Abstract
In the Meno, Phaedo, and Phaedrus, Plato outlines the controversial thesis of a priori knowledge that all learning is a form of recollection—anamnesis. He uses this as an argument for the immortality of the soul via reincarnation. Because of this latter claim, the thesis is widely mocked by contemporary evolutionarily-informed materialists. But we can safely reject the metaphysical claim without abandoning the insight of the epistemological one. And indeed, modern evolutionary theory can explain how learning—at least of the sort that depends on certain a priori concepts—can be a kind of recollection. Through this metaphor, natural selection is a process by which information about the world is transmitted across time. When we learn by reasoning about a priori knowledge, then, we in an important sense rely on information in our genomes—if not our souls—information acquired by the process of natural selection—if not conscious acquisition. Thinking of a priori knowledge with the metaphor of anamnesis elucidates two essential features of the relationship between epistemology and ontology. First, it emphasizes that there is necessarily a time-delay between our a priori knowledge and the universe to which it bears a relationship, if any. Second, it clarifies that a priori knowledge is knowledge that enhances reproductive fitness—which could well be because it reflects ontology faithfully, but could as easily be a kind of innate nominalism.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Especially as for some of these more complex behaviors, such as avian migration, there’s a great deal of scientific controversy over whether they are straightforwardly “genetic” or better accounted for with a more complex evolutionary development perspective that includes substantial contingent environmental components (Carroll 2008). However, the point here is simply the less controversial observation that these behaviors have unconscious informational content and arose by natural selection (Rappole 2013). For discussion of the mechanism by which this information is transmitted across generations, see below, Sect. 6, and footnote 2 in particular.
In recent years, there has been growing controversy in biology and the philosophy of science over the extent to which DNA and in particular coding genetic sequences are primary mechanisms of the transmission of information across generations. In light of discoveries on the extent to which phenotypic expression depends on “epigenetic” (or non-DNA, at least non-coding DNA) molecules (including RNA and protein) and regulatory mechanisms, some have argued for a “post-genomic” paradigm that understands information to be transmitted through complex, interrelated, genetic and epigenetic means (Stotz and Griffiths 2013; Pradeu 2016). Baetu, for instance, defends a non-reductionist view of biological information in which genes are understood to be a part of the informational content of deterministic, heritable “genomic programs” that depend also on epigenetic mechanisms (Baetu 2012). Others continue to defend the causative primacy of the information contained in DNA sequences (Weber 2016; Kjosavik 2014; Waters 2007). The precise causal relationship between genetic and epigenetic forms of information storage and transmission are beside the point here—the argument requires only that there be relatively stable, heritable, materialistic media of biological information, whether simple (as the traditional view of DNA syntax as biological information) or more complex (as multi-level genomic programs). I primarily refer here to “genomes” and the informational content of DNA syntax for simplicity and familiarity, but nothing would change philosophically to substitute “genomic program” for “genome.”
