Abstract
We define a formal semantics of conditionals based on normatively ideal worlds. Such worlds are described informally by Armgardt (Gabbay D, Magnani L, Park W, Pietarinen A-V (eds) Natural arguments: a tribute to john woods, College Publications, London, pp 699–708, 2018) to address well-known problems of the counterfactual approach to causation. Drawing on Armgardt’s proposal, we use iterated conditionals in order to analyse causal relations in scenarios of multi-agent interaction. This results in a refined counterfactual approach to causal responsibility in legal contexts, which solves overdetermination problems in an intuitively accessible manner.
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Notes
On the latter definition, the set of overdetermining causes qualifies as a cause, but the members of such a set do not (Andreas and Günther 2021a).
We say that Bob’s omission and the Queen’s omission, respectively, are causes of the plant’s death. But only Bob’s omission is causally responsible for its death. McGrath (2005) has a stricter view on causation: an omission is a cause only if some norm is violated. She thinks Bob’s failure to water the plant is a cause of its death, while the Queen’s omission to water the plant is not. Note that she thereby does not preserve the verdicts of the simple counterfactual test even though she treats events and absences on a par.
Braham and van Hees (2009) have shown how degrees of causal contribution may be formally distinguished using what is called the NESS test for causation. NESS stands for necessary element of a sufficient set, sufficient to bring about a certain effect. Our motivation for a counterfactual approach to distinguishing individual causal contributions is rooted in the observation that the but-for test for causation is better known among scholars and practitioners of law than the NESS test.
Recall that the qualification other things being equal is built into the semantics of counterfactuals by some ordering of similarity or relevance.
Again, it is worth noting that collective actions may also be captured along the lines of the NESS test, as shown by Braham and van Hees (2018).
On the latter definition, the set of overdetermining causes qualifies as a cause, but the members of such a set do not (Andreas and Günther 2021a).
Unlike the Halpern–Pearl definitions of causation, our analysis does not fully solve the problem of preemption. While the genuine cause is counted as a cause, the preempted ‘cause’ is wrongly counted as a cause as well. We plan to remedy this situation in future work.
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Andreas, H., Armgardt, M. & Gunther, M. Counterfactuals for causal responsibility in legal contexts. Artif Intell Law 31, 115–132 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-021-09307-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-021-09307-2