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Politics and economics

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The Review of Black Political Economy

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Notes

  1. See “Harrowing Week-Long Race to Rescue Continental Bank,”New York Times, May 21, 1984, p. 1 ff.

  2. See Sam Peltzman, “Towards a More General Theory of Regulation,”Journal of Law and Economics 19 (August 1976): 211–40; Anne O. Krueger, “The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society,” in James Buchanan and Roger Tollison, eds.,Towards a Theory of the Rent Seeking Society (Texas A&M University, 1980), pp. 51–70.

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  3. For discussions of these issues, compare Anthony Downs,An Economic theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957); Robert Axelrod, “Where the Votes Come From: An Analysis of Electoral Coalitions, 1952-68,”American Political Science Review 66 (March, 1972): 11–20; Kenneth A. Shepsley, “The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition,”American Political Science Review 66 (June 1972): 555–569.

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  4. New York: Random House, 1972.

  5. For an illuminating account of U.S. government subsidies to overseas sales of U.S. industry, particularly aircraft makers, see David Baron,The Export-Import Bank (New York, Academic Press, 1983).

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  6. Krueger,loc. cit.

  7. Thomas Gale Moore, “The Beneficiaries of Trucking Regulation,”Journal of Law and Economics 21 (October, 1978): 327–43.

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  8. Ibid.

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  9. Interstate Commerce Commission, Ex Parte MC-150 (Sub No. 1),Report on Minority Participation in the Surface Transportation Industry, Washington, D.C., August 7, 1981, Executive Summary paragraph 3, and Appendix A paragraph 2.

  10. See the graphic description of life in rural America and the political battles in the Texas legislature in Robert A. Caro,The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), especially chap. 18.

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  11. Caro presents an interesting example. The Brown brothers (of Brown and Root) were ideologically closer to John Nance Garner than to Franklin Roosevelt in the 1940 contest for the Democratic nomination, but they supported Roosevelt because they would reap a larger regard if he were to be nominated and reelected. See, Caro,ibid., chapter 30.

  12. Robert L. Bish,The Public Economy of Metropolitan Areas (Chicago: Markham, chaps. 2 and 3).

  13. This argument is not quite correct as stated. Politicans will act in the way portrayed if they are simply majority maximizers, which is different than forming a winning coalition. A candidate with a large majority who feels strongly about an issue might be willing to sacrifice some of that majority to take the side to which he is most sympathetic. For a discussion and criticism of the capture approach to economic regulation, see Marcus Alexis, “The Applied Theory of Regulation: Political Economy at the Interstate Commerce Commission,”Public Choice 39 (1982): 5–27.

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  14. Marcus Alexis, “The Economic Status of Blacks and Whites,”American Economic Review 68 (May 1978): 179–85.

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  15. “Black Wards Win Registration Race, Study Says,”Chicago Tribune, May 28, 1984, section 1, p. 9.

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Authors
  1. Marcus Alexis
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Alexis, M. Politics and economics. Rev Black Polit Econ 13, 9–24 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02903765

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