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Notes
Louis E. Loeb, ‘Causal Theories and Causal Overdetermination’,The Journal of Philosophy LXXI (1974), 525–544.
John O'Connor, ‘Causal Overdetermination and Counterfactuals’,Philosophical Studies 29 (1976), 275–277.
More precisely, this is my analysis of ‘a is a C-condition ofb’ given the following assumption: “LetX be anynon-simultaneous-disjunction of events such thatb depends counterfactually onX. Letx be any disjunct inX. Then we assume that there exists at least onesimultaneous-disjunction of eventsD in whichx is a disjunct and such thatb depends counterfactually onD.” (Loeb,op. cit., p. 542.) This assumption is irrelevant to the issue between O'Connor and myself.Cf. O'Connor,op. cit., p. 276. Obviously, (i) is an extension of David Lewis' analysis of causation. See his ‘Causation’,The Journal of Philosophy LXX (1973), 556–567.
Cf. Loeb,op. cit., p. 542.
O'Connor,op. cit., p. 276.
Ibid.
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I am grateful to Fred Schmitt for helpful comments.
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Loeb, L.E. Causal overdetermination and counterfactuals revisited. Philos Stud 31, 211–214 (1977). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01855295
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01855295