Notes
“The one opinion is universal, the other is concerned with the particular facts, and here we come to something within the sphere of perception; when a single opinion results from the two, the soul must in one type of case [Translator's note: i.e. in scientific reasoning affirm the conclusion, while in the case of opinions concerned with production if must immediately act (e.g. if ‘everything sweet ought to be tasted’ and ‘this is sweet,’ in the sence of being one of the particular sweet things, the man who can act and is not prevented must at the same time actually act accordingly). When, then, the universal opinion is present in us forbidding us to taste, and there is also the opinion that ‘everything sweet is pleasant’, and that ‘this is sweet’ (now this is the opinion that is active [Translator's note: i.e. determines action]), and when appetite happens to be present in us, the one opinion bids us avoid the subject, but appetite leads us towards if (for it can move each of our bodily parts); so that it turns out that a man behaves incotinently under the influence (in a sense) of a rule and an opinion, and of one not contrary in itself, but only incidentally-for the appetite is contrary, not the opinion-to the right rule.” Aristotle,Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. VII; Ch. 3, 1147a25–1147b2, translated by Sir David Ross and quoted fromThe Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon, and published by Random House, New York, 1941. I have emphasized the kinship of my analysis with Kant's moral philosophy in “Language, Rules and Behavior”, printed inJohn Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom, a volume of essays edited by Sidney Hook, and published by the Dial Press, New York, 1950.
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Sellars, W. Obligation and motivation. Philos Stud 2, 21–25 (1951). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02199418
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02199418