Abstract
The supporters of Indeterminate Futurism Theory [IFT] suggest three different reasons for preferring their view over Growing Block Theory [GBT]. If compared to GBT, IFT offers a better account for the open future problem, our cognitive attitudes towards future contingents, and how open the future is. Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker disagrees with them, stating that the advantages suggested by IFT's supporters are not advantages at all and/or can be accommodated by GBT. This means that, if he is right, there is no reason to prefer IFT over GBT. However, if we prove the feasibility of (at least) one of the supposed advantages of IFT, Longenecker should admit that the game between IFT and GBT could still be open. Here, we focus on our cognitive attitudes towards future, with the aim of showing that the explanation of such attitudes may be a string to IFT's bow, as Ross Cameron suggests.
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Tambassi, T. On Future Ontology: A Reply to Longenecker. Axiomathes 32, 169–172 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09518-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09518-3