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Ethics and Lobbying: The Case of Real Estate Brokerage

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Abstract

Members of licensed occupations benefit from legal standards that limit entry into their professions. Is it ethical for these professionals to give political support to these standards? I examined the case of real estate brokers and found that their educational requirements raise average commissions by one quarter of a percentage point, costing consumers $5.4 billion per year without improving the quality of brokerage services. The case raises interesting ethical issues which are difficult to resolve.

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Correspondence to David Barker.

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Barker, D. Ethics and Lobbying: The Case of Real Estate Brokerage. J Bus Ethics 80, 23–35 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-007-9434-0

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