This paper addresses two very old issues in human society: espionage and double crossing. Our major conclusion points out that there will be a serious over rewarding problem in the direct mechanism due to double crossing in espionage, and a competitive mechanism with a relative performance regime can possibly mitigate the over rewarding problem and still extract the information.
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Ho, S.J. Extracting the information: espionage with double crossing. J Econ 93, 31–58 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-007-0290-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-007-0290-2