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Leonard Nelson: A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies

Translated by Fernando Leal and David Carus (Argumentation Library, Vol. 26) Springer, Cham, Switzerland, 2016, vi + 211 pp

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Notes

  1. For the history of this term, Leal cites the monograph (Birken-Bertsch 2006), which is unavailable in English, but see (Pozzo 2008).

  2. ‘Although I had to resist the temptation to change Nelson’s diagrams to make them even more similar to modern usages, arrows were added to indicate the direction of the reasoning involved’ (p. 14, emphasis in original).

  3. For the French logician Robert Blanché whose version of the hexagon is best known. However, Blanché was anticipated by his fellow countryman Augustin Sesmat and by the American Paul Jacoby (Jacoby 1950). Earlier versions of the hexagon may yet be uncovered. As one commentator has observed, ‘Blanché’s hexagon was up to very recently part of an esoteric folklore’ (Béziau 2012, p. 2).

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  1. Florida Institute of Technology, Melbourne, FL, USA

    Andrew Aberdein

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Aberdein, A. Leonard Nelson: A Theory of Philosophical Fallacies. Argumentation 31, 455–461 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-016-9398-2

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