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Judiciaries in corrupt societies

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Abstract

Recent empirical work shows that judicial dependence can explain high levels of corruption. This paper examines how the dependence of judiciaries influences corruption at different levels of the government in a model where the central government, low-level officials, and the judiciary are corrupt. In the model, the central government sells offices to low-level officials and demands ex-post payments enforced by the judiciary. Because an independent judiciary can rule against the central authority and accept bribes from stealing low-level officials, it reduces corruption at the higher level of government but promotes corruption at the lower level. Therefore, even if highly corrupt, an independent judiciary may reduce total corruption.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Stockholm University, 106 91, Stockholm, Sweden

    Mikael Priks

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  1. Mikael Priks
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Correspondence to Mikael Priks.

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I wish to thank Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, Fredrik Andersson, Stefano Della Vigna, Rafael Di Tella, Nicola Gennaioli, Edward Glaeser, Bengt Holmström, Sten Nyberg, Torsten Persson, Per Pettersson-Lidbom, Ilia Rainer, Jesper Roine, Andrei Shleifer, Stergios Skaperdas, David Strömberg, Jenny Säve-Söderbergh, Jean Tirole, Francesco Trebbi, Thierry Verdier, Hans Wijkander and seminar participants at Harvard University, Stockholm University, the Stockholm School of Economics, the Institute for Industrial Research in Stockholm, the University of Munich, NUI at Maynooth and the CEU Workshop in Budapest on Comparative Institutional Economics for their helpful comments.

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Priks, M. Judiciaries in corrupt societies. Econ Gov 12, 75–88 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-010-0082-y

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