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Democracy, autocracy and the likelihood of international conflict

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Abstract

This is a game-theoretic analysis of the link between regime type and international conflict. Democratic leaders can credibly be punished for bad conflict outcomes, whereas autocratic leaders cannot. Due to the fear of being thrown out of office, democratic leaders are (i) more selective about the wars they initiate and (ii) on average win more of the wars they start. Foreign policy behaviour is found to display strategic complementarities. Therefore, the likelihood of interstate war is lowest in the democratic dyad (pair), highest in the autocratic dyad with the mixed dyad in between. The results are consistent with empirical findings.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), P.O. Box 55665, 102 15, Stockholm, Sweden

    Thomas P. Tangerås

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  1. Thomas P. Tangerås
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Correspondence to Thomas P. Tangerås.

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I am indebted to Harry Flam, Joseph Harrington, Johan Stennek, Robert Dur (the editor) and two anonymous referees as well as seminar participants at IFN and University of Sydney for their helpful comments and to Christina Lönnblad for editorial assistance.

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Tangerås, T.P. Democracy, autocracy and the likelihood of international conflict. Econ Gov 10, 99–117 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-008-0055-6

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