References
Åkesson S, Helm B (2020) Endogenous programs and flexibility in bird migration. Front Ecol Evol 8:1–20. https://doi.org/10.3389/fevo.2020.00078
Baetu TM (2012) Genomic programs as mechanism schemas: a non-reductionist interpretation. Br J Philos 63:649–671
Bargh JA, Morsella E (2008) The unconscious mind. Perspect Psychol Sci 3:73–79. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00064.x
Bealer G (1992) The incoherence of empiricism. Proc Aristot Soc Supp Vol 66:99–143. https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteliansupp/66.1.99
Bennett K (2020) Environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA). In: Zeigler-Hill V, Shackelford TK (eds) Encyclopedia of personality and individual differences. Springer, New York
Besson C (2008) Logical knowledge and Gettier cases. Philos Q 59:1–19. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.565.x
Boghossian P (2021) Normative principles are synthetic a Priori. Episteme 18:367–383. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2021.32
Caporale LH, Doyle J (2013) In Darwinian evolution, feedback from natural selection leads to biased mutations. Ann NY Acad Sci 1305:18–28. https://doi.org/10.1111/nyas.12235
Carey S (1998) Knowledge of number: its evolution and ontogeny. Science 282:641–642. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.282.5389.641
Carroll SB (2008) Evo-devo and an expanding evolutionary synthesis: a genetic theory of morphological evolution. Cell 134:25–36. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cell.2008.06.030
Chisholm R (1977) Theory of Knowledge, 2nd edn. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs
Chompsky N (1986) Knowledge of language: its nature, origin, and use. Praeger, Westport
Cobb W (1973) Anamnesis: platonic doctrine or Sophistic Absurdity? Dialogue 12:604–628. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217300028079
Cofnas N (2016) A teleofunctional account of evolutionary mismatch. Biol Philos 31:507–525. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-016-9527-1
Cottingham J (1988) The rationalists. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Darwin C (2003) The origin of species: 150th Anniversary Edition. Signet, New York
Dawkins R (1983) Adaptationism was always predictive and needed no defense. Behav Brain Sci 6:360–361. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00016447
Dennett DC (1995) Darwin’s dangerous idea: evolution and the meanings of life. Simon & Schuster, New York
Doolittle WF (2013) Is junk DNA bunk? A critique of ENCODE. PNAS 110:5294–5300. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1221376110
Eddy SR (2013) The ENCODE project: missteps overshadowing a success. Curr Biol 23:R259–R261. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2013.03.023
Fine G (1992) Inquiry in the Meno. In: Kraut R (ed) The Cambridge companion to plato. Cambridge University Press, New York, p 214
Frank SA (2009) Natural selection maximizes Fisher information. J Evol Biol 22:231–244. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1420-9101.2008.01647.x
Frank SA (2012) How to read the fundamental equations of evolutionary change in terms of information theory. J Evol Biol 25:2377–2396. https://doi.org/10.1111/jeb.12010
Geisler WS, Diehl RL (2003) A Bayesian approach to the evolution of perceptual and cognitive systems. Cogn Sci 27:379–402. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog2703_3
Ghiselin MT (1973) Darwin and evolutionary psychology: Darwin initiated a radically new way of studying behavior. Science 179:964–968. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.179.4077.964
Gontier N, Bradie M (2021) Evolutionary epistemology: two research avenues, three schools, and a single and Shared Agenda. J Gen Philos Sci 52:197–209. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-021-09563-5
Gould SJ, Vrba ES (1982) Exaptation; a missing term in the science of form. Paleobiology 8:4–15
Grafen A (2015) Biological fitness and the fundamental theorem of natural selection. Am Nat 186:1–14. https://doi.org/10.1086/681585
Harden KP (2021) The genetic lottery: why DNA matters for social equality. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Hogeweg P (2011) The roots of bioinformatics in theoretical biology. PLoS Comput Biol 7:e1002021. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002021
Holyoak K, Morrison R (2005) The Cambridge Handbook of thinking and reasoning. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Hood L, Galas D (2003) The digital code of DNA. Nature 421:444–448. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature01410
Kitcher P (1980) A priori knowledge. Philos Rev 89:3–23. https://doi.org/10.2307/2184861
Kjosavik F (2014) Genes, structuring powers and the flow of information in living systems. Biol Philos 29:379–394. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-013-9407-x
Lehar S (2003) Gestalt isomorphism and the primacy of subjective conscious experience: a gestalt bubble model. Behav Brain Sci 26:375–444. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x03000098
