Skip to main content
Log in

The conscious experience of action and intention

  • Research Note
  • Published:
Experimental Brain Research Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The neural signals that give rise to our experience of the actions we perform are not well understood. Obhi et al. (Cognition 110:65–73, 2009) proposed that both efferent and re-afferent signals contribute to the conscious awareness of intentional actions. We further highlight the role of these signals in the awareness of our actions and the intention to perform these actions. We obtained temporal judgments of movement onset and the intention to execute finger and toe movements. This enabled us to compare our results with predictions corresponding to the conduction length of either effector. Our results confirm the findings of Obhi et al. (Cognition 110:65–73, 2009) that both efferent and re-afferent signals contribute to the awareness of planned actions and suggest that these signals may also play a role in our experience of our intention to perform an action.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Searle (1983) distinguished two forms of intention, ‘intention-in-action’ and ‘prior intention’, to refer to the necessary antecedents for a specific action and pre-meditated intentions that may or may not be carried out, respectively. Here we restrict ourselves to intention-in-action.

References

  • Bard C, Paillard J, Teasdale N, Fleury M, Lajoie Y (1991) Selfinduced versus reactive triggering of synchronous hand and heel movement in young and old subjects. Kluwer/Plenum, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Blakemore S, Wolpert DM, Frith CD (2002) Abnormalities in the awareness of action. Trends Cogn Sci 6(6):237–242

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Brass M, Haggard P (2008a) To do or not to do? The neural signature of self-control. J Neurosci 27(34):9141–9145

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brass M, Haggard P (2008b) The what, where, whether model of intentional action. Neuroscientist 14:319–325

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Colebatch JG (2007) Bereitschaftspotential and movement-related potentials: origin, significance, and application in disorders of human movement. Mov Disord 22(5):601–610

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Deecke L (1990) Electrophysiological correlates of movement preparation. Rev Neurol 146(10):612–619

    PubMed  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Haggard P (2005) Conscious intention and motor cognition. Trends Cogn Sci 6:290–295

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Haggard P (2008) Human volition: towards a neuroscience of will. Nat Rev Neurosci 9:934–946

    Article  PubMed  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Haggard P, Eimer M (1999) On the relation between brain potentials and the awareness of voluntary movements. Exp Brain Res 126(1):128–133

    Article  PubMed  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Libet B, Gleason CA, Wright EW, Pearl DK (1983) Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain 106(Pt 3):623–642

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Matsuhashi M, Hallett M (2008) The timing of conscious intention. Eur J Neurosci 28(11):2344–2351

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Obhi SS (2007) Evidence for feedback dependent conscious awareness of action. Brain Res 1161:88–94

    Article  PubMed  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Obhi SS, Planetta JP, Scantlebury J (2009) On the signals underlying conscious awareness of action. Cognition 110:65–73

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Sarrazin JC, Cleeremans A, Haggard P (2008) How do we know what we are doing? Time, intention and awareness of action. Conscious Cogn 17:602–615

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Shibasaki H, Hallett M (2006) What is the Bereitschaftspotential? Clin Neurophysiol 117:2341–2356

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Soon CS, Brass M, Heinze HJ, Haynes JD (2008) Unconscious determinants of free decisions in the brain. Nat Neurosci 11(5):543–545

    Article  PubMed  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Stenneken P, Aschersleben G, Cole J, Prinz W (2002) Self-induced versus reactive triggering of synchronous movements in a deafferented patient and control subjects. Psychol Res 66(1):40–49

    Article  PubMed  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Wolpert DM, Ghahramani Z (2000) Computational principles of movement neuroscience. Nat Neurosci 3(Suppl):1212–1217

    Article  PubMed  CAS  Google Scholar 

  • Wolpert DM, Miall RC (1996) Forward models for physiological motor control. Neural Netw 9(8):1265–1279

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by a discovery grant from the Natural Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada awarded to SSO, and infrastructure provided by funding from the Canadian Foundation for Innovation (to SSO).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Sukhvinder Singh Obhi.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Strother, L., Obhi, S.S. The conscious experience of action and intention. Exp Brain Res 198, 535–539 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00221-009-1946-7

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00221-009-1946-7

Keywords

Navigation