.

Appendix B

Ten-Item AND Four-Item Measures of Negotiator Self-Efficacy

O’Connor and Arnold’s (2001) ten-item measure of negotiator self-efficacy (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). Note: Items 4 and 10 are reverse-scored.

  1. 1.

    I feel confident that I can prevent the other negotiator from exploiting my weaknesses.

  2. 2.

    I am confident in my ability to perform effectively in this negotiation task.

  3. 3.

    I think I can reach a high level of performance in this negotiation.

  4. 4.

    I do not think I would feel confident in my ability to negotiate for my salary.

  5. 5.

    I am sure I can learn how to perform this negotiation effectively in a relatively short period of time.

  6. 6.

    I feel confident in my ability to negotiate effectively on this task.

  7. 7.

    I am certain that I can persuade the other negotiator to make most of the concessions.

  8. 8.

    I think I can convince the other negotiator to agree with me.

  9. 9.

    I am sure that I can gain the upper hand against the other negotiator.

  10. 10.

    I think the other negotiator would convince me to make more concessions.

Sullivan et al. (2006) four-item measure of negotiator self-efficacy (distributive; 0 = no confidence, 100 = full confidence).

  1. 1.

    Persuade the other negotiator to make most of the concessions

  2. 2.

    Convince the other negotiator to agree with you

  3. 3.

    Gain the upper hand against the other negotiator

  4. 4.

    Prevent the other negotiator from exploiting your weaknesses

Appendix C

Eight-Item Sins Scale

You will be asked to consider a list of tactics that negotiators sometimes use. You should consider these tactics in the context of a situation in which you will be negotiating for something which is very important to you and your business. For each tactic, you will be asked to indicate how likely you would be to use this tactic in this situation.

Please indicate the likelihood that you would use these tactics during your negotiation.

1 = not at all likely to 7 = very likely

  1. 1.

    Promise that good things will happen to your counterpart if he gives you what you want, even if you know that you can’t (or won’t) deliver these things when his cooperation is obtained.

  2. 2.

    Intentionally misrepresent information to your counterpart in order to strengthen your negotiation arguments or positions.

  3. 3.

    Make an opening demand that is far greater than what you really hope to settle for.

  4. 4.

    Convey a false impression that you are in absolutely no hurry to come to a negotiated agreement, thereby trying to put time pressure on your counterpart to concede quickly.

  5. 5.

    In return for concessions from your counterpart now, promise to make future concessions which you know you will not follow through on.

  6. 6.

    Deny the validity of information which your counterpart has that weakens your negotiating position, even though that information is true and valid.

  7. 7.

    Make an opening demand so extreme that it seriously undermines your counterpart’s confidence in his ability to negotiate a satisfactory settlement.

  8. 8.

    Guarantee that the rest of the managers and employees in your department, whom you represent in this negotiation, will uphold the settlement that you reach, although you know that they will likely violate the agreement later.

Appendix D

Study Material for iPod Negotiation Task

In this study, you and another participant will be randomly assigned to roles of Seller and Buyer and engage in an online negotiation simulation. If you and the other participant reach a deal, you will earn 5% of your profit from the deal at the end of the lab session. Please wait while role assignments are made.

You have been assigned to the role of: Seller219. The participant you will be negotiating with will play the role of: Buyer219

You have been assigned the role of Seller. Your task is to negotiate the sale of a used iPod (two years old, silver, 80G, w/case, headphones, and charger). You checked Craigslist, and saw that similar used iPods in good condition were selling for about $30-$70.

The iPod is in great working condition. The only problem you have had with it were two instances when the iPod froze. After freezing you could not get the device restarted until you found a fix online that involved resetting the factory defaults and as a result deleting all your music. Thankfully, you had all your songs on the hard-drive of your computer.

You listed the iPod on Craigslist. The listing is below. The Buyer you will negotiate with will also see this listing.

figure b

You will now begin negotiating the sale of the iPod with the other participant. The negotiation will begin with the other participant contacting you using the chat feature of the experimental software in order to begin the discussion and learn more about the item.

You will only have a limited amount of time to chat. When the time to chat runs out, you will have an opportunity to exchange offers.

You have a message from Buyer219.

Buyer219: ok, I guess I’m supposed to go frist [sic]…so you’ve had the iPod for 2 years. it doesn’t have any problems, does it?

Seller219: [seller response]

Buyer219: ok. let me think about what I’d be willing to pay… they gave some other ads here that I am suposed [sic] to compare this one to

You will now make an offer. The number of rounds for exchanging offers in this negotiation is limited and uncertain. At some point, the negotiation will end with or without a deal.

Here is how each round works: Your counterpart will see your offer and compare it other ads that they have (their outside option). Your counterpart will then either accept your offer, reject your offer, or make a counteroffer. If you reach a deal, you will earn 5% of the sale price. If you do not reach a deal, you will earn $0.

Select Choice: $30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60, 65, 70

Your partner has accepted your offer of [selected offer inserted].

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Gaspar, J.P., Schweitzer, M. Confident and Cunning: Negotiator Self-Efficacy Promotes Deception in Negotiations. J Bus Ethics 171, 139–155 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04349-8

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04349-8

Keywords

Search

Navigation