Lohmann KJ (2018) Animal migration research takes wing. Curr Biol 28:R952. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2018.08.016
Mark JT, Marion BB, Hoffman DD (2010) Natural selection and veridical perceptions. J Theor Biol 266:504–515. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.07.020
Marshall C (2013) Kant’s one self and the Appearance/Thing-in-itself distinction. Kant-Studien 104:421–441. https://doi.org/10.1515/kant-2013-0028
Mayr E (1983) How to carry out the Adaptationist Program? Am Nat. https://doi.org/10.1086/284064
McCoy J (2011) Re-examining recollection: the platonic account of learning. Int Philos Q 51:451–466. https://doi.org/10.5840/ipq201151448
Meyers RG (2006) Understanding empiricism. Routledge, London
Millikan RG (1984) Language, thought, and other biological categories: new foundations for realism. MIT Press, Cambridge
Mouritsen H (2018) Long-distance navigation and magnetoreception in migratory animals. Nature 558:50–59. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-018-0176-1
Pinker S (1994) The language instinct: how the mind creates Language. William Morrow & Co, New York
Pinker S (1997) How the mind works. Norton, New York
Pradeu T (2016) Toolbox murders: putting genes in their epigenetic and ecological contexts. Biol Philos 31:125–142
Rappole JH (2013) The avian migrant: the biology of bird migration. Columbia University Press, New York
Ridley M (1999) Genome: the autobiography of a Species in 23 chapters. HarperCollins, New York
Rousseau M (1981) Recollection as Realization—Re-mythologizing Plato. Rev Metaphys 35:37–48
Russell G (2008) Truth in virtue of meaning: a defense of the analytic/synthetic distinction. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Sandis C (2008) In defense of four socratic doctrines. Think Philos For Everyone 6:85–98. https://doi.org/10.1017/S147717560000302X
Sarkar S (2013) Does ‘Information’ provide a compelling Framework for a theory of natural selection? Grounds for caution. Philos Sci 81:22–30. https://doi.org/10.1086/674204
Stotz K, Griffiths P (2013) Genetics and philosophy: an introduction. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Summerfield DM (1991) Modest a priori knowledge. Philol Phenom Res 51:39–66. https://doi.org/10.2307/2107819
Sznycer D, Cosmides L, Tooby J (2017) Adaptationism carves emotions at their functional joints. Psychol Inq 28:56–62. https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2017.1256132
Tooby J, Cosmides L (1992) The psychological foundations of culture. In: Barkow J, Cosmides L, Tooby J (eds) The adapted mind. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 19–136
Varella MAC (2018) The biology and evolution of the three psychological tendencies to anthropomorphize biology and evolution. Front Psychol 9:1839. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01839
Vollmer G (2004) New arguments in evolutionary epistemology. Ludus Vitalis 12:197–212
Waters CK (2007) Causes that make a difference. J Philos 104:551–579. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2007104111
Weber M (2016) Which kind of causal specificity matters biologically? Philos Sci 84:574–585. https://doi.org/10.1086/692148
Whitehead AN (1979) Process and reality. Free Press, New York
Williams GC (1992) Natural selection: domains, levels, and challenges. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Wilson DS (2015) Quality of life from an evolutionary perspective. App Res Q Life 11:s331-342. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11482-014-9341-3
Wiltschko R, Wiltschko W (2009) Avian navigation. The Auk 126:717–743. https://doi.org/10.1525/auk.2009.11009
Zagzebski L (1994) The inescapability of gettier problems. Philos Q 44:65–73. https://doi.org/10.2307/2220147
Zhegunov G (2012) The dual nature of life: interplay of the individual and the genome. Springer, New York, pp 251–258
Zoeller G (1989) From innate to ‘a priori’: Kant’s radical transformation of a Cartesian-Leibnizian legacy. The Monist 72:222–235
Bourrat P & Griffiths PE (ahead of print 2021) The idea of mismatch in evolutionary medicine. Br J Philos Sci
Faye J (2016) In defense of nominalism. In: Experience and beyond. Palgrave Macmillan, New York
Gregory RT (ed) (2011) The evolution of the genome. Elsevier, Amsterdam
Ichikawa JJ, Steup M (2017) The analysis of knowledge. In: Zalta EN (ed) Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/
Ritter J (2015) Homecoming. In: Sermon on the rocks. Duchamp, inc., New York
Ruse M (ed) (2021) Philosophy after Darwin: classic and contemporary readings, 2nd edn. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Samet J (2019) The Historical controversies surrounding innateness. In: Zalta EN (ed), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/innateness-history/
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
About this article
Cite this article
Toomey, J. Evolutionary anamnesis. Biol Philos 37, 56 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-022-09886-7
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-022-09886-7