Abstract
Collusive Intra-Industry Trade in Identical Commodities. — A homogenous-goods Cournot model with two countries and two firms is analyzed. Firms may collude by monopolizing their domestic markets, but they may also engage in collusive intra-industry trade. It turns out that, though such trade is costly because of transportation costs, firms might indeed trade since this enlarges the scope of successful collusion. Hence, intra-industry trade in homogenous goods is not a reliable indicator of competition.